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Summary
This thesis is both a conceptual analysis of securitization and an analysis of the 
political and societal security threats that plagued the Sukarno and Suharto regimes in 
Indonesia. It charts securitization’s place within the current security literature and 
examines the critiques of these sectors. It addresses the criticism that political 
security is too broad and lacking a distinct identity of its own. Using the work of 
Alagappa and Ayoob allows us to expand our understanding of political 
securitization, the nature of the threats to the sector, define a clear referent object, and 
apply securitization logic to the study of authoritarian regimes. Secondly, with 
respect to societal securitisation, this dissertation will develop the current literature to 
incorporate social psychology theory, which provides us with a clearer understanding 
of not only how and why social groups, and thus social identities, form but also why it 
is people need these groups in the first place, and also why inter group conflict can 
occur. This in turn provides a more robust conception of societal security. The thesis 
then uses these operationalised security concepts and uses them to analyse post­
colonial Indonesia. It argues that the central principles of both the Sukarno and 
Suharto political regimes had within their guiding principles the antecedents that 
would lead to their ultimate failure. It also argues that the oppressive policies of the 
New Order towards ethnic minorities, rather than destroying the targeted groups 
actually defined and strengthened notions of what it was to be Indonesian.
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Introduction
Strategic Vs. Security Studies
This thesis is based within the area of International Relations known as security 
studies. Since its conception in the aftermath of World War One International 
Relations has been preoccupied with the question of war, or more importantly why 
wars occur and how we can prevent them? Over the intervening 80 years or so the 
discipline has diversified to examine virtually every aspect o f human interaction and 
behaviour, leaving the issue of conflict to be examined by Strategic and Security 
Studies. However, the difference between these two disciplines is something that 
should be examined.
Strategic and security studies first truly emerged from under the umbrella of IR 
as disciplines in their own right in the 1950s and 60s. Strategic Studies is concerned 
with how actors, predominantly government/state elites, think about and use force 
during peace or war. It looks at how force is used to promote the safety (or security) 
of the unit. By contrast Security Studies looks at how the unit defines “safety”, it 
looks at what is constituted to be a threat, and what options the unit considers as being 
suitable to resolve it. So the primary difference between the two disciplines is that 
whilst strategic studies is concerned with how force is deployed and utilised, security 
studies is also concerned with why the force is being deployed, or more specifically 
what it is being deployed against. A further distinction is that security studies is also 
concerned with wider issues such as the environment or the economy, which are
1
considered to be equally significant but rarely involve the use of actual “force”. In the 
aftermath of World War Two, with the deepening crisis between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and the increasingly complex nature of world politics it seemed that 
IR was being distracted from its roots, and in doing so diluting the academic 
possibilities for studying the issues surrounding conflict. Scholars like Bernard 
Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter and, in Britain, John Garnett were using the questions 
posed by strategic and security studies to refocus their minds back towards the key 
issues that were facing the Anglo-American governments of the day. This in turn led 
to the development of a substantial body of literature, and possibly even more 
importantly made a name for those researchers as being experts within the 
increasingly complex field of military affairs. As such it lead to their work becoming 
known by those in power, and therefore when the time came to re-evaluate nuclear 
strategy and your foreign policy agendas, these ‘experts’ were called upon.
As one might imagine, during this period these Anglo-American dominated 
fields, became severely entwined as the interests and concerns of both groups of 
scholars overlapped. In this climate, the question of what was making Western states 
insecure was over-shadowed by the dominant and somewhat obvious threat of nuclear 
war. Even when non-nuclear/irregular problems presented themselves they were 
typically related to the greater strategic questions of the day, or they were deemed to 
be irrelevant or of lesser importance. As David Baldwin states: “If military force was 
relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not 
relevant, that issue was consigned to the category o f low politics.”1 However as we 
moved into the period known as the second Cold War in the late 1970s the
1 David A. Baldwin, ‘The Concept o f  Security” Review o f  International Studies Vol.23, N o .l (2001),
p.9
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assumptions of Strategic Studies began to unravel. Lawrence Freedman pinpoints that 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the eventual collapse of the USSR acted like a 
catalyst, leading to a disciplinary brain drain away from Strategic and towards 
Security studies. And as the Second Cold War finally came to its conclusion with the 
Velvet Revolutions and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, with it came the 
collapse o f a single strategic threat. And with this collapse came the emergence of a 
wider debate between strategic and security scholars. Whilst some saw the end of the 
Cold War as having no significant impact upon an international system that had been 
unchanged since World War Two2, others purported that the end o f the Cold War 
radically altered all of the questions that scholars have been asking, and also meant 
that it was necessary to rethink the answers that they already felt they had. Therefore 
the questions that the West had for so long found easy answers to now required re­
analysis. Some felt that “[the] state system [was] alive and well... [and] military 
competition between sovereign states will remain the distinguishable feature of 
international politics”4, and maintained that “strategic” questions should remain their 
primary concern. Others who had been considered strategic scholars now turned their 
hand to addressing these questions of security, and began new “risk assessments” o f 
this “New World Order”.5 The end of the Cold War provided a platform for security 
scholars to table their questions, without the concern that they were superfluous to the 
“larger” geo-political concerns of superpower relations. Previous assumptions
John Mearsheimer “Disorder Restored” in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (eds.) 
Rethinking A m erica’s Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1992) p.214; also cited in David A. Baldwin “Security Studies and the End o f  the Cold War” World 
Politics Vol. 48, No. 1, (1995) p .l 17.
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the 
New International Studies” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 37 (June 1993) p. 141
4 Mearsheimer “Disorder Restored” p.214 
For example Lawrence Freedman, “International Security: Changing Targets” Foreign Policy  N o.l 10
(1998) pp.48-63
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concerning force, power and insecurity were no longer sacrosanct. And this in turn 
meant that splits began to emerge within Security Studies.
The Traditional/Orthodox vision for Security Studies can be summed up by 
Stephen Walt who believes that it may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and 
control of military force, which should be examined in a positivist/empirical way.6 
He argued that Security Studies was “the study of the threat, use, and control of 
military force”.7 In this Walt is arguing for Strategic Studies with a few why questions 
thrown in. This is not to suggest that the whole orthodoxy was as dismissive o f 
change as Walt, and in fact Walt’s article provoked a considerable backlash from 
security scholars arguing for a less narrow approach to security analysis. Within the 
traditionalist camp there were those concerned with other problems that states face, 
however there was a debate as to whether these were dealt with within the realms of 
normal politics or not. They stipulate that Security should be confined within a 
narrow military definition in order to maintain its analytical validity. The 
traditionalist definition of security post-Cold War had not moved significantly away 
from the works o f the Strategic/Security thinkers of the 50s and 60s. The claim by 
Walter Lippmann in 1943 that “a state is secure only to the extent to which it is not in 
danger o f having to sacrifice core values, [and] if  it wishes be able, if challenged, to 
maintain them [values] by victory in such a war”8still held validity to Walt and his 
contemporaries. They still saw that to be secure was concerned with the ability of the
6 Stephen M. Walt, “The renaissance o f  Security Studies” International Studies Quarterly Vol.35, No.2
(1991) pp.211-239 
Ibid. p.212 (emphasis removed)
8 Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield o f  the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943) p.51 
(Emphasis added)
4
state to “protect internal values from external threats”.9 The orthodoxy sought to 
emphasise the dominance of an external orientated realist, or neo-realist, ontology of 
International Relations. Security was about stopping others from changing your 
personally chosen way of life. An outlook blatantly coloured by the American 
tradition and the experience/perceptions o f the Cold War.
Even from within the critics to W alt’s Renaissance article, there was still a 
considerable state-centric flavour. For example in his comprehensive critique of 
Walt’s, Edward A. Kolodziej argued against the dominance o f second and third level 
analysis, that is interstate conflict and the impact of the international system.10 
However, he stops short at arguing for a totally reductionist approach to the discipline 
and instead posits that intra-state conflict should be incorporated into security 
analysis. Therefore whilst he takes issue with Walt’s neo-realist leanings he does not 
quite break ranks from the realist paradigm entirely and embrace a radical rethink of 
security. For orthodox security studies it is the state and the military that lie at the 
heart of the questions concerning security and insecurity, and whilst there were efforts 
made to review these questions, the orthodoxy maintained their focus. The primacy 
of the state dominated their thinking, and the “state can have no higher goal than 
survival” 11, as such ultimately the sanctity of a states borders and the protection of its 
population remains the focus of analysis. Therefore because this is the remit of the 
military, military affairs too are the focus of security studies. Even with the 
advancement of ideas like Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and the 
alleged ‘Islamic threat’ posed to the western way o f life, this traditional view of
9 Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock, “National Security”, in David L. Sills (ed.), International 
Encyclopaedia o f  the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968) p.40
Edward A. Kolodziej, “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!” International Studies 
Quarterly V ol.36, N o.4 (Dec., 1992) pp.423-4
11 Mearsheimer, “Disorder Restored” p.222
security still carries a lot of weight, and has a prominent position both within the 
discipline and public policy. However even with its historically strong position, this 
is not to say that this was the only way to judge security, and challenges were being 
made.
Critical Security Studies
The traditionalist view has not gone uncontested, and numerous contending 
approaches emerged or were reintroduced to the discipline. These approaches come 
under the general heading Non-Traditional Security Studies, though this not a 
homogenous group and is in fact a very broad church. The first meaning of Non- 
Tradtitional Security Studies is that it is a group encompassing all o f those who, for 
whatever reasons, are critical o f the orthodox approach. The small ‘c ’ theorists’ 
concerns vary from those who wish to broaden our conception of security, that is, 
beyond the narrow state and military focus of the orthodoxy, to those who wish to 
deepen our notions o f what it is to be insecure. The second group of people who are 
typically labelled Critical Security Theorists, and they are so called because they seek 
to incorporate Critical Social Theory into the study of security. That is, they seek to 
propose an alternative to the epistemological, ontological and normative
• 19preconceptions of orthodox security studies. An orthodoxy that stipulates that the 
neorealist model o f ‘systemic stability’ is fundamental in ensuring security, a stability 
that is typically enforced with military means. Instead Capital ‘C’ Critical Security 
Studies, sometimes called the Welsh School13, argues that critical explorations of
12 E. Fuat Keyman, Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward Critical Social Theory o f  
International Relations (Atlantic Highlands, N ew  Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1997) 
P-4
The reason for it being labelled the Welsh School is due to the fact that much o f  the early work was 
carried out by scholars based in Aberystwyth. Not all security scholars who see themselves at 
belonging to the “Capital C” camp would embrace the label o f  “Welsh School” however I have chosen
6
security “have to start in our heads before they can take place in the world.” 14 Welsh 
School theorists believe that the focus should shift from state level politics towards 
that of the individual, and more specifically human emancipation. This is a view 
initially put forward by Ken Booth who states that:
Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those 
physical and human constraints which stop the carrying out what they would 
freely chose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together 
with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on... Emancipation, not 
power or order, produces true security.15 
Booth therefore argues that by looking at the constraints to individual freedoms 
instead of that which limits the power of the state, we will have a better, and wider, 
understanding of what is behind a given insecurity, and more importantly the 
strategies devised will be directed towards what he argues to be the real problem.
Another major problem that the Welsh School has with Orthodox Security 
Studies is in its positivist methodology. Instead they believe it is unrealistic to think 
that you can study the social world in an objective/empirical manner. Richard Wyn 
Jones interestingly cited that in fact the positivist attempts to emulate the natural 
sciences are outdated as they model their position on a Newtonian world rather than 
using modem Quantum Developments, ironically Jones uses science to attack the 
positivists scientific method.16 Jones cites Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle as a 
case and point. Heisenberg states that the act of observation changes the behaviour of
to use it as it is a useful term to distinguish between the two type o f  critical security scholars. For a 
more thorough explanation review Ken Booth (ed.) Critical Security Studies and World Politics 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005) pp-vii-ix.
14 Ken Booth, ‘‘Critical Explorations” in Ibid. p.3
15 Ken Booth “Security and Emancipation”, Review o f  International Studies Vol. 17, No.4 (1991) p .319
16 Richard Wyn Jones, "Travel without Maps': Thinking about Security after the Cold War' in Jane 
Davis (ed.), Security after the Cold War (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996) pp. 196-218.
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an object, therefore for example you can either know the speed of an electron, or its 
exact location but you cannot know both. This is because the act of measuring a 
particle’s speed effects its location, and finding its location affects its speed. In the 
social world we know that we act/behave differently when we are being watched, and 
also that we use our personal values as a filter when we interpret what we see. 
Therefore an observer will either affect the subject or alter the results from their 
purest form making objective/empirical study impossible. Jones concludes that in the 
current/Post Cold War environment the models and assumptions that had been 
established and used by traditional security and strategic studies to understand 
security issues were now obsolete, he believes that we are now travelling map free 
and stipulates that whilst most wander around aimlessly, Critical Security theories 
offer us a normatively given sense of direction. Jones believes that you can use the 
issue of Emancipation as a compass, which can be used to guide our learning, 
observations and interpretations. Also we will be able to use this direction will negate 
the sense of uncertainty and flux that we find ourselves in, both as academics and also 
within the physical reality of the world, and give us a sense of focus. It is here that I 
take issue with the Welsh School. Using Jones’ terms, an observer may have an 
effect on an object, but it is an unintentional and unfortunate side effect of the 
observation process. To attempt to influence the object is not the role of the Security 
Studies Scholar, rather it is to digest and attempt to understand what we see and 
comment upon it. Whilst I believe the intentions expressed by the Welsh School are 
morally applaudable, they are also inherently Western, and it is questionable as to 
exactly how valid the belief that such a culturally biased solution would be a better 
solution to our intellectual problems than the orthodoxy currently offers.
8
In recent years the notion of expanding, or arguably it would be more accurate 
to say reducing, the referent object to the Individual or smaller, minority groups 
within the state has continued with the development of Human Security. This is 
based around two clear reconceptions of insecurity: “[Firstly] safety from such 
chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. [And secondly] it means protection
9 91 7 rT-' *from sudden and harmful disruptions in patterns o f daily life.” This broad 
redefinition takes us away from the systemic approach of the traditionalists, instead 
looking at a much lower level of analysis. Human Security sees the individual as the 
focal point of study and therefore anything that is detrimental to an individual is a 
security threat, notably; economic, food/nutrition, health, environment, personal
18 i •safety, community integrity and the freedom from political oppression. This was 
summed up by Amitav Acharya as ‘freedom from want and freedom from fear’19. 
This discussion of how best to understand the assault on personal freedoms has been a 
contentious issue for many years, especially within the literature concerning the Third 
World. This is because of the more evident threats to human security within these 
regions of the globe. The debate however has not just raged over attempting to better 
define what it is that impinges on Third World citizens’ abilities to live a ‘secure’ life, 
but also in terms of an effective point o f analysis. Is the individual the best way to 
examine this issue, or is this reductionism inadequate for examining the complex 
security dynamics of the Third World?
17 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999 p.23 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/
18 This is not to suggest that the security scholar only reviews these issues at the micro-level, rather that 
by using the individual as the referent object it opens up a wider notion o f  what it is to be insecure. 
Through the analysis o f  the issue it is likely that one would look at other levels o f  analysis, for example 
in the case o f  the environment whilst one could begin by reviewing the impact o f climate change upon 
an individual and/or their local community, one would also need to address the wider regional and 
international implications o f the issue. I also would like to highlight that it is not from work on human 
security that thinking on insecurity in these other sectors originated, rather human security offers a 
framework with which one can broaden and deepen security analysis.
19 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West?” IDSS Working Paper 17 (Singapore: 
Institute o f  Defence and Strategic Studies, September 2001)
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Third World Security Studies
Third World security studies had a broader definition to insecurity long before 
the current debate. This is because they acknowledged that the realities of first or 
second world states, the main focus of the western literature, were very different to 
those of the third world. In 1987 Caroline Thomas became one of the first Western 
authors to introduce this perspective to the mainstream Security Studies literature. 
She stated that the issues that affected the Third World were not thermo nuclear war, 
rather “[it was] relative weakness, the lack of autonomy, the vulnerability and the lack 
of room for manoeuvre which third world states have on economic, political and of 
course military levels.”20 In the same way that the level of analysis for the Welsh 
school is different to the Orthodoxy, opting to focus predominantly on individuals, 
third world security studies sees insecurity as not only originating from the 
international system, but rather on the internal dynamics o f states and intra-state 
tensions. This alternative focus to security, lead to Third World Security scholars 
adopting and incorporating a wider range of theoretical concepts and methodologies. 
This broadening allowed the scholars to engage with non-traditional issues that, whilst 
they were not considered high politics in the developed world, had more resonance in 
the third world. For instance the environment, whilst it was being studied and 
engaged with by non-third world scholars, was still secondary to “hard” security 
issues. Third world security writers like Jessica Tuchman Mathews however saw the 
environment as having more significance. Tuchman Mathews states:
Environmental decline occasionally leads directly to conflict, especially when 
scarce water resources must be shared. Generally, however, its impact on
Caroline Thomas, In Search o f  Security: the Third World in International Relations (Boulder, CO: 
Rienner, 1987) p. 1
10
nations security is felt in the downward pull on economic performance and,
21therefore, on political stability.
This highlights two key trends in third world security, firstly that focusing on 
individual insecurities may be too narrow or reductionist to appreciate larger regional 
or global security problems. And secondly that many threats are not directly harmful 
in and of themselves, but rather in the effects they have elsewhere, for instance here in 
the economic and political realm. Therefore to focus on the international political 
system to provide security or emancipating individuals is at best irrelevant and at 
worst distracting from the real security threats to those in the third world, as these 
westernised attempts to secure do nothing to resolve the third world’s real problems. 
In the 1990s in the midst of the development and growth of alternative approaches to 
the study o f security, many scholars began to more explicitly examine the security 
concerns of the developing world. These studies varied from those who built upon 
the work of scholars like Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Caroline Thomas, to those 
who sort not to radically detract from the orthodox realist position. But rather more 
clearly understand how both internal and external factors directly effected the third 
world, an example of this approach is the work of Mohammed Ayoob.
In his 1995 text The Third World Security Predicament, Mohammed Ayoob
lays down a constructive critique to both the traditional and critical security studies
scholars. To the Traditionalists he argues that the majority o f the characteristics of
their literature are unsuited to discussing the dynamics of the third world. Especially
their external orientation, focus on systemic security and, even in the post Cold War, a
preoccupation with the issues regarding the two major alliance blocs o f the previous
21 Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “The Environment and International Security” in Michael T. Klare and 
Daniel C. Thomas (eds.) World Security: Trends and Challenges at C entury’s End (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1991) p.366
11
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50 years.22 Ayoob’s concerns are that these issues are of far less importance to third 
world states and so analysing them does little to shed light on, let alone resolve third 
world insecurities. Firstly Ayoob states that the problems that many developing states 
face are not external at all, but rather emerge from within their own borders, and those 
threats that do emerge in the external realm are actually instigated from problems 
within third world states. These threats tend to be in the form of civil wars in 
neighbouring states that “spill over”, a particularly dangerous prospect as these spill 
overs can act like a catalyst to the recipient states equally insecure domestic 
situation.23 It is because of the third world’s need to focus internally that any changes 
made in the international/systemic arena have little or no positive consequences on 
their security. This is because changes made are done for the benefit of the first and 
second worlds, bypassing the third’s concerns, which remain ineffectively remedied. 
Whilst Ayoob is more interested in a wider interpretation of Security Studies, he is 
also equally dissatisfied with the “de-definition” that he sees the Welsh School is 
advocating. Rather than lowering ones focus to the individual as a point of analysis, 
he still sees the state as the primary unit o f security affairs, and in particular the state 
making process. Secondly, Ayoob sees that it is the Political realm that should be 
studied rather than the excessive broadening approach advanced by other members o f 
the critical security studies camp. This is not to say that Ayoob is ignoring these other 
realms rather:
Although it retains its primacy in the definition o f security, the political realm 
must be informed by these other areas of human activity. However, the 
influence of the other realms on matters that effect security must be filtered 
through the political realm and must be directly relevant to that realm. In other
22 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1995) p.6
23 Ibid. p.7
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words, when developments in other realms - ranging from the economic to the 
ecological -  threaten to have immediate political consequences or are perceived 
as being able to threaten state boundaries, political institutions, or governing 
regimes, these other variables must be taken into account as a part of the state’s 
security calculus.24
Ayoob sees that an efficient concept of security for the analysis of the Third World 
must meet two main criteria: “First, it must go beyond the traditional western 
definition of security and overcome the external orientation and military bias that are 
contained in the western definition. Second, it must remain firmly rooted in the 
political realm while being sensitive to variables in other realms”. Ayoob envisions 
a politically focused definition of security, which is still state focused, but examines 
the architecture, and influences of the state making process on the insecurities third 
world states face. He acknowledges that other realms sometimes affect state security, 
however they are irrelevant as a point of focus unless they “threaten to have political 
outcomes...or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the 
realm of both domestic and international politics.”26
With regards to State building, the problem is as follows. Ayoob sees that there 
has not been enough time for the states that exist in the third world to take root and 
develop effectively. The territories that were inherited from the colonial powers are 
filled with problems left over from their previous rulers. These include; ethnic 
tensions, as groups suddenly found themselves placed within states that they have 
little or no allegiance to, this leads to fissures in society and ultimately attempts to 
overthrow existing regimes; Demands for political participations, economic
24 Ibid. p.8
15 Ibid. pp. 11-12
26 Ibid. p.9
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redistribution, and social justice; and finally because of the unrepresentative and 
authoritarian nature of many regimes there is a “vicious circle o f violence and counter
27 • •violence as regimes are challenged and react with brutal force.” It is this 
“overloading” of weak polities with massive problems that are at the root of the 
insecurity that is apparent in most of the developing world.
Unfortunately these are not the only problems that Third World regimes face. 
The state making process does not occur in a vacuum, and external actors also impact 
on those involved in it. The problem that third world states have with respect to the 
international system as a whole is that they are forced to adhere to the rules and norms 
that the developed world has previously established. The first o f which is concerning 
what it is to be a ‘state’. It is expected that a state will have an effective infrastructure 
that will support the social and economic well being of itself and its people. There is 
an expectation placed upon the state elite that they should control their borders and 
maintain law and order within their state. This expectation originates both from their 
own people and, perhaps more importantly, from the international community as a 
whole. At the same time modem rules dictate that you should do all o f these things in 
accordance with international laws and morals, they need to behave in the same way
• • • 98as the “civilised” western world. This pulls states and regimes in two opposing 
directions. Third World states are:
[Expected] to approximate human rights standards as measured by the 
performance yardstick o f the industrialized democracies...[and] enhance their 
stateness by extending their dominion over often reluctant populations in the
27 Ibid. p.41
28 Ibid. pp.87-88
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shortest possible time in order to approximate the standards of effective
29statehood set by the industrialized democracies of Europe and North America.
This aggravates the instability of the regimes in place, as they are unable to 
effectively achieve either task. If they focus their efforts on human rights and their 
status as a member of the international community their domestic situation will 
collapse and hence the regime loses its status anyway. If however they focus purely 
on maintaining control, then the international community condemns them especially if 
they use more extrem e  methods of pacification, which given the time scale and 
economics of most Third World politics is likely. The international community then 
places pressure on them to stop and revert to a more acceptable methods, which masy
TObe less successful strategies and so their state/regime is less secure. What becomes 
the normal pattern of behaviour in many of these weak states is that they move from 
one compromise to the next, never really achieving a secure position. This means that 
they move from crisis to crisis, with little knowledge of how to effectively alienate 
themselves from this predicament. One of the true injustices o f this predicament that 
can be perceived but is not explicitly emphasised by Ayoob, is that the developed 
world has already been through this state making process, but was able to do so at a 
much slower pace and without excessive scrutiny. Rather than guide the third world 
through this time of transition however, and help them not to make the same mistakes, 
they instead pass judgement with out offering real alternatives to those regimes 
struggling with the infancy o f statehood.
Ayoob also expresses concerns with the emancipatory approach to the study of 
third world insecurity. Whilst Ayoob acknowledges the claims that it is problems that
29 Ibid. p.87
30 Ibid. p.88
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are inherent in the state that create insecurity, he opts for a less reductionist approach 
to the study of the third world. Against Booth’s Welsh School reasoning he states 
“Booth’s definition refuses to acknowledge that a society or group can be 
emancipated without being secure and vice versa”. This comes down to the fact that 
whilst states/regimes may create insecurity for individuals, the collective/majority of 
people ultimately better within the state, irrespective of injustices, than without the 
large scale institutional support and representation. This said however Ayoob does 
see the need to address the individual/human level concerns within the state making 
process. Appreciating the concerns by those who put pressure on the third world he 
states:
In the climate of their changed domestic and international attitudes, the move 
toward democratisation is no longer merely a laudable goal for states in the 
Third World; it has become a political precondition for establishing legitimate 
state structures and regimes that enjoy the acquiescence, if  not enthusiastic 
support of their populations.32 
What this statement represents is a further acknowledgement from Ayoob that we 
must rethink how we deal with third world security problems. He is saying that whilst 
the external pressures from the west, to conform to our values, have altered the 
security dynamic to the extent that it makes state making even more difficult. If the 
third world were better able to take into account the root concerns that the Welsh 
School and Human Security writers are discussing, then the current boom/bust cycle 
of the third world security predicament could be redressed and ultimately averted.
31 Ibid. p. 10
n  Ibid. p. 179
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The security predicament in the Third World in likened by Ayoob to a 
‘Multilayered cake’, these layers being the domestic, regional and global. Whilst 
each is distinct and has its own ‘flavour’ it is the domestic layer that flavours and 
dominates the cake as a whole.33 Ayoob sees however that the regional and global 
factors contaminate and influence what the nature of a state’s domestic policy will be. 
So whilst the instability that is experienced by most Third World states appears to be 
a localised phenomenon, because of the contaminating effect each layer has on the 
others, an insecure Third World will have repercussions for the rest of us, and also 
because the majority of states are currently in the “developing” camp, the overall 
impact on the developed world could be significantly dangerous. Therefore, for 
Ayoob, a re-thinking of how we see Third World Security and therefore how we 
address and resolve problems here is vital for global security too.
Re-defining Vs De-defming
In his case for broadening the definition of security Ken Booth argues that it is 
better to have open intellectual boundaries and risk irrelevance, than narrow ones and 
risk ignorance.34 This declaration was a move against the closed neorealist ontology 
that underpins the orthodoxies assumptions regarding security. That is, the dominant 
position o f the state and military in their thinking.35 Critics o f the orthodoxy36 stress
33 Ibid. p. 189
Ken Booth and Eric Herring, Keyguide to Information in Strategic Studies (London: Mansell, 1994)
jj>.20
Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc., 1999) (online edition) (http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones04.html 02/05/06)
For example as shown by Rob Walker in “Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge o f World 
Politics Alternatives Vol. 15, No. 1 (1990) pp. 3-27; and “The Subject o f  Security” in Keith Krause 
and Michael C. Williams (eds.) Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press 
Limited, 1997) pp.33-59 (amongst others)
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that it is these deep-seated assumptions that colour and restrict the orthodoxies 
conception of security. They argue that by deepening our conception of security, our 
change in perspective will open the security scholar up to other questions that have 
been closed off by the ontology of the orthodoxy. As discussed above this is not a 
point of view that originated post-Cold War, however as Sean M. Lynn-Jones and 
Steven E. Miller argue “[the end of the Cold War revealed] a different set of dangers” 
and in so doing “revealed [an] agenda.. .broader in its focus, giving much greater 
attention to previously neglected sources of conflict.”37 That is, “the end of the Cold 
W ar...added legitimacy and credibility to demands for a broader security agenda” , 
and in so doing established the possibility to re-define the concept of security and in 
so doing open up our “intellectual boundaries”. This is what the Welsh School has 
sought to achieve, however, whilst as an individual I whole-heartedly agree with 
Booth’s argument against intellectual parochialism, I also feel that intellectual 
irrelevance is not a risk worth taking. By this I mean, that given increasing time and 
financial constraints we do need a way of focusing our attentions. Therefore whilst 
the Welsh School, and other post-positivist, theories that attempt to broaden the 
concept o f security are admirable, the orthodoxies concerns that this may de- 
emphasise the study is not purely the final roar o f a dinosaur in the face of evolution, 
rather it is a legitimate scholarly criticism of the broadening agenda.
Securitization and the Copenhagen School
The Emancipation model of re-imagining Security Studies was not the only
route scholars took. A notable and very interesting approach was devised by the
37Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions o f  International 
Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995)
Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (online edition) 
(http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones04.html 02/05/06)
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Copenhagen School, so called because of its base at the Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute (COPRI); it is an approach that was formally put forward within Security: A 
new framework fo r  analysis,39 though it is a continuation of the themes and ideas put 
forward by the main contributors in earlier works. Most significantly People, States, 
and Fear by Barry Buzan,40 which laid the groundwork for the Schools 
redefinition/broadening agenda and influenced the work of other critical security 
scholars including those within the Welsh School 41 The Copenhagen project is not as 
radical an assault on the orthodoxy as the Welsh School however. When A New 
Framework was published in 1998, a collaboration between Barry Buzan, Ole Waever 
and Jaap de Wilde,42 it was a comprehensive rethinking of the discipline in order to 
effectively address the on going problem of broadening the subject without “reducing 
its analytical utility”.43 I choose to discuss it after the Welsh School because whilst 
its foundations lie earlier than emancipatory theory, the comprehensive framework 
was published after Critical Security Studies established its own theoretical base and 
so in part Buzan et al were responding to Critical Security Studies as well as the 
Orthodoxy44 Therefore this means that also, and perhaps more significantly, I 
believe that the Copenhagen approach not only addresses problems with the 
orthodoxy, but also communicates an alternative to the more extreme, especially from 
the point of view of traditional security scholars, elements of other critical 
approaches. The first thing that this framework did was redefine what was meant by
39From now on referred to as The New Framework.
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security Studies in the Post-Cold  
War Era (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983) A second edition was published in 1991.
41 This influence was expressed both in Ken Booth’s “Security and Self: Reflections o f  a Fallen 
Realist” lecture held at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto in 
1994 (Transcript available (http://www.vorku.ca/vciss/publications/OP26-Booth.pdf (14/05/2006)) and 
also in his chapter o f  the same title in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) Critical Security
Studies: Concepts and Cases pp.83-120 (most explicitly, though critically, p .86, 106)
From now on Buzan et al, unless the author o f  a particular section is evident/specified directly 
Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament p.9
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis (Boulder, CO: 
Rienner, 1998) pp. 34-5
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security. To the Copenhagen School “ ...security is about survival... [from] an 
existential threat to a designated referent object”, and that “ ...the special nature of 
security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them”. This 
creates a more fluid environment for the Security scholar to examine, however it is 
still narrowly and specifically defined.
An ‘existential threat’ is something that effects a referent objects (what these 
objects are will be addressed below) ability to not only function but to actually exist. 
If a threat of this nature appears then the object is able to “use whatever means 
necessary to block a threatening development”45 How though does one establish what 
an existential threat is? The Copenhagen School does not believe that there are 
objective threats ‘out there’ that we can empirically measure and quantify, rather they 
are subjective. Unlike Ayoob who sees that an issue becomes one of security once it 
enters the political realm, Buzan et al envisage a different process. For them there is a 
spectrum ranging from non-politicized at one end to securitized at the other. Any 
issue can be placed anywhere on this spectrum, depending on how it is perceived by 
those involved in the issue. If an issue is not being seriously discussed, debated, or 
commented upon by sector elites or authority figures, then it will be non-politicized, 
an example of this could be a dispute between neighbours where it is very serious to 
those concerned but has no wider repercussions. If, however, an issue were to 
become part of public policy, that requires action from a governing body, e.g. 
intervention or funding, then this issue has been politicised. An example of this 
would be the regulation of CFC emissions; the concept of global warming was 
elevated from being a minority issue to requiring direct intervention from
45 Ibid. p.21
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government, and ultimately all governments, in order to resolve the problem. For an 
issue to leave the realm of politics and become a security issue, it must be argued that 
“this issue is more important and than other issues and should take absolute 
priority”.46 The way that this priority is shown is by presenting the issue as an 
existential threat, claiming that if  we do not focus all o f our effort here, we will not be 
around to worry about the other issues. Therefore, and this is a key principle within 
the New Framework, “ ‘Security’ is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this 
practice that the issue becomes a security issue-not necessarily because a real 
existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.”47 The 
point here is that whilst any issue can be a security issue, most o f the time they remain 
elsewhere on the spectrum. Therefore it is better to analyse the process that makes an 
issue a security threat, or perhaps prevents an issue being securitized, in order to have 
a clearer understanding of security.
The process of moving through the Securitization spectrum is not as simple as 
pointing a finger and mobilising your armed forces. Presenting something as an 
existential threat is only the first step in the process and termed a ‘securitizing move’, 
the issue is only secuitized if the ‘audience’, who can be defined as those who need to 
be convinced, accept that it is a risk. For example, The Government claimed that Iraq 
is a security risk to Britain, however they then needed to mount a Public Relations 
campaign, including the now infamous intelligence reports in order to sway public 
opinion enough to justify their desire to use extraordinary methods to remove the 
threat. In this instance the measure desired being military force or war. 
“Securitization [is fulfilled] by cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking
46 Ibid. p.24 (emphasis added)
47 Ibid. (emphasis added)
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of rules”,48 this is rather like the Clausewitzian concept of war being a continuation of 
politics by other means; security is an exlension of politics by extraordinary means. 
This process, like any human activity, differs from time to time and place to place, the 
Copenhagen School have highlighted five different ‘places’, or sectors from which an 
issue can emerge and become securitized. These are: Military; Economic; 
Environmental; Political and Societal. Each sector has its own distinctive set of actors 
and referent objects that are involved in the process.
In the Military sector the focus o f attention is on the State as a whole. The 
focus of this sector is to maintain the ‘territorial integrity’ of the state, be it internal or 
external. This means that the securitizing actor, or securitizer, is typically the state 
itself or a state representative for example a member o f government. The audience 
that needs to be convinced can be more varied ranging from the general public as a 
whole, to the armed forces or a government select committee. However, once an 
event has escalated to the extent that it has become an existential threat to the State, 
securitization is easier than in other sectors. This is because the securitizer in this 
sector is seen to be a voice of authority and so his or her arguments are perceived to 
have validity.
For the Copenhagen school the Economic sector has a diverse range o f referent 
objects. However not all o f these objects have equal claim to be considered a security 
referent. Some of these units, for instance transnational corporations, NGOs, small 
businesses, and even individuals who have invested the Stock Market, though they all 
can be considered integral to the capitalist economic system, rarely make a
48 Ibid. p.25
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securitizing move to a wider audience when they are existentially threatened. This is 
because at this level economics is a brutal Darwinian world, and it is not possible for 
every unit to be successful. In fact it is an important and necessary part of the system 
for companies to collapse, and some individuals will lose money, as new companies 
will rise to replace weaker ones and resources are redistributed; this competition is at 
the heart o f Capitalism.49 The result of this competition is that existential threats to 
these units are not generally securitized.50 For these units to successful securitize 
their existential crisis the Copenhagen School argues that it is necessary for the unit to 
tie its demise with a wider economic issue. For example it may be possible to claim 
that the collapse of their business will have ramifications for the local community, or 
instead it could be connected to a national issue.51 However, for the Copenhagen 
school these moves rarely succeed unless it can be claimed that either the state or 
wider “liberal international economic order (LIEO)—meaning the entire nexus of
c'y t
rules and norms about open trading and financial arrangements” are also being 
existentially threatened. An existential threat here would be an issue that lead to the 
total collapse of the economic system and so an inability for those within the state, or 
wider LIEO, to function. Buzan et al argue that because of the variety of referent 
objects that consider themselves, or can be considered, to be units of the economic 
sector, what can be considered to be an economic existential threat is equally varied. 
A New Framework acknowledges that for individuals economic security is primarily 
concerned with the same “basic human needs” as outlined within the Human Security
49 Ibid. p. 100
There are examples o f  securitizing moves being made for instance the closure o f  the Rover plant at 
Longbridge in 2005 elicited a call for extraordinary measures from the government to ensure the plants 
survival.
51 Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis pp. 100-1
52 Ibid. p. 102
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theories.53 However, where the Copenhagen approach differs is because despite the 
hardship and suffering an individual in an economic crisis may feel, and the fact that 
these issues may be “enormously important to individuals and indeed societies”54 the 
issues cannot be considered to be an existential threat to the individual. And if the 
individuals circumstances become such that the individual’s ability to survive the 
situation does come into question, it is more likely that the issue would either be 
securitized within another sector, for instance political or societal. Or as with 
securitizing moves made by other economic actors the issue would be tied together 
with wider state or LIEO issues. The Copenhagen School argues that:
[there] is...a  state equivalent of basic human needs. Unless a state is self-reliant 
in the resources required to feed its population and industry, it needs access to 
outside supplies. If that need is threatened, the national economy can be clearly 
and legitimately securitized.55 
In the ordinary, day to day, running of the state, whilst there may resources in which it 
is not self sufficient, typically they will be able to access these resources through 
direct trade with other states. Therefore, if a domestic industry is seriously and 
adversely affected by an issue it may not have direct ramifications on the state itself; 
however, it may adversely affect its ability to trade or engage within the LIEO as a 
whole. Or in even more extreme cases the impact of an economic sector threat will 
have ramifications in other sectors as the state elite works to rectify the economic 
crisis. This overspill, the Copenhagen School argues, problematises the study of the 
economic sector; however it also signifies one of the central concerns of economic
53 Ibid. p. 103
54 Ibid. p. 104
55 Ibid. p. 105
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insecurity, that is, that “economic activity fairly easily triggers survival issues in all 
the other sectors”.56
With the Environmental sector the Copenhagen School built upon a wide body 
of literature that had been developing both within security studies and International 
Relations as a whole, but also in the natural sciences.57 In its broadest sense, the New 
Framework argues that the environmental sector can encompass a vast range of issues 
including: climate change, the disruption of ecosystems, the depletion of natural 
resources, famine, war-related environmental damage, issues that emerge from over 
population and unsustainable consumption of resources.58 But the complexities of 
these issues mean that again there is a degree of overlap with other sectors, and the 
degree that these issues would be securitized as environmental threats is debateable.59 
Also with such a wide range of potential security issues, it raises the question as to 
what in particular is the primary referent object within the environmental sector. 
Buzan et al argue that, on the surface at least, the primary referent object is the 
environment itself, that is, the space in which we live. But underlying this is a 
concern that ultimately the primary concern of the environmental sector is the “risk of 
losing achieved levels of civilization”.60 So rather than the physical planet upon 
which we live being the primary referent for environmental security, it instead
56 Ibid. p. 116
57 Examples o f  this literature would include Neville Brown “Climate, Ecology and International 
Secuirty” Survival Vol.31, N o.6 (1989) pp.519-532; John E. Carrol (ed.) InternationalEnvironmental
Diplomacy: The Management and Resolution o f  Transfrontier Environmental Problems (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Marc A. Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” 
International Security Vol.20, N o .l (1995) pp.35-62; Jessica Tuchman Matthews, “Redefining 
Security” Foreign Affairs Vol.68, N o.2 (1989) pp.162-177; Clive Ponting, A Green History o f  the 
World (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1991); Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International
Relations (London: Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 1992), and Arthur H. Westing (ed.) 
Cultural Norms, War and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). These represent a 
cross section o f  some o f  the literature available and should not be considered exhaustive.
Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis, pp.74-5
59 Ibid. p.75
6U Ibid. (Emphasis removed)
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“concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential 
support system on which all other human enterprises depend” 61 Buzan et al go on to 
argue that if  one takes this civilizational position vis a vis environmental security then 
the following paradox arises: “The only way to secure societies from environmental 
threats is to change them ”62 Therefore, we wish to secure the environmental sector in 
order to maintain the way in which we carry out our lives, but in order to secure the 
environment it is likely that we will need to alter the way we live our lives. In 
essence, it is the civilizational developments we ultimately wish to secure that are at 
the heart of the threat to the environmental sector. This in turn creates an interesting 
dynamic for whilst there are those who acknowledge that humans must behave 
responsibly when engaging with their physical environments. There are other actors 
who actively seek to oppose securitizing moves as to radically change behaviour in 
the interests of the environment will in turn restrict other human endeavours, for 
instance industrial, and hence, economic activity.63 The Copenhagen School goes on 
to argue that there are essentially three possible environmental threats that can 
emerge. Firstly, threats to human civilization from the natural environment that are 
not caused by human activity (for example earthquakes or meteor strikes). Secondly, 
threats from human activity to the planet, where the changes made do seem to pose 
existential threats to civilization (for example greenhouse gas emissions, or landfills). 
Finally, threats from human activity that do not seem to pose existential threats to 
civilization (for example the depletion o f mineral resources, whilst inconvenient, it is 
arguable that humanity will adapt new technologies to make up for the loss).64 
Securitizing moves to remedy these issues can be initiated from any level in the
61 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security Studies in the Post-Cold  
War Era (Second Edition)(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) pp. 19-20 (emphasise added)
" Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis p.76 (Emphasis added)
63 Ibid. p.77
64 Ibid. pp.79-80
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system, however in order to counteract the wider and more serious consequences of 
environmental threats it is still the state that is dominant not only in drawing attention 
an issue, but also in the implementation of the extraordinary measures necessary to 
promote the necessary changes, and even then rarely unilaterally.6'
The Political sector is a more vague area, this is partially because it can be 
argued that “all security is political”66 or at the very least all security issues have been 
political at some time in their duration. For the Copenhagen School Political security 
is concerned with threats directed towards the political regime, from both within the 
physical territory that the political elite administers (its legitimacy), and from other 
states (whether it is recognised). These two variables (legitimacy and recognition) 
enable a political regime, (the institutions, processes and principles that make up the 
political system, not the government that is in power) to function effectively. The 
existing literature on Political Security distinguishes between legitimacy and 
recognition by stipulating that they are generated internally and externally 
respectively. That is legitimacy is obtained from within the unit that the regime 
governs, and recognition is generated from the international community at large. If 
they are existentially threatened then the regime is unable to carry out even the most 
basic of functions and thus it must act in order to prevent this from happening. To 
date the majority of the work conducted by the Copenhagen School with respect to 
political security has focused on recognition and the external pressures facing political 
regimes, which is not necessarily appropriate when examining developing states.
65 Ibid. p.92
66 Ibid. p. 141 (emphasis added) and Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament. Passim.
6 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 1. (See Also)Buzan et al. A New Framework fo r  Analysis p. 144, 
150. Also, Barry Buzan, People States and Fear (2nd Edition) Chapter 2 (passim); and Alan Collins, 
Security and Southeast Asia. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2003) p.63
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As part o f my thesis, in order to more effectively operationalise the concept for 
developing states and regime formation in particular, I have utilised the work of 
Muthia Alagappa68and Mohammed Ayoob. Alagappa provides a thorough definition 
and exploration about the nature o f legitimacy that is currently lacking in the literature 
of political security and is particularly appropriate when examining the complex 
political realities faced in the developing world. Ayoob on the other hand addresses 
the difficulties faced by developing states during the nation building process. That is 
the way in which new regimes are forced to balance the need for external recognition 
against the legitimacy derived internally. The synthesis of these writers enables me to 
develop a clearer understanding of not only the nature of the threat within the political 
sector but also how the struggle to attain and maintain political legitimacy impacts 
upon the power elites within states, and in turn explains why they identify these 
problems as security issues. Another key debate that has emerged within this sector is 
the nature of the audience and what constitutes an audience. Whilst in western style 
liberal democracies the audience is relatively easy to pin point, however in more 
authoritarian regimes the securitization process is less straightforward, particularly 
within the political sector. Within authoritarian regimes who do the elite need to 
address in order to move an issue from the political realm into that of security? What 
is the nature of this type of regimes audience, and is it legitimate? A more 
fundamental question would be do they make a securitizing move at all, and if so, 
which I believe they do, why? Why is it necessary for a regime that could or should 
be able to act unopposed, to seek the tacit approval of an audience?
Muthiah Alagappa, (ed.) Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: the quest fo r  moral authority 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995)
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Societal security is o f great interest, and an area that is unique to the 
Copenhagen approach. The sector is made up from are the numerous collective 
identities that are independent from the state, examples of which would be ethnic or 
religious identities. In the societal sector, the referent object is one the numerous sub­
groups that make up society, the identities that we subscribe to, and make up who we 
are. In the words of Buzan and Waever:
For international security analysis, the key to society is those ideas and practices 
that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, 
the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as 
members of a community. These identities are distinct from, although often 
entangled with, the explicitly political organisations concerned with government69 
If an identity is existentially threatened then the elite can securitize the issue of the 
threat and call for extraordinary measures in order to remove the threat and secure the 
identity.
Whilst the definition above seems simple enough the concept o f societal 
security is not unproblematic and therefore it is necessary to clarify the terminology 
further. For the purposes o f securitization analysis, societal security is about the 
large, self-sustaining identity groups that individuals align themselves to. This large, 
self-sustaining identity group could be the state’s population, since as Benedict 
Anderson famously notes a nation is an “imagined community”. A nation is itself 
though often comprised of large, self-sustaining identity groups and is often referred 
to as multi-ethnic. Thus societal security can be used to examine the perception of 
threat that can exist within a multi-ethnic nation, such as Indonesia.
69 Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis p .l 19
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Since this concept was introduced however it has faced criticism and requires 
refinement. Perhaps the most important critique levelled at the approach is in 
questioning whether identity should be used as a referent object at all. This is a point 
that has been addressed in recent literature (for example Tobias Theiler) and I will 
develop further in part two of my thesis utilizing ideas from the discipline of social 
psychology. Social psychology is the study of “those mental products which are 
created by a community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely
• 95 70of individual consciousness since they presuppose the reciprocal action of many”. It 
is this change of emphasis from individual identity to a larger, less reduced 
group/collective perception of identity that is necessary to fully address the concerns 
of the Copenhagen schools critics, and thus eradicate the problems associated with 
identity as a referent object. Theiler draws particular attention to the relatively recent 
psychological development of Social Identity Theory (SIT).71 SIT is a method of 
explaining not only how and why social groups, and thus social identities, form but 
also why people need to form these groups in the first place. I have developed the 
work of Theiler to incorporate a wider section of the theories and concepts of Social 
Psychology to provide a more robust conception of Societal Security. I believe that 
this provides a clear notion of, and definition of, the group formation process itself. 
This allows a clearer understanding of what it is that is threatened, why identity is 
targeted by certain political actors, and more importantly, answers the critics of 
societal security by showing why societal groups are valid referent objects. This 
interdisciplinary approach, combining International Relations and Security Studies
70 W. Wundt cited in Michael A. Hogg and Graham M. Vaughan, Social Psychology (Third Edition) 
(Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2002) p.l 12
Tobias Theiler, ‘Societal security and social psychology’ Review o f  International Studies Vol.29 
(2003) pp.249-268
30
with theories of Social Psychology, offers a more robust and empirically sound notion 
of societal security.
Whilst this sector seems to be a natural bedfellow to the Welsh School, or the 
Human Security camp, there are key differences that make it not a totally smooth 
alliance. For whilst it is true that this sector is about “ ...threats primarily to 
individuals (threats in society)” the distinction is that “ ...only if they threaten the
72breakdown of society do they become societal security issues.” So rather than 
becoming embroiled in the day to day concerns facing individuals, one sees how 
these challenges affect the collectivities these individuals belong to. For the 
examination of the third world this should be an adequate distinction. This is because 
there are many different hardships that individuals face, however many of them will 
not be able to gamer enough resonance to lead to successful securitizations. And the 
more reductionist concerns of Human Security will likely impact upon society as a 
whole and thus be securitized, or politicised within different sectors, either way the 
issues are addressed or acknowledged within the framework.
The central importance of “Identity” in international relations theory is not one 
that originated with the Copenhagen School, and their position is a continuation of 
that put forward by Alexander Wendt,73 and the Social Constmctivist school of 
thought. Constructivists argue that in a “world in which identities and interests are 
learned and sustained by intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and
7" Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis p. 121 (emphasis in original)
For example in Wendt, “Constructing International Politics” International Security Vol.20, N o.l 
(1995) pp.71-81; “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics”, in Y osef Lapid and 
Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.) The Return o f  Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1996) pp.47-64; Social theory o f  International Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); and the seminal 1992 publication “Anarchy is What States Make o f  It: The Social 
Construction o f Power Politics” International Organization Vol.46, No.2 (1992) pp.391-425.
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do, is one in which ‘anarchy is what states make of it”’.74 What this is suggesting is 
that if one does not accept the traditional ‘atomistic” conceptions of the state, and 
instead think of states as entities with leaned identities and interests, then 
traditional/realist assumptions of international relations are brought into question. 
Rather than ‘national interest’ being a simple notion of state survival, interests in a 
constructivist world are derived from the identities that individual states have 
developed in discourse with other states.75 And this in turn determines the behaviour 
of states within the international system.76 Therefore, “daily life of international 
politics is an on-going process of states taking identities in relation to Others, casting
77them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the result” . It can be
78argued that identity is a fluid concept and that it changes and evolves over time. 
This is a concept that is integral to Constructivist thinking. For example in his 
introduction to The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics Peter J. Katzenstein argues that a central reason for rethinking traditional 
security is to understand “why do the interests of some powerful states in the 1990s, 
but not in the 193Os...make them intervene militarily to protect the lives and welfare 
of citizens other than their own?”79 It is therefore the changing nature of identity that 
has elevated it as a valid subject within both IR and security analysis, but this in turn 
problematises the Copenhagen School’s claims that it can become a referent object.
74 Alexander Wendt, “Levels o f  Analysis vs. agents and Structures: Part III”, Review o f  International 
Studies Vol. 18, No.2 (1992) p. 183
75 Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison” European Journal o f  
International Relations Vol.7, No.3 (2001) p.318
76 For further examples o f  this argument see Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make o f  It” p.398; and 
Wendt, Social theory o f  International Politics p.231
77 Ibid. p.21
This is one critism (o f several) that has been levelled at the Copenhagen approach by Bill McSweeny 
initially in Bill McSweeney, ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’ Review o f  
International Studies Vol.22 N o .l (1996) pp 81-93, and continued in “A Response to Buzan and 
Waever”, Review o f  International Studies Vol.24, N o .l (2000) pp 137-40, and also Security, Identity 
and Interests: A Sociology o f  International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
A full exploration o f the criticisms o f the Societal Sector are addressed in Chapter one.
Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f  National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) pp.7-8
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Previous approaches maintained the state as the primary referent object for analysis, 
and use identity merely as a variable to belter understand state behaviour, whilst the 
Copenhagen School de-coupled identity from the state and instead argues that identity 
itself should be the focus of analysis. The Copenhagen School argue that the criticism 
that this is impractical due to the fluidity of identity is misplaced; this is due to the 
fact that whilst identities do change, a core value, label or conception of the identity 
still remains, and it is this label that subsequent members identify themselves with. 
So whilst what it is to be a British individual may alter, the fact that they are British 
does not. Whilst each generation o f teenagers identify with different things, they are 
still teenagers.80 So an existential threat within this sector would be something that 
would destroy that social group and make it impossible to identify yourself with it. 
For example policies that would make it illegal to practice your religion or speak your 
language. The problem for the study of this sector is in identifying what are merely 
evolutions, and what are assaults upon the identity as a whole, and perhaps more 
importantly what would be an extraordinary measure to combat such an assault? One 
concern is that a securitizing move in the societal sector may in fact lead to state 
intervention and a politicisation within the political sector, thus negating the utility of 
the sector for analysis (a critique further developed below). However whilst this is 
sometimes the case, it is also possible for perceived identity threats to be dealt with 
outside the state. These minority groups, rather than using the states legitimate 
apparatus devise their own strategies in order to “survive as a distinct culture”.81 The 
New framework highlights three strategies that can be used: “to dominate the existing 
government (e.g., Tutsis, whites under apartheid), to form their own [separate]
80 This discourse is closely examined by Paul Roe in his thesis on the Societal Security problem atic in 
Krajina and Transylvania.
Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis p. 122
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82government (Slovenes, Zionists) or to be left alone (traditionally, Jews in Europe)”.
It is worth noting that any one of these strategies can have drastic knock over effects 
within other sectors, for instance the Political. One newly emerging threat that the 
New Framework draws attention to is that of Globalization, or the homogenisation of 
Global culture. This ties in with Ayoob’s notion that the Western norms and values 
can undermine third world security. This cannot only be a securitized issue, in how it 
destabilises regimes (Political sector) but also in how the indigenous 
cultures/identities react to this intrusion.83 It is issues like this that make the societal 
sector a pivotal focal point of analysis of state security problems.
There are numerous criticisms of this approach to the study of Security, firstly 
because the New Framework sees security as a ‘speech act’, in which individuals 
determine what or what is not an issue worthy of merit, then we lose any objective 
notions of security, which is something the traditional, positivist strategists and 
security scholars constantly strive for, and also it distracts our attention from ‘real’ 
dangers that are in the world.84 The crux of this argument however seems to be one of 
the focus for security analysis. The critics are more interested in what a security 
threat is, where as the Copenhagen School are more interested in how an issue 
becomes a security concern. Believing that in understanding how an issue is 
securitized we can more fully understand security predicaments/dilemmas and thus 
deal with the threats. Another critique is that some of the sectors seem, for want of a 
better term, irrelevant. That is, the areas themselves rarely are securitized, or tend to 
only be directly embroiled in security issues through indirect actions in other sectors.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid. p. 138g4
For an expansion o f  this critique see Olav F. Knudsen, ‘Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: 
Desecuritizing Securitization’ Security Dialogue Vol. 32, No.3 (September 2001) pp.355-368
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This is particularly the case with the political sector where the concerns of regimes
85can be “squeezed” or obscured by security incidents within other sectors. And 
because of the problematic nature of the political sector (which will be addressed in 
full in chapter one), scholars have decided in the past to address it in conjunction with 
these other incidents. For instance Barry Buzan has used the terms “military- 
political” and “political-societal”. By condensing the terms he both is acknowledging 
this problem, and offering a temporary solution, but also problematizing his own 
sectors.86 Another problem/phenomenon that can occur is “spill over”87, where issues
emerge in one sector, but the responses to the issue has ramifications in other sectors.
88For example economic crises can result in environmental or societal threats. This 
apparent sidelining of some issues, seemingly placing emphasis on the more 
traditional areas of study, seems to create a hierarchy within the sectors, where Buzan 
et al claim there is not one. To the critics, if the majority of security events take place 
within the state, and thus are seemingly explained by addressing the military, or 
military-political, sector, why should they focus their attention on the other 
‘redundant’ sectors? The reasons for examining all sectors come down to what the 
Copenhagen school call ‘Cross Sectoral Dynamics’.89 This is because securitization is 
a social process, all other social processes colour the security actors’ perceptions. So 
they “let security concerns from one sector color their security definitions in other 
sectors”,90 thereby making it easier or harder to securitize certain issues. That is, the 
perceptions and views held by the audience with respect to an event in one sector, can
85. Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis p. 141
86 Examples o f where Buzan has done this are: “National Security in the Post Cold War Third World”, 
Strategic Review fo r  Southern Africa Vol. 16, N o.l (1994) pp. 1-34, and “The Post Cold-War Asia-
Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Coopertaion” in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific 
Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995) pp. 130-151 
Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis, p .l 17 
™ Ibid. p.211
89 Ibid. pp. 163-194
90 Ibid. p. 190
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determine their reactions vis-a-vis a second sector. Therefore “problems that on the 
surface seem to be military might, on closer inspection, turn out to be motivated by 
fears in the other sectors”,91 and so by ignoring the so called ‘lesser’ sectors you may 
in fact be ignoring the real root of insecurity.
This cross-sector dynamic is of particular relevance when considering the 
processes involved in political security. One of my key aims in this thesis is to 
determine the boundaries of the political sector. As discussed above, there is a 
difficulty in defining the referent object in this sector due to the fact that in effect 
everything can be considered political. Therefore by developing this area of the 
securitization concept, one will be able to formally define the sector and determine its 
utility. For if it can be argued that political sector security threats all cross over into 
secondary sectors, is it useful to keep political as a sector in its own right or is it more 
advantageous to consider security threats as being political economic, political 
military etc.
From the above discussion of the research literature I believe that there is a need 
to expand our conception of security away from the orthodox neo-realist state 
centric/military dominated definitions. Whilst I acknowledge the significant 
intellectual and normative advances that have been made by Critical Security Studies, 
I also feel that this more reductionist conception of security is so far removed from 
the orthodoxy, that it is virtually unrecognisable. In short by using the concept of 
individual emancipation as the referent for study, whilst one effectively broadens the 
concept of security to encapsulate a wider variety of potential security issues, but one
91 Ibid. p. 167
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also devalues the systemic/inter-state concerns that have traditionally dominated the 
discipline. This is why I feel that the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework 
offers a more appropriate model for the expansion of security, because the 
Copenhagen School openly accepts that the traditional security dynamics still hold 
validity and are of central importance within the military sector, whilst at the same 
time their securitization model offers an alternative perspective on how and why an 
issue becomes considered a security issue. By reconceptualising beyond traditional 
ideas of power and interest, to instead posit that it is the discourse between the elites 
and audiences of dominant referent objects, it opens up the possibility to broaden the 
study of security beyond traditional boundaries, whilst still maintaining a clear 
analytical position. That is, not everything can be considered a security issue if it 
impacts upon individual freedoms, rather accepting that whilst theoretically 
everything can become a security issue, the logic of securitization and the 
intersubjective discourse between the elite and audience mean that security issues still 
have a sufficiently refined and definitive quality. With regards to the broadening 
agenda of security studies I believe this controlled broadening that the Copenhagen 
School offers the most intellectually satisfying solution to the problem of widening 
the agenda beyond traditional conceptions, whilst maintaining the analytical validity 
of security as a concept.
That said, the model is not unproblematic. The criticism of the approach, in 
particular with regards to its Sectoral expansion and the definitions of the referent 
objects has not been effectively addressed by the School itself. In part one of my 
thesis I will seek to address these problems with regard to the political and societal 
sectors. Chapter one will focus on the political sector, clarifying the referent object
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with this sector, and what constitutes a political threat. I will address the concerns 
that the framework as it currently exists fails to effectively address the challenges that 
face the developing world and in particular authoritarian regimes. In order to do this I 
will incorporate the work of Mohammed Ayoob and Muthiah Alagappa to examine 
the issues that face a developing regime, and in particular intra-state challenges. 
Chapter two will look at recent developments in social psychology, and use them to 
bolster the claims made by Buzan and Waever regarding identity as a valid and 
verifiable referent object within the societal sector. I hypothesise that these 
operationalised concepts will provide a more robust analytical framework. I will then 
use the two models to examine the political and societal challenges that faced the 
Sukamo and Suharto regimes in post-colonial Indonesia.
Post-colonial Indonesia
My motives for using Indonesia as a case study are that I wish to address 
another criticism of the Copenhagen approach, that it is Eurocentric and not useful for 
the study of other areas. The case study in question is post-colonial Indonesia and the 
concept of securitization can be applied to its nation building experience in particular 
the formation and maintenance of political regimes and the ethnic tension between 
pribumi and non-pribumi.
The formation of both the nation and the regimes that govern it is particularly 
interesting with regards to Indonesia. Such a large and diverse nation state caused 
problems and difficulties even prior to its inception. How were these problems 
exploited by the independence movement and by the first regime 1947-1956? What 
institutions and processes were created and why? In this section I will carefully 
address the Pancasilia, the five principles upon which Indonesian nationhood and
38
nationality is based. What are the principles and what do they mean with regards to 
the establishing of a legitimate Indonesian regime? Chronologically, the next key 
event that is o f interest is the attempt by Sukamo to transform the regime away from a 
western model towards an Indonesian model of “Guided” democracy. What was he 
hoping to achieve? What effect did it have on the perceived legitimacy of his mle, 
who was his audience and how did they react? What were the other effects of this 
transition? Another important question is how the international community responded 
to this change, was this new regime recognised favourably, and how did their 
recognition or lack of it lead to, or contribute towards, the eventual downfall of this 
regime and the September 30th 1965 coup? And how in turn did Suharto and the New 
Order react to the coup whilst establishing their own claims to govern, how did they 
usurp Sukarno’s legitimacy, and effectively convince their audience that they were the 
right people to govern Indonesia?
For the New Order the central question is how did they balance the need for 
external recognition against the need for internal legitimacy? How were they able to
effectively enforce their regime? What methods did they use, how did they adapt and
*
develop their ideas, and finally what events eventually emerged to bring about their 
downfall? Interconnected with this analysis is the exploration of how both Sukamo 
and Suharto created and manipulated Indonesian identity. Both what it was to be 
Indonesian and perhaps more importantly what it was to not be Indonesian. Within 
this aspect of nation building I postulate that the “othering” of the Chinese was central 
to both regimes, but more effectively by the New Order, in establishing the group that 
they claimed to represent and thus their audience. Why did they target the Chinese 
for this treatment? What is in both national cultures and characters of both the ethnic
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Chinese and the Indonesian’s that lead to this segregation? What did the New Order 
do to resolve their issues with the ethnic Chinese and what effect did it have, not only 
on the Chinese but also on Indonesian as a whole? This will help address the question 
as to why these political regimes in Indonesia put as much time and energy as they did 
in seemingly secondary endeavours, when they could have been focusing their 
attention elsewhere. I argue that the policies they pursued were in fact central to the 
regimes attempts at establishing a coherent notion of Indonesia and therefore were 
central to the nation building process itself.
I believe that by using the securitization framework to examine Indonesia I will 
test the robustness of the operationalised concept. Therefore because this thesis is 
primarily concerned with securitization theory, rather than radically altering our
• • Q ?perspective of post-colonial Indonesia , I decided to utilize the wealth of secondary 
data that is available from within the United Kingdom rather than utilize the archives 
and libraries in Indonesia, or conduct interviews. This is because whilst this would 
have been undoubtedly fruitful and interesting, the cost of a prolonged field trip in the 
region was not justifiable as it would not sufficiently advance the primary concerns of 
my thesis.
The structure of the thesis reflects the primacy of the securitization theory. In 
part one I address the problems with political and societal securitization and then in 
part two I seek to apply this operationalised concept. Chapters three and four look at 
the political challenges faced by Sukamo, initially looking at his struggle to establish 
a clear notion of what an independent Indonesia should be, looking at both the
92 i s
~ Although I do believe that the securitization approach does offer a fresh perspective on both Sukamo 
and Suharto era Indonesia, and this in turn gives a better understanding o f both the ethnic tensions that 
plagued this period and also the rise and fall o f both regimes.
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struggles he faced from within “Indonesia” and from the colonial powers of Japan and 
the Netherlands. Chapter four looks at how after establishing his vision of Indonesia 
he sort to further maintain his hold on power and it examines the two democratic 
models that he implemented and ultimately their failure. The failure of Sukarno’s 
model of rule is addressed in chapter five, which examines how Suharto and the New 
Order successfully formulated and implemented their own agenda for Indonesia, and 
they effectively laid claim to the legitimate right to rule. Chapter six explores the 
New Order regime and how it manufactured Indonesia’s political system in order to 
de-legitimise and weaken political opposition and thus was able to solidify their own 
grip on power until the economic crisis of 1997 sufficiently weakened the regimes 
claim to legitimacy and brought about the end of the New Order. Finally chapter 
seven explores the role of pribumi and non-pribumi relations in Indonesia and in 
particular the relationship between the Indonesian elites and the ethnic Chinese. It 
argues that the societal conflict and othering of the Chinese was integral to the 
establishment and survival of a coherent sense of Indonesian-ness.
In the two sections of my thesis I will answer the following questions. Firstly, it 
will show if there is a clearly definable referent object in the political sector, and if so 
what are the mechanisms that occur during the securitization process in this sector. 
Secondly, I show if it is possible to develop the concept of political security with 
particular reference to the problems that occur within the developing world. Next I 
will address the criticisms of societal securitization and see if it is possible to use the 
tools available within social psychology to create a more robust and clearly defined 
notion of identity. In part two, I will examine regime formation within Indonesia, and 
see whether the securitization process is applicable to the political security of an
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authoritarian regime, both in its inception and in maintaining power. Finally I will 
utilise the opertaionalised societal concept to see if it enables us to better understand 
the ethnic troubles within Indonesia, and particularly Sino-Indonesian relations.
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Part One: Operationalising the Political and Societal Sector
Chapter One: Political Security: External Vs. Internal
Of the five sectors that were highlighted by the Copenhagen School, it is 
political sector that is the most problematic. This is because there is an apparent 
difficulty in separating political threats from threats directed at or emerging from 
other sectors. This however is a difficulty that has emerged from a lack of 
understanding in what political security actually entails. This problem with respect to 
political security was initially highlighted by Buzan et al within Security: A New 
Framework, where they state:
The problem with the political security sector is that, paradoxically, it is the 
widest sector and is therefore also a residual category: In some sense, all
security is political. All threats and defences are constituted and defined 
politically. Politicization is political by definition, and, by extension, to 
securitize is also a political act.1
This observation that “all security is political” is inadequate for defining 
political security as an area for study in its own right. Buzan elaborates that political 
security is the “sub group of political threats that do not use massive military, 
identificational, economic or environmental means”2 thus giving the sector the 
appearance of a theoretical overflow, which is reserved for all issues that do not 
comfortably fit within other sectors. This conception of political security does not tell 
us very much about what a political security issue is, rather it informs us as to what it 
is not. Therefore if the political sector is to establish an identity of its own, several
Barry Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 
1998) p. 141
2 Ibid. p. 142 (emphasis added)
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points need to be clarified in order to remove its theoretical ambiguity. Firstly, it is 
necessary to define the political sector and establish what it is that is threatened. 
Secondly, how is the political sector threatened? What constitutes a threat, and from 
where do these threats originate? By addressing these questions this will enable 
analysis of the discourse in which security issues within the political sector are 
resolved. Within this chapter I will address these points, and also make the claim that 
the current bias towards external political threats is misplaced and in actuality internal 
challenges are equally prevalent, especially in relation to the developing world.
What is the referent in the Political sector?
The political sector is the realm where authority has been institutionalised. That 
is the governments, institutions and bodies that either already wield authority and 
power, or those actors that seek to gain that power and authority themselves.3 
Therefore the referent objects for the political sector are these political units 
themselves, but how does one effectively define a political unit? Charles Tilly lays an 
appropriate foundation in his definition of the state. He stipulates that they are 
“coercion-wielding organizations that are ‘distinct from households and kinship 
groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations... The 
term therefore includes city states, empires theocracies, and many other forms of 
government, but excludes tribes, lineages, firms, and churches as such’4”.5 Buzan et 
al expand this notion further claiming “[a] political unit is a collectivity that has 
gained a separate existence from its subjects. It can be a firm or a church, not in their
3 Ibid. pp. 145-50(passim.)
The “as such” is an acknowledgement o f  the fact that historically some typically non-political units, 
for instance churches, can in fact develop a political aspect.
5 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992  (London: Basil Blackwell,
1990) pp. 1-2
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basic capacities as economic or religious units but only to the extent that they act 
according to the political logic of governing large groups of people.”6 The most 
obvious ‘political unit’ therefore would be the state, which is still the primary and 
dominant reverent in international relations.
Buzan and Waever observe that there are three classes of state, which can be 
classified based upon their level of development: Modem, Premodem, and 
Postmodern.7 Modem is the archetypal “Westphalian” state model, it is this that 
represents what it is to be developed. It is defined as having “strong government 
control over society and restrictive attitudes towards openness. They see themselves 
as independent and self-reliant entities, having distinctive national cultures and 
development policies”8. Premodem states are those that have low levels o f socio­
political and economic cohesion and also have “poorly developed stmctures of 
government”.9 States at this level o f development may have yet to attain modem 
status, this may be the case for a new state, or it may be that the state in question has 
“failed”,10 that is it did fulfil all the criteria to be classified as being modem at one 
time but no longer does. Buzan and Waever establish a case that could lead to this 
lapse in status. In the case of some developing states, particularly those with 
authoritarian regimes, the regimes may establish themselves as being at a higher state 
o f development than is strictly true. These states are said to “impose modernity”,11 
that is, they successfully emulate the role of a developed state. However, because this 
is an artificial situation, that is, they are not in the same developmental position as
? Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis p. 143 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
pp.22-26
8 Ibid. pp.22-3
9 Ibid. p.24
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p.23
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other modem states, it is possible for there to be a backlash in which the veneer of 
modernity collapses. Those in power will find that in actuality it has some serious 
developmental issues that have not been addressed and thus it loses its status. 
Examples of imposed modem regimes would be Iraq (pre-2003), Iran and North 
Korea.12 Postmodern or post-Westphalian states appear much like modem states, but 
“they have a much more open and tolerant attitude towards cultural, economic, and 
political interaction”.13 Postmodern states do not see borders, sovereignty and 
national identity as being as important as their modem counterparts, instead 
developing institutions and are less concerned with the “inside/outside” politics that 
preoccupies modem and premodem states.14 Examples of postmodern states are the 
member states of the European Union. Buzan and Waever observe that in reality 
states rarely perfectly fit into one of these three models and it is better to think of a 
spectrum of development that these states are moving through, with premodem at one 
extreme and postmodern at the other.13
Whilst the state is currently dominant in international relations, this is not 
necessarily a permanent arrangement but rather the political reality that security 
analysts, political institutions, and those attempting to create political institutions, find 
themselves in today.16 For the Copenhagen school the primary referent object within 
the political realm is not the state itself, but rather the principles, ideas and institutions 
that allow a state to function. That is, they give the states elite (the government) the 
authority, both internally and externally, to effectively ‘govern’. These principles,
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. pp.23-4
15 Ibid. p.22
Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis pp. 143-4
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ideas and institutions are called the political regime.17 The political regime is “the 
formal and informal organization of the centre of political power, and of its relations 
with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and 
how those who are in power deal with those who are not.”18 The regime can also be 
defined as referring to “the principles, institutions, and procedures that constitute the 
political system.” 19 A threat to the political regime would target the two pillars upon 
which all regimes are built: the first is the internal legitimacy of the regime, and the 
second is its external recognition. Political security is about the survival of the unit 
that currently represents the state and/or the population that make up the state. This is 
not to be confused with military security, threats to the physical integrity of the state, 
or societal security, threats to the ethnic identity/identities of the people or peoples 
that inhabit the state. Political security is concerned with the threats to the 
instruments of power, the institutions, principles and apparatus that enable effective 
governance, or conversely it is concerned with attacks made against those who seek to 
eliminate the incumbent regime. Those alternative/opposition political units that are 
attempting to change the current political order. An appropriate example of the 
complexity of this sector of security studies is that of the struggle for independence. 
The ruling regime will attempt to target the political organisations that threaten their 
position, for example opposition political parties, newspapers, and individuals. This 
is an attack to weaken the capability of those that wish to usurp them. It is a move 
made in order to defend their ability to govern effectively. When such a move is 
made it can blur the line between societal, military and political security, depending
17 Ibid. p. 144, 150. Also; Barry Buzan, People States and Fear (2nd Edition) (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) Chapter 2 (passim); and Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003) p.63 
Robert Fishman, “Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe s Transition to Democracy World 
Politics V ol.42, No.3 (1990) p.428
M uthiah Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: the quest fo r  moral authority 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) p.27
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jupon the methods implemented by the regime, this blurring can make establishing the 
I  root cause o f a securitizing move problematic. The overlap of security sectors 
^however is inevitable as many of the principles, ideas and institutions that are at the 
i  heart of the regime have antecedents outside the political sector, for instance the 
9  societal sector or military. Are a regime's actions ethnically motivated or is it trying 
? to assert its authority upon a situation? Is the regime in power targeting institutions 
because they belong to a particular ethnic group, or is the ethnicity of the group 
■J}( secondary to the fact that the regime feels that the group it is targeting is trying to 
1 weaken their ability to govern? Conversely the actions o f the independence 
| movements also need to be scrutinised. Are they attacking the incumbent regime 
j because they feel that the regime has no right to hold power over them, or is it 
I because they do not like the regime’s ethnic make up? This analysis is made doubly 
„ difficult because ethnic slurs can colour the language of the parties involved in a 
|  political struggle. Therefore either making the conflict shift into the societal arena, or 
1 simply give the impression of this occurring. A similar blur can occur between the 
j political and military sectors by virtue of the fact that the governing regime may make 
I a securitizing move in the name of the state, which, if accepted, will provide the 
I regime with the means to remove the threat posed by their political opponents, this
|  action will move the nature of the conflict out of the political and into the military
10I sector.
The problem of identifying which sector the issue that is being securitized is 
|  within is even more acute within premodem states. This is due to the need that they 
J have to establish themselves within the international system as a whole, and also the
Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis p. 146
ct that they are more prone to threats that target the regime’s internal legitimacy, 
as is because the regimes in developing states have not been long established and 
erefore there is the likelihood of those within the state who will question the 
egitimacy of the new regime. However, within modem and postmodern states, the 
egime is more established and accepted as being the norm, and as a result challenges 
o its legitimacy are less likely.21 What are also established within modem regimes 
ire the boundaries of the ordinary and the principles, mles and ideas that lie at the 
■heart of the political order. These will have permeated into the wider population of 
the state and have been accepted. This means that the population itself have become 
flan institution within the regime (for example within democracies) and therefore it 
widens the number of authorities within the sector and therefore the places where a 
move in defence of the political regime can originate.
It is important to note the difference here between principles and values as 
referents that can be securitized. A principle can be securitized as a referent object 
because it can be existentially threatened. Values by contrast cannot, at least not by 
the political unit itself. This is because a value is essentially an individual 
interpretation of the central principal and therefore more difficult to securitize.22 For 
example even a relatively straightforward principle like the belief in the sanctity of 
human life can in actuality lie at the heart of numerous, sometimes opposing values. 
So for instance with regards to the death penalty being the appropriate punishment for 
a convicted murderer, people who are in favour of capital punishment can argue that it 
s acceptable as a form of deterrent and also a method of emphasising the seriousness 
f  the crime, whilst those opposing would argue that all life is sacred. Both cases can
be made using the same central principle. If a principle is deemed to be important 
enough then the threat can be perceived as being existentially damaging to the current 
political order and therefore there is the possibility of securitization.
^hat is a threat in the Political sector?
Having established that it is the political regime that is threatened it is necessary 
o address what it is that constitutes an existential threat to the regime. For Buzan: 
Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state... The idea 
of the state, particularly its national identity and organising ideology, and the 
institutions which express it are the normal target of political threats. Since the 
state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as 
military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state.23 
Therefore within the political sector, whilst the state is an important entity it is not the 
state itself that is threatened but rather the principles, ideas and institutions that make 
p the state. If one imagines that the human body is the state, a political threat does 
ot target the body itself directly but rather the immune system, central nervous 
ystem and those processes that allow the body to function effectively. For Buzan 
d Waever politics is about the discourse between these institutions, the principles 
d ideas that each has, and the discourse between those currently controlling the 
nstitutions and those who wish to change the current order.24
Buzan, People, States and Fear (2nd Edition) p. 118
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For the Copenhagen approach political security is an evolution of the classical
tradition that includes the likes of Machiavelli who see politics as “a continuous
struggle to establish the quasi-permanence of an ordered public realm”25, political
security is about “threats to the legitimacy or recognition either of political units or of
the essential patterns (structures, processes or institutions) among them.”26 It is about
the struggle that political units have in order to establish themselves, and then
maintain their position as a member of the international community. This is not
something that can be achieved via force of will, but rather it is a matter of
“international subjectivity, of statehood and other forms of international being, to
which the individual unit has to relate.”27 For Buzan the political regime has three
main components that can be attacked. These are: Physical Base, Institutions, and
Ideas.28 The physical base is the geographical area that is administered by the regime,
and this can be threatened by several means, and potentially other sectors, namely
economically, environmentally or militarily. If the regime no longer has somewhere
to administer or govern then this will be existentially damaging. The physical base is
.essentially the State itself, and as such it is unlikely that an existential threat to the 
physical base, although it is fundamental to the regime, would be securitized as a 
“political” issue. Rather the move is more likely to be made within the military or 
environmental sectors, depending upon the nature of the threat. Institutions are 
similar in nature to the physical base in that any actual attack upon an institution can 
be explained more effectively through the sector that the physical issue emerged, for 
instance military or economic. The aspect that links both institutions and the physical 
base into the political sector however is in the ideas upon which the political
25 Ibid. p. 144 
H  Ibid.
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institutions (including in many instances the nation state itself) are based.29 Within 
the remit of ideas, any principle can potentially gain significance and be existentially 
threatened; however three that are seen as being particularly important within 
international security policy are nationalism, political ideology and sovereignty. 
These lie at the heart of any regime’s claim to legitimacy and recognition, as they help 
to define that they are the appropriate body to administer their region. This can cause 
problems for premodem states where the claims to statehood are or can be relatively 
recent developments and as such challenges to the legitimacy of the regime can 
become security issues; this is not as likely in the developed world where challenges 
of this nature are more likely to have an institutional or politicised outlet. Thus if the 
ideas that lie at the heart of the regime can be weakened, the nature of the current 
political and social order can also be changed. If the ideas that lie at the heart of a 
regime’s claim to govern are threatened and this threat constitutes an existential threat 
to the regime, the elite will need to use whatever means necessary -  including 
extraordinary measures- to defend the regime. An example of an elite utilising such 
methods to remove a threat to their regime would be the Stalinist purges in the Soviet 
Union. The incarceration and execution of key political opponents by Stalin was a 
way of ensuring his political survival and therefore the survival of his regime.
Securitization in the Political sector and the “Securitization Paradox”
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Copenhagen model of security analysis 
is the primacy of discourse and debate to the establishment o f security threats. The 
dialogue that emerges between the audience and elite that initiates the passage of an 
issue from the politicised to the securitized realms of the security spectrum is
Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis p. 150
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particularly interesting when one examines the political sector. Because of the lack of 
a “physical” referent within this sector, the securitization process is forever rooted 
within the theatre of political discourse in a way that is less apparent within other 
sectors. For instance even within the societal sector there is an actual, real ethnic 
group whose ethnic identity has been threatened, whereas in a political security 
situation it is an idea that is being challenged. As explored above, the three aspects o f 
the political unit can all be threatened but attacks upon the institutions or the physical 
base would be conducted from within other sectors, and as such a securitizing move 
from the elite would be couched as being an existential threat to the referents of these 
sectors rather than the regime. However, for ideas, the existential threat can only be 
made in the name of the regime,30 and because the biggest threat to an idea is another 
competing idea, the discourse and debate that occurs as a response to a threat is even 
lore crucial within the political sector.
The process of securitization within the political sector differs slightly from
I
what occurs within other security sectors. In the other sectors the process that occurs 
is that a securitizing move is made, which may or may not lead to the authorisation 
for the use of extraordinary means to rectify the situation. Within the political sector 
however this is only the start of a larger phenomenon, for there is the secondary 
problem, which I call a “securitization paradox”. The securitization paradox occurs 
because of the dual nature of the discourse. Within the political sector the securitizing 
move is not merely followed by the authorising or denying response from the 
audience, but also a counter-securitizing move from the body that initiated the threat. 
Buzan et al discuss this problem with particular reference to international
30
dthough it may be worded in terms such, as “this is a threat to our way o f  life”.
.
intervention. In this instance the intervening power will call upon a principle in order 
to (justify the extraordinary step of intervention, for example referring to an act o f 
genocide or aggression. Buzan et al observe that in such an instance “dual 
securitization” takes place as the government that is the ‘victim’ of the intervention 
will protest against this act, most likely claiming that its sovereignty is being violated 
and it will do whatever is necessary to defend itself from the violation. What is 
occurring is that there are two competing securitizing acts, which are both in the 
defence of two different but equally fundamental principles.31 As such there will be a 
debate between the opposing sides resulting in compromise, conflict or one side 
backing down.
This dynamic is also of particular relevance to the study of developing states 
and the problems of regime formation itself, more particularly with regards to internal 
security threats. This is because at the early stages of regime formation there are 
typically numerous competing groups all laying claim to the legitimate right to rule. 
Therefore, if one can understand the dynamic o f securitization and counter- 
securitization that occurs within the political sector, then one can have a better 
understanding of what is occurring in at the early stages of regime formation.
It can be argued that this counter-securitization that is observed within the 
political sector is not unique to political security and a discourse of this kind occurs in 
all securitization situations. However because of the fact that the escalation o f 
“hostilities” that occurs within the political sector never leaves the discourse stage, 
this means that the securitization paradox, whilst not unique to the political sector, the
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conditions surrounding political securitization mean that it is more likely to arise here 
than in other sectors. The debate escalates and it can fuel security incidents within 
other sectors but the political security incident itself will remain rooted in discourse, 
the issue only being resolved via compromise on the part of the competing “elites”, or
32the removal of the physical base and/ or institutions through another sector.' The 
paradox is that the political security threat may not actually result in victory for either 
party within the political sector itself.
Within Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis Buzan et al establish two main 
types of dual securitization processes, that can lie at the heart of securitization 
paradoxes: Intentional and Unintentional.33 Intentional threats can originate from 
within the state or from a neighbour and will be a single-minded assault on the regime 
in place with the intention of removing one or all pillars of the regime. An example 
of this would be an independence movement such as the Vietminh in Vietnam. Their 
raison d ’etre was to liberate Vietnam from initially the Japanese and then the colonial 
French. Their defining principle was that of self-determination and it was 
diametrically opposed to the imperialist principles that defined the actions of their 
colonial opponents. Their every act was designed in order to undermine the regimes 
that were in place. Unintentional threats by way of contrast, may have systemic or 
structural antecedents that erode the pillars of the regime and thus necessitate a 
securitizing move. An example of an unintentional security threat would be the 
European Union.34 As this institution grows it encroaches upon areas that would 
traditionally belong to the nation state, for example the right to establish their own
The third possible outcome, one side backing down, is typically a merely a delaying tactic and just 
leaves more time for the ‘disagreement’ to fester.
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laws and rule without external intervention. As such for some Europe is seen as being 
a threat and some groups, for example the United Kingdom Independence Party, 
politicise issues and others, for example the British National Party, go further and 
attempt to securitize issues with reference to sovereignty and national independence, 
claiming that the EU threatens Britain’s political system. If the defining principles of 
one regime put them at odds with another then an unintentional securitization cycle 
can occur, for instance if a regime establishes itself on a principle of being anti­
communist, any communist unit, whether it is internal or external in origin will see 
the regime as a threat and react accordingly, and vice versa. Equally if a regime is 
defined by a principle that loses potency over time, then the very principle that 
offered protection and stability initially can now either become a threat to the current 
political order, which could occur if there was a drastic shift in the balance of power 
between two dominant powers. For example in Indonesia, Sukarno’s decision to 
position his regime to the left and thus allay himself with the Communist powers o f 
the region, in particular the People’s Republic of China, meant that the United States 
and the West saw his regime as being a political threat. Another reason that the 
principles the regime is based on can weaken the regime’s position is if other political 
units no longer recognise the principle as being significant, the idea no longer is 
sufficient to act as a pillar for the regime. A good example o f this would be the New 
Order regime. In 1966 their anti-Communist stance was an adequate foundation and 
was enough to ensure effective relations with the dominant powers in the region. By 
the mid-1990s however this principle was both irrelevant and insufficient and so the 
regime found itself being criticised by the same powers that had supported it at its 
inception. However for the regime that finds itself being existentially threatened,
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whether the attack is intentional or not is essentially irrelevant, as extraordinary 
measures still must be taken in order to re-stabilise the regime.
External Political Security in Premodem Regimes
Within the current literature there is a bias towards the study of externally based 
security threats.36 There are several reasons for this, firstly due to the dominance of 
Realism in international relations there is a bias towards a systemic ontological 
perspective within the literature. This is not purely symptomatic of the perspectives 
of the writers, but also it reflects the attitudes of the audience, in this case the Euro- 
American academic communities who still make up the mainstream of the discipline. 
Whilst there is a move away from state centric perspectives (as was shown in the 
Introduction) the dominance of Realism and Neo-realism still permeates these 
alternative approaches. Secondly, because the research was being carried out by 
Europeans, and the primary case studies for the initial research was the western world, 
in particular Western Europe, then it is not surprising their research was more 
concerned on external issues. This is due to the fact that in the security calculations 
of these regimes the simple truth is that political security threats are concerned with 
interstate relations, due to the fact that their domestic situation is relatively fixed and 
stable, and therefore unlikely to be threatened from an internal actor.37 This means 
that the threats directed towards these regimes were predominantly issues that 
questioned the regimes position in the international system itself, namely issues of 
external recognition. This is highlighted further within A New Framework where in 
exploring and defining potential political security challenges the text focuses almost
35 Ibid. pp. 154-59
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exclusively on the two principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and the 
discourse between the state elite and external actors.38 Where the possibility of local 
security challenges does arise, the text argues that whilst political challenges are 
rarely regional/bilateral engagements, but also they are “almost never local 
[intrastate]” affairs.39 However, for many developing states external security, that is 
ensuring recognition from the international system, whilst it is important, is secondary 
to the immediate problem of establishing a legitimate claim to power. Whilst it is true 
that external recognition is vital for the fledgling regime, the immediacy of internal 
threats can have a far more debilitating effect upon their chances of survival. It is 
this problem that Mohammed Ayoob addresses in The Third World Security 
Predicament.
Ayoob observes “[given] the historical juncture at which Third World states 
find themselves, this means their security calculus must take into account domestic as 
well as external threats.”40 The juncture that Ayoob is highlighting is the immediate 
aftermath of colonial rule, where for most third world states the single most important 
action that must be undertaken is the nation building process. This is where the new 
political order is established, the ideas are formulised, and the factors that make the 
political unit what it is, both physical and ideological, are laid down. Ayoob 
stipulates that there are three main activities that make up this are; War, Policing, and 
Taxation. Whilst these three processes do not effectively show all of the processes 
that are at work during the regime formation process what Ayoob does highlight is the 
mechanism by which the state elite establish both the physical base and also the
38 Ibid. pp. 150-60
39Ibid. p. 159
Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Inc., 1995) p. 11
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t formation of the primary institutions that allow a regime to function. War is 
I concerned with the expansion and consolidation of the “territorial and demographic 
! domain” that the regime will administer.41 This is the establishment of the physical 
I base upon which the regime is based. For Ayoob war also incorporates the activity of 
I imposing order upon those within the “domain”. Once order has been imposed then 
9 policing becomes the primary activity. For Ayoob, policing is “[the] maintenance of 
I order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, such order has already 
I been imposed”.42 This is a long-term project and in order to be successful requires 
I full implementation of the third activity, taxation. Taxation is “[the] extraction of 
I resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state essential 
I to support not only the war-making and policing activities undertaken by the state but 
also maintenance of apparatuses of state necessary to carry on routine administration, 
I deepen the state’s penetration of society, and serve symbolic purposes.”43 In short 
I these three activities are necessary to enable a new regime to establish itself (war), but 
I then also ensure that it is able to sustain any and all threats that come its way (policing 
I and taxation). What Ayoob is describing here is the creation of the physical base and 
I institutions that are the foundations of the regime. It is the role of a new regime’s
f elite to move its physical base/state through the developmental spectrum in order to
.attain an advantageous position, namely modem and ultimately postmodern status.
However for new regimes, this first task is a far from straightforward operation. 
This is because aside from the “universal” challenges of war, policing and taxation, 
regimes that are entering the current international political system face a second 
significant problem. The problem is that the current system is a far less favourable
ybid. p.22
Jbid. pp.22-3
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environment than the one in which their predecessors developed. There have been 
I changes in the international system, both in terms of technology and ideology, that 
mean the developing state is constantly being assessed, monitored and judged by 
others. The technological changes are quite fundamental to the world that we now 
find ourselves in. When the European and American regimes were established the 
world was a very different in terms of communication and transportation, and it is 
developments within these two technological areas that have a fundamental impact 
upon new regimes today. The world today is a far more accessible place, to the extent 
that to a large degree if something has a significant impact upon one part of the globe, 
then it has repercussions everywhere else. This is due to developments within 
transportation and communication. The developments in transportation mean that 
people travel much more widely and cheaply, meaning that these once unknown or far 
away places are now known and more readily visited. This means that people now 
J have affinities with these places and therefore feel affected by events that happen 
there. Developments in communication have had a far more serious impact, for not 
only can people travel to these places, but they can now relay information about what 
is going on there to people back home, instantaneously. This has lead to the creation 
of a mass media, which quickly and effectively draws attention to anything that is 
considered inappropriate by western populations. This ties in with the changes that 
have occurred in terms o f ideology, particularly in postmodern regimes. A significant 
' change that has emerged from the west, but it has spread, is that there is an acceptance 
of universal rights, which all human beings should enjoy. This means that if or when, 
the media report on events that occur in the developing world, it can provoke a 
reaction from western populations. Therefore, not only does the regime need to 
effectively resolve the issues of war, policing and taxation, but it has to do this in a
way that is deemed to be acceptable by the rest o f the international system, or at the 
Very least it must not behave in a way that alienates itself from the more powerful 
regimes within the system. This is not because there is any real risk o f external 
Intervention, but rather there is a need on the part o f the new regime to “fit in” with 
the dominant regimes in the system. If it is perceived as being a rogue regime then it 
lean have repercussions in matters such as economic policy or tourism.
The second problem that new regimes face is that they need to establish 
themselves quickly. The European and western regimes were able to develop at their 
own pace, able to slowly resolve problems in the most effective way. This ensured 
that the regimes that developed were stable, legitimate in the eyes of their 
populations, and recognised by other regimes. This process created a template of 
what a regime and nation-state should be. It is this template that all new regimes need 
to emulate, and it also the standard by which new regimes are measured. However, in 
the current order, new regimes do not have the luxury of time that their predecessors 
were afforded and this means that they find it difficult to attain the results that they 
desire and thus the nation building process is more difficult.
In the same way as the rest of the world is now able to observe and therefore 
influence the nation building process, those regimes in development are also able to 
I  see those that have already developed, and this interaction has an effect upon their 
■own actions. One possible outcome is that they will not find an effective, “unique” 
.^solution to their developmental issues. Instead they follow the example that was left 
jto them by the states that have already attained modem or postmodern status.
|  However, in so doing they may not actually find an appropriate solution to the
-
problems that they face. After all the realities that a seventeenth century European 
regime faced are not the same as those of a twentieth century regime in Southeast 
Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa.44 The second side effect of the interaction that 
premodem regimes face is that because there are states already ‘flaunting’ the fruits of 
velopment, the new regimes work to an accelerated timetable to reap the benefits 
emselves. They are constantly in a state of playing ‘catch-up’ with the rest o f the 
orld, and because of this comers may be cut in the building of the pillars o f the 
olitical unit itself. This means that important developmental issues may be 
verlooked in their policy formulation as they focus their attention on the “goal” of 
ecoming “developed”. This leaves them vulnerable to criticism; both from within 
d without, and therefore inevitably weakens their position developmentally 
peaking.
Whilst Ayoob does not explicitly discuss the third pillar of the regime (founding 
principles and ideas), he does observe that within third world security the options 
available to a developing regime are limited by the principles of the international 
system that these regimes find themselves in. Historically the principle of sovereignty 
was so engrained and dominant that what occurred within a nation's boarders was its 
business and no one else’s. This means that whilst nation building was a violent and 
bloody process, there was no public out cry or external intervention to limit the 
actions of the developing regimes. For regimes in the twentieth and twenty first 
centuries however the principle of sovereignty is less dominant as it once was to those 
members of the international system who are positioned in the postmodern area on the 
development spectrum, which is compounded by the presence of the global mass
media, and it means that the options available to a regime are again limited, as they do 
not wish to gamer negative publicity. At the same time the international system 
dictates that in order to be accepted as an equal member of the system, then the new 
states must behave and act in the same way as the current members. This creates an 
extra level of pressure as the state attempts to resolve its problems using methods that 
are not necessarily best suited for the task.45 This as a notion parallels the 
Copenhagen schools principle of recognition. An example of this would be Sukarno’s 
attempts to establish a western style democracy in Indonesia post independence. This 
was an attempt at emulating existing models of state administration, but Sukamo 
ibandoned this system in 1957, claiming that “[Indonesia] had used the wrong 
'Stem, a wrong style o f government...an import democracy.. .not in harmony with 
our [Indonesia’s] spirit.. .not in harmony with our personality”.46 Sukamo went on to
describe his model o f Guided Democracy, or Gotong Rojong, as being “an authentic
.
Indonesian term which gives the purest reflection of the Indonesian soul” 47 By 
behaving in the same way as an established regime behaves, therefore the regime will 
gamer the same recognition and respect. In much the same way as in human 
psychological development, we feel the need to fit in and be part o f a group, political 
regimes want to be part of the international group of states. They want to be viewed 
J>y other regimes as being an equal, or at the very least valid. This need for 
recognition therefore hinders their own actions and policies, and so they must conduct 
lemselves not only with their goals in mind, but also the opinions and values of the 
rest of the international community and their neighbours.
45
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The consequences of failing to balance these two problems can be incredibly 
detrimental to the security of the regime that is in place. For Ayoob security is 
defined in relation to vulnerabilities “that threaten or have the potential to bring down 
or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and [the] governing
difficult circumstances. If a regime were able to totally ignore the opinions and 
values of the international community, then this could potentially enable the elite to 
more effectively remedy the regime’s internal vulnerabilities and conduct its nation 
building, in a way more appropriate for their particular problems. However, even
because the regimes actions may violate the founding principles o f other regimes in 
the international system, this means that the regime may indirectly weaken itself with 
respect to its external vulnerabilities. And whilst it is unlikely that the regime will 
come under direct threat from an external power, the elite may however find that it is 
£not viewed favourably in other areas of international politics and diplomacy, for 
example the economic sanctions towards Cuba since 1957, South Africa in the 1960s, 
70s and 80s, and Iraq in the 1990s. Even more damaging is the possibility o f an 
[external regime offering support to an internally based rival and thus strengthening 
;their cause against the incumbent regime. The seriousness of the violation and the 
jimportance that the violated principle holds to the offended regime would determine 
jthe magnitude o f their response, however ultimately it could result in the regime being
[weakened. By contrast if the regime remains focused upon the wishes o f the
regimes.”48 At the heart of third world security policy is the need to limit these
vulnerabilities,i s, but as explored above, the ruling elites must try to achieve this under
hough their internal situation may be perfectly, uniquely, and appropriately resolved,
pxistentially threatened by an external power, or at the very least the regime would be
48
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Ltemational community and neglects their domestic agenda, then either the nation
holding process could fail, or other groups within the state will make the claim that 
they are better suited to administer power. This could result in an existential threat 
from within. The regime’s legitimacy can then be questioned and if it is to survive 
then extraordinary measures would be required to remedy the situation. So even 
though the primary concern of a premodem regime is internal in focus, the regime’s 
elite’s task is even more difficult due to the state of the international system that they 
are in. The nature of the current political system means that external political threats 
can negatively impact upon their primary task of nation/state formation and
development. And so whilst unlike in postmodern regimes where security challenges 
are “almost never local”, the external challenges are likely to have internal 
repercussions. And many of the internal challenges will actually have external 
antecedents.
Internal Political Security  in P rem odem  R egim es 
Internal security is based upon ability of the regime to be legitimate in the eyes 
of those that it has power over. Legitimacy is the cement that holds a regime in place; 
it “achieves what power alone cannot, for it establishes the belief in the rightness of 
rule which, as long as it endures, precludes massive challenges”.49 Regime legitimacy 
is concerned with the acknowledgement of the regimes claim to govern, and it is 
obtained through dialogue with those who are to be governed. It is a dual process in 
which the right to command is coupled with the obligation to obey by the populous.'0 
If the population do not feel obliged to obey, for instance if they do not feel the ruling
- ___________________________________
Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University o f
California Press, 1978) p. 17
1 AlaSaPpa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia p .l 1
ite represent their interests, then political legitimacy is insecure and therefore the 
J:gime may be existentially threatened. Examples of where the population do notI
acknowledge the right to rule of the regime would be the case of the Republican
movement in Northern Ireland or the Basque separatists in Spain. In both of these
1
ases sections of the ruled population feel no obligation to obey the ruling elite and
us the legitimacy of the regimes are weakened in those regions. The dual process
■
model is adequate when defining political legitimacy and therefore security in most 
developed/democratic regimes. Here the population at large has a significant and 
frequently constitutionally defined role to play. This means that any incumbent 
government inherits a secure and legitimate position, with out the regime itself being 
called into question. However the dual process model is less apt for addressing the 
jissues of legitimacy that emerge within premodem/developing states.51 Here the role 
jof the population is less favourable than those of developed/democratic regimes, and 
in particular with reference to authoritarian regimes. In authoritarian regimes the 
[population as a whole appear to have a very little role to play at all in the process of  
legitimisation. This particular criticism has been levelled toward the Copenhagen 
jmodel by Ralf Emmers. The critique lies in the fact that during the process of 
securitization, the securitizing authority or elite must engage with an audience. But in 
ijjan authoritarian regime who or what is this audience, and why would a dictatorship be 
^required to take part in the discourse that securitization logic suggests?^2 It would 
Appear that by its very nature an authoritarian regime would not make this move. An 
authoritarian elite would have no need for audience participation, and thus it would
Definitions of modem, premodem and postmodern states discussed on pp.42-3 o f  this thesis 
Emmers and others participating in the Non-traditional security project at the Institute o f Defence 
\ lnd Strategic Studies in Nanyang, Singapore have voiced this concern with the Copenhagen framework 
Fi correspondence, though as yet have not expressed it in print.
appear that the Copenhagen framework does not, or cannot explain what occurs in 
these regime types.
Therefore, whilst securitization theory can be used to examine why some 
challenges become security issues in the modem and postmodern world, it appears to 
be less useful when examining challenges that face developing states. Where 
authoritarian regimes and dictatorships seemingly pay no heed to the wills o f the 
/people, or the people are too terrorised to feel able to speak up against the wishes of 
the regime that is in power. That said the fact that the securitizing authority is 
undemocratic does not change the need to gain legitimacy. This is because in the 
current international political system, the dominant states all place emphasis on the 
need for other regimes to mirror the same political systems that they adopted, which 
includes being legitimate.53 This is another example of internal and external political 
security issues overlapping, the need of the regime to be recognised means that it also 
needs to be legitimate. A regime’s actions need to be seen as coming from a 
legitimate source, and because the regime that is in place wants to be recognised and 
be secure from external pressures, the regime will therefore do what it can in order to 
be seen to be legitimate. In the Words of Muthiah Alagappa:
Legitimation of power is an interactive and therefore dynamic process among 
the government, the elite groups, and the politically significant public: those in 
power seek to legitimate their control and exercise of that power; [and] the 
subjects seek to define their subordination in acceptable terms54
>4 ^?zan anc^  Waever, Regions and Power p.24
agappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia p. 13 (Emphasis added)
Therefore for Alagappa the existence of a less than democratic system does not 
ultimately change the process by which legitimation is achieved, rather he believes 
that it is occurring in a more selective way. By this I mean that the regime still seeks 
the approval of an audience, but rather than looking for the acceptance of the entire 
population, they target an audience of the “politically significant”. Now depending on 
the nature of the regime in place, who and what is significant will vary, but the 
process of legitimisation still needs to be undertaken, and an audience needs to be in 
place. Alagappa goes on to explain the process of legitimisation as being 
“characterized by projections and counter projections of legitimacy, by contestation of 
meanings, and by deployment of resources including coercion, negotiation, and 
possibly suppression and elimination.”55 Thus Alagappa has highlighted the dual 
process of the securitization paradox, and interestingly this paradox is perhaps more 
evident within developing/non-democratic regimes than within the developed world 
that the securitization approach is argued to favour. For Alagappa the nature of the 
struggle is an attempt by the contesting parties, that is the regime and those opposed 
to the regime, to gain legal validity for their principles and also gain consent from 
their audience.56 The legal validity is of importance as it gives the regime/or counter 
regime, the power to define the realm of the ordinary, and in doing so setting the 
boundaries of the extra-ordinary, thereby creating the parameters o f any securitizing 
moves that they may wish to make. This discourse lies at the heart of the 
securitization paradox. An important part of this process is to ensure that “adequate 
procedures exist for the population to express their dissatisfaction... [thereby ensuring 
that] they can be satisfied within the existing political framework”.57 What this
suggests is that even within an authoritarian system there is a need to establish within
---------------------------------------
: 2Ibid. pp. 13-4 
'bid. p. 14
ollins, Security and Southeast Asia p.64
1^tfeeir political regime an appropriate safety valve of this nature. This does not mean 
the formation o f democracy, or a free press, but rather the “politically significant” 
must feel that they have an avenue or mechanism whereby they can channel their 
frustrations. For instance within Indonesia both Sukarno and Suharto established a 
parliamentary system of politics where potential politically significant dissidents 
ould participate within their respective regimes. If a regime does not effectively find 
place to channel potential opposition then their ability to govern will be hampered, 
his is because their energies will be spent using non-political means, for example 
artial law, to secure themselves. This is necessary to ensure the longevity of the 
egime, because any potential opposition can be satisfied without needing to resort to 
ethods that may existentially threaten those in power. If the regime is particularly 
areful in how they define their political institutions, principles and frameworks, in 
ssence defining the ordinary, then they will be able to keep many of the more
CO m B
ndesirable actions of regime formation outside of the securitized area of the 
olitical spectrum. This is beneficial not only in securing the regime internally, but 
Iso in being able to avoid drawing undue attention to the less favourable processes of 
ation building, this allows them to secure their legitimacy without negatively 
ffecting their international standing vis a vis their external recognition.
Jite-Audience discourse in Premodem Regimes
The elite of the regime will emerge from out of the same group that make up 
heir politically significant audience.59 Therefore when the ordinary is defined, it is 
arried out with reference to a pre-existing framework of the social and ideological
From the perspective o f  the international system.
Tobias Theiler, ‘Societal security and social psychology’ Review o f  International Studies Vol.29 
°03)p.261
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principles, which are shared by both the elite and the audience. This means that 
authoritarian regimes can achieve a degree of legitimacy that would appear alien from 
a western/liberal perspective.
A command-obedience relationship may be defined as legitimate if  the political 
order in which it is rooted is based on shared norms and values, if the 
government in concern acquired power in conformity with established rules, if 
that power is exercised within prescribed limits for the promotion of the 
community’s collective interest, and if the governed have given their consent to 
the incumbent government.60
This acceptance of an authoritarian regime can also be explained by the 
circumstances in which it came to gain power. For example, “it may have brought 
bout the removal of a despotic regime or of an authority installed by an external 
gency such as a colonial power”.61 If a regime is perceived as being more favourable 
ban their predecessor, then there is every possibility that the politically significant 
udience will accept what the new regime offers. Once the new regime’s rules and 
orms have been accepted, then the regime will be judged in accordance with them, 
f they are found wanting then there is the possibility that the audience will rebel and 
hus become a threat to the regime. The audience will judge the regime based on two 
riteria, firstly on whether they follow and obey their own rules, in other words, is the 
■egim e corrupt, and secondly based upon their performance in using the power.62 
Both of these criteria are viewed subjectively by the internal audience, and whilst in 
jheory they hold equal importance for judging the effectiveness of the regime, in 
leality so long as the regime performs well, then the regime can still maintain an
6] /A^ a§aPpa. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia p. 15
t  Collins. Security and Southeast Asia p.67
< Alagappa. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia p.21
effective grasp on power irrespective of corruption.63 So long as those within the
audience feel that the regime is working effectively for their best interest, then other
misdemeanours can be overlooked.64 This is however a dangerous position for a
. . .
regime, because if  it is corrupt and relying on its performance alone for legitimisation, 
then there is the possibility that their performance will at some point fail to meet the 
standards of their audience. If this occurs then the regime will be in a weakened 
josition and therefore vulnerable to political threats.
External vs. Internal: Political sector securitization in premodem regimes
The current output of work that is concerned with Political sector securitization 
las a major failing. It is overly biased towards examining the issues that effect 
western modem and postmodern regimes. In its raw state the theory is inadequate for 
examining the complexities of the nation formation process that much of the world is 
undergoing. The bias towards external security threats suggests that the framework is 
unable to address the internal security crises of premodem regimes. However, Buzan 
et al acknowledge that the Political sector is incredibly complex and the framework is 
still being developed. Not only by Buzan and Waever themselves,6? but also in the 
ingoing research of both security and area specialists.66 I believe that by 
incorporating the ideas of Ayoob and Alagappa within the framework of political 
securitization as outlined by the Copenhagen school, a more robust and satisfactory
David Beetham, Legitimation o f  Power (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 
4^ 9l) pp. 136-42
This is also true o f the external audience who can and will ignore much so long as they feel the 
iegime that is in power is performing effectively for their (the audience’s) best interests.
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Power
See Ralf Emmers, Non-traditional Security in the Asia Pacific (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish 
ntemational, 2004); Amitav Acharya, M ely Caballero Anthony and Ralf Emmers (eds.) Non- 
waditional Security in A sia: Dilemmas in Securitisation (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006); and 
bn Collins, Security and Southeast Asia.
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analytical framework becomes available. The work of Ayoob highlights with greater
clarity the problems that face premodem states and in particular the external
challenges that face developing regimes. The inclusion of Alagappa defines the
legitimation process that all regimes undergo and this gives a greater understanding of
the utility or even applicability, of the securitization approach when examining
authoritarian regimes. This operationalisation of political security was necessary to
address the criticisms of the political sector, especially with regard to third world
jcurity challenges. In part two of this thesis I will examine the case study of post-
jolonial Indonesia. Between 1945 and 1997 Indonesia experienced several political
security challenges that this framework will enable a better and clearer understanding
)f. These challenges are: How did an effective Indonesian independence movement
jmerge and how did they gain sufficient legitimacy and recognition to effectively
tsurp the Dutch colonial powers? How did this new regime fare once it had
sstablished itself as the new regime? What methods did Sukarno use, and what
listakes were made, in attempting to establish the pillars of the new Indonesian
Ration state? How did Sukarno manage the external political security situation? And
inally in relation to the Sukarno era, what was the nature of the political assault in
1965 that ultimately lead to his removal from power and the emergence of the New
Order regime under Suharto? With respect to the Suharto era, what methods did the 
1New Order regime employ, how did they differ from Sukarno and perhaps equally 
importantly, what lessons were learnt? How did the New Order ensure that it was 
able to maintain a secure grip on power, how were they able to effectively control the 
creation of boundaries of the ordinary and ex/ra-ordinary? What role did external 
security issues have in the life of the New Order regime, both in terms of its creation, 
it longevity, and perhaps ultimately its demise? What had changed in terms of the
effectiveness of the regime and the nature of the audience, why did the New Order 
collapse?
j^hapter Two: Operationalising Societal Security: Social Psychology and Social
Identity Theory.
The concept of societal security is a recent phenomenon, developed from the 
works of both Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, of the Copenhagen school. In the 
societal sector, the referent object is not society itself but rather the numerous sub­
groups that make up society, the identities that we subscribe to, that make up who we 
are.
“For international security analysis, the key to society is those ideas and 
practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is 
about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals
identifying themselves as members of a community. These identities are
. .distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly political
.
organisations concerned with government” p. 119
Whilst the definition above seems simple enough the concept of societal 
ecurity is actually problematic and therefore it is necessary to clarify the terminology 
rther. For the purposes of securitization analysis societal security is about the large, 
self-sustaining identity groups that individuals align themselves to. So one may say 
that societal security is about addressing the security of society, however even this is 
problematic, this is because society is often used to refer to the greater/wider term of 
state population. Whilst initially an acceptable assumption, when one spends any 
time examining state dynamics, particularly within developing states, it becomes clear 
that the state is rarely a group that has a collective identity. In actuality a states
Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.,
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‘society’ may be made up of several societal units, or multiple identities, that share no 
common connections aside from that they share geographical proximity. What the 
Copenhagen approach argues is that it is these societal groups that are the referent 
object of the Societal Sector. Societal groups are self-defming, self referential and 
self-sustaining. The membership of these groups chose to be part o f the entity and 
identify with it and other members of the group. This term as defined by the 
Copenhagen school is not without its critics, one critic of note for instance was Bill 
IcSweeney who argues that the Copenhagen school was attempting to objectify 
identity in a way that is inconsistent with the fluid nature of identity itself. That is, all 
social identities are self referential and “imagined”2, by their very nature they change 
md alter both as a natural process o f them being, in other words identities simply 
change from time to time and place to place evolving to suit the needs of the 
individuals that make up a societal group. Because of this McSweeney argues it is 
iroblematic to make identity the referent object in a security context because it is 
lifficult if not impossible to establish what is a genuine threat to a given group and 
diat is in actuality an evolution of the identity. McSweeney sees identity not as 
)eing an abstract fact, something that is “out there” to be studied, but rather that “it is 
process of negotiation among people and interest groups”4, and as such to objectify 
it in anyway creates problems. This is because it will mislead the scholar into 
>elieving society can be empirically examined, in other words our theories of what is 
Jccurring within society can be modelled and compared to “the real world”, 
something that McSweeney feels is impossible. He also feels that the Copenhagen 
rgument is mistaken in believing that there is one identity within society that could
3 i^ea supported in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso: London, 1991) 
vjJk dl McSweeney, ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’ Review o f  International
Studies Vol.22, N o.l (1996) pp 81-93
be identified and thus objectified as a point of reference in the study o f security, in his 
defence McSweeney was criticising early concepts of societal security5, however I 
believe he was misinterpreting what it was Waever et al were trying to emphasise as 
being “societal”. Rather than the sub-groups that constitute what we commonly 
understand as being society, McSweeney was instead viewing societal security as 
being about assaults upon society as a whole, and by society meaning the cultural 
equivalent of the state, he did not see that it is actually possible to have numerous 
identities within the same society.
Buzan et al took the questions raised by McSweeney seriously however they 
argue they were misplaced. Their response is this, that whilst identity is changing and 
does change there is still a core notion of what it is to be whatever you claim to be, so 
'or instance whilst what constitutes and Englishman in 2005 is different than what 
ade an Englishman in 1955, certain key themes would allow them to recognise each 
ther, and also the fact that they both claim to identify themselves with the label 
‘Englishman” means that the concept has utility. One could argue that the analysis of 
ecurity is essentially a snap shot of a given place at a given time, when viewed in this 
ight the fluid nature of identity has no bearing on the analysis. Also as securitization 
s about the survival o f the referent object, even a fluid object will have a notion of 
hat it means to not survive. For instance:
“The state is not a constant either, yet there is a lot of security policy to defend 
it. France has changed over the centuries, but there is a French security policy. 
There are actors who mobilize security policy in the defence of something 
which is ‘thingish’ enough to be invoked in this way. Identities too can be
5
That is pre 1998 and the more formal establishment o f the concept o f securitization within Security: a 
New Framework fo r  Analysis.
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. defended. This does not imply that identities do not change, only that we 
\ should not expect everything to change all the time: certain things stay the same 
h throughout the period relevant for an analysis. A very big part of social science 
j is about what we take a relatively more fixed than what.”6
I f  we were to ignore any socially constructed notion from being a referent object, then 
social scientists would very quickly run out of things to study. The Copenhagen 
School argue that whilst it is true that we could study the process of identity 
formation, in much the same way as we examine the processes that lead to the 
formation of states, however just as it can be superfluous to over analyse the historical 
context that lead one to understand “why” a particular security problem has occurred 
to a state, so to it is necessary to accept that a particular identity does exist and that it 
is struggling to survive. Also McSweeney’s claim that identity is “never more that a 
provisional and fluid image of ourselves as we want to be”7is seen by Buzan and the 
Copenhagen school as being misleading as identity itself can, in fact often, becomes 
"fsolidly sedimented” within our social reality and is seemingly if  not actually an
• ft •  • aimmovable object within the “real world”. The heart of this difference of opinions is 
in ascertaining what identity actually is, is it a fluid, abstract value that individuals 
give value and meaning to, or is it “an intersubjectively constituted social factor”?9 
For the Copenhagen School it is the latter. That is, identity is given validity and 
meaning, not merely by individuals laying claim to it, but rather it is sedimented by 
interactions with either others who also lay claim to the identity, or by those who view 
themselves as being different. McSweeney criticises the Copenhagen approach
Sparry Buzan and Ole Waever, ‘Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically untenable? The Copenhagen 
school replies’ Review o f  International Studies Vol.23, No.2 (2000) p.243 
gPiU McSweeney, ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’ p.90 
Buzan and Waever, ‘Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically untenable?’ p.244, also explored more 
^lly below. 
id. p.245
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regarding this position, as this would mean that all self determined notions of identity 
Would be relegated into the “black hole of individualism”.10 In other words, for 
McSweeney identity is self determined and therefore impossible to objectively study 
because of its individualistic nature. This is not to argue that identity is irrelevant but 
rather the Copenhagen project is flawed in thinking that it is able to objectify identity 
as a referent. By contract because the Copenhagen School see identity as being 
determined intersubjectively, this means that once a group has established for itself 
what “it” is, then a social object has been created, and it is this that they claim can be 
tudied as a referent for the societal sector.
ocial Psychology
Despite the engagement on the concepts of identity and societal sub-groups that 
as taken place within the literature,11 there still exists however an analytical 
ncertainty regarding the validity of identity as a referent. For whilst it is apparent 
that some security instances do appear to have societal elements, the responses to the 
riticisms of McSweeney and others as to how identity can be attacked threatened, 
nd existentially destroyed, have not been fully addressed by the Copenhagen school 
r their supporters. And if one is unable to fully address these questions then the
Bill McSweeney, “Durkheim and the Copenhagen school: a response to Buzan and Waever” Review  
- International Studies Vol.24 (1998) pp. 138-9 
Aside from the initial discussions between McSweeney, and Buzan and Waever in McSweeney, 
dentity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, Buzan and Waever, ‘Slippery? 
ontradictory? Sociologically untenable? ’, McSweeney, “Durkheim and the Copenhagen school: a 
isponse to Buzan and Waever”, McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology o f  
International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) (Passim ) but in particular 
PP-68-78. A wider body o f  literature concerning this sector has also emerged. Including Michael C. 
^Williams “Modernity, identity and security: a comment on the ‘Copenhagen controversy”’ Review o f  
I International Studies Vol.24 (1998) pp435-39, Michael C. Williams, “Identity and the Politics o f  
jpfiecurity” European Journal o f  InternationalRelations Vol.4, No.2 (1998) 204-225, Paul Roe, “The 
Jdj^astate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?” Journal o f  peace research Vol.36 No.2 
# 9 9 9 ) pp 183-202, Pinar Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions o f Security” International 
f t udies Review Vol.5, N o .2 (2003) pp.203-22.
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validity of the societal sector within the Copenhagen framework is thus called into 
question. This is a point taken up by Tobias Theiler within his article ‘Societal 
Security and Social Psychology’, in which he argues that the holes in logic within the 
Copenhagen school’s framework not only can be, but also already have been filled 
within the findings of social psychology.12 It is important to note that the vast 
majority of social psychology is dominated by the study of individuals and in fact this 
is perhaps why the vast bulk of the research in this discipline has either been ignored 
or simply gone unnoticed by scholars of international relations, however that being 
said there is a growing movement within social psychology that acknowledges that 
there is a “psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of 
individuals”.13 It is these processes that social psychology purports to explain, it is 
the study of “those mental products which are created by a community of human life 
and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness since they
1 4 . • •presuppose the reciprocal action of many”. It is this group/collective perception of
identity that is necessary to fully address the concerns of the Copenhagen schools
ritics, and thus eradicate the problems associated with identity as a referent object.
of Social Identity Theory (SIT). SIT is a method of explaining not only how and why
social groups, and thus social identities, form but also why people need to form these 
groups in the first place. The following section explores the development of the 
^Social Psychology, starting with the work that was carried out in order to explain how 
individual group identities form and develop. This degree of analysis into the process 
of identity formation does contradict assertions within the Copenhagen approach that
Tobias Theiler, ‘Societal security and social psychology’ Review o f  International Studies V ol.29 
(3 003) pp.249-268
u 1 M  Allport, Social Psychology. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924) p.4 
W. Wundt cited in Michael A. Hogg and Graham M. Vaughan, Social Psychology. (Third Edition) 
arlow, Essex; Pearson Education Limited, 2002 ) p.l 12
t0 study these processes would be “superfluous”,15 however I believe that it is by 
understanding these processes in more detail that we understand the empirical validity 
df identity as a referent object. Theiler’s study drew particular attention to the recent 
developments of Social Psychology, but I contend that by understanding how the
developed its understanding of group formation and dynamics, then we too 
as scholars of international relations and security studies will also have a clearer
d why we as individuals form groups is one that has been at 
id political science since its inception, whether it is to escape 
;imise our interests social psychology offers us an 
anation of our behaviour and actions as a collective, be that 
ietal groups. SIT was not the first concept that attempted to 
nenon. In 1966 Muzafer Sherif introduced the Realistic 
vhich was a way to explain the peculiarities not just of group 
roup behaviour.
refer to relations between two or more groups and their 
Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, 
ually, with another group or its members in terms o f  their 
ve have an instance of intergroup behaviour” 16 
as being based upon seeking goals and competition between
T'jnerent social groups. Groups formed based upon the competition amongst
,#|   --------------------
15 . .
16 As is discussed earlier in this thesis p.73
■Muzafer Sherif cited in Hogg and Vaughan, Social Psychology p.390 (emphasis in original)
Understanding of what identity is and why it is significant.
Realistic Conflict Theory
dividuals. If individuals can function/survive on their own they will, however if
ere emerges a goal that can only be achieved via interdependence and cooperation
then a group will form. This observation is not one that is new to IR scholars, and it
has parallels to the stag hunt that Rousseau describes in Inequality, where the need to
eat drives the five hunters to group together to capture a stag.17 The hunger overrides
.the individual desire to be independent, by acting as a group they will profit and thus 
a group is formed. However, Sherif proposes that when there are mutually exclusive 
oals, that is when there are not enough resources to share, and then it will lead to 
ter individual competition. To continue the stag hunt analogy this is when the 
pportunity for the individual to capture a hare, at the expense of the group as a 
hole, then he or she will take this and thus ensure their survival.18 The key thing 
hat Sherif notes is that this behaviour is reflected in intergroup relations as well.
Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory (Sherif 1966)19
Shared Goal Requiring 
Interdependence
Mutually Exclusive Goal
Interpersonal Relations Interpersonal Cooperation
I
Interpersonal Competition
i
Group Formation Interpersonal Conflict
Group Solidarity Reduced Group Solidarity
Group Collapse
I  Rousseau cited in Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University 
f ^ . 1 9 5 4 )  pp.167-8a i bid.
u  H°gg and Vaughan, Social Psychology, p.392
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Intergroup Relations Intergroup Cooperation
Intergroup Harmony
Intergroup Competition
Intergroup Conflict
.So for RCT the natural state of things is independence whether as an individual or, 
once one has been formed, as a group. This creates an ethnocentric view of the world 
in which there is an us and a them, or those who are cooperating and those who are 
not. The only way to overcome this bias is with the introduction of a “Superordinate 
goal”, in fact in experiments to try and replicate the intergroup conflict observed by 
Sherif in his initial experiments British researchers Tyerman and Spencer discovered 
that whilst testing a group of boy scouts the pre-existing superordinate relationship 
that the boys had meant that any attempts to promote or even provoke conflict were to 
no avail, by contrast it was easy to increase intergroup cooperation. Tyerman and 
Spencer concluded that this was due to the overarching, pre-existing identity as scouts 
counteracted the sub-group/patrol mentality that RCT predicted would dominate 
proceedings.20
Minimal Group Paradigm
In the early 1970s researchers began to get interested in what it took to form a 
social group and so Henri Tajfel initiated experiments to establish what the minimum 
requirements were. They wanted to see what conditions are “both necessary and
W bid . pp.392-3
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sufficient for a collection of individuals to be ethnocentric and to engage in intergroup 
competition”.21 The first experiment in 1971 took a group of British schoolboys and 
divided them into two separate groups randomly, although the participants were told 
that they were divided based on their preference between the works of two 
anonymous artists. The children were then told which group they belonged to and 
that another group existed, although they had no idea as to who was in their group (in­
group) or the other group (out-group), as their identities were concealed by code 
numbers. The participants were then told to distribute an amount of money between 
pairs of recipients based only on code number and which group they belonged to. In 
repeated experiments the results showed that the children developed a distribution 
strategy that favoured their own group.22 This was a surprising finding as these 
groups had no history or chance of a future, there was no basis for the members of the 
groups to favour those who were in their group other than the fact that they were 
members of the group, there was not even any possibility of financial gain as the 
participants could not assign money to themselves. The only explanation was that the 
fact that they were members of a group meant that they wanted their group to be more
than the out-group.
Later experiments were developed with the intention to create even more 
ihinimal groups. In 1973 Billig and Tajfel divided the participants into X and Y 
groups and explicitly told those involved that they were being divided randomly so as 
to avoid any possibility that group members may feel a kinship or connection with 
their fellow members for some other reason, for instance that they liked the same
"Vbid. p.399
J  Henri Tajfel et al, ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’ European Journal o f  Social 
P&ychology Vol. 1 (1971) pp. 149-77
84
H is t.23 This and numerous later experiments backed up the proposition that “the 
mere fact of being categorised as a group seems to be necessary and sufficient to 
produce ethnocentrism and competitive intergroup behaviour”.24 However, this view 
has not gone unchallenged and whilst being placed in a group does have an effect it is
25not always sufficient to either over power pre-existing prejudices or conceptions, 
and a particularly interesting observation was made by Mummendey et al, who 
identified a “positive-negative asymmetry”. That is they saw that in Minimum Group 
Experiments participants did show the typical ethnocentric bias when their task was 
distributing resources to their group, however when it came to removing resources (or 
potentially issuing punishments) the group effect was much weaker and in some cases 
disappeared.26
Identity Theories
It became clear from the Minimal Group Experiments that how one categorises 
oneself is of vital importance to how one behaves in the social world. Within 
sociology and social psychology there are two main schools of thought about how one 
does this: Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory (IT and SIT respectively). IT 
sees that individuals may have numerous distinct selves, based upon their different 
roles in society, for example a person can be a mother, a daughter, a wife and a 
teacher, and these identities or roles are “self-conceptions, self-referent cognitions, or
M. Billgin and Henri Tajfel, ‘Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour’ European
Journal o f Social Psychology Vol.3 (1973) pp.27-52
,5 H°gg and Vaughan, Social Psychology, p.400 
m lbid .
A. Mummendey et al, ‘Categorization is not enough: intergroup discrimination in negative outcome 
■ °cation’ Journal o f  Experimental Social Psychology Vol.28 (1992) pp. 125-44
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self-definitions”.27 This mirrors the arguments put forward by Bill McSweeney. In 
IT the importance a given role has is based upon its salience to the individual. That is 
these roles exist in a hierarchy within the individual, the higher a given role is within
This hierarchy is self constructed and so even though two people may have the same 
roles they will not necessarily behave the same way in a given situation because of 
differences in their salience hierarchy. An example being: “one person may work on 
the weekend while another may spend time with the children, although both may have 
a “parent” role identity. The difference in behavior is due to differences in identity 
salience”.29 But how does one account for differences in salience? IT argues that the 
salience of a given identity will be determined by a person’s commitment to that role, 
and this is determined by how important a person feels it is to behave in a given way 
around certain people. For instance, one will behave one way when one is with 
friends or colleagues and in a different way when one is with a superior or someone in 
a position of authority. If one does not adopt the appropriate role when the situation 
dictates then it can result in a weakened position for the individual, be it literally or
30psychologically by effecting self-conceptions and or self-esteem.
Sheldon Stryker has identified two distinct forms of commitment: Interactional 
and Affective. Interactional commitment reflects the number o f roles that are 
associated to a given identity, or into how many facets of your life does the identity 
permeate (extensivity of commitment). Affective commitment refers to how
27 Michael Hogg et al, ‘A tale o f two theories: a critical comparison o f  identity theory with social
■y’ Social Psychology Quarterly Vol.58, No.4 (1995) p.256
John Hoelter, ‘The effects o f role evaluation and commitment on identity salience’ Social 
Psychology Quarterly Vol.46 (1983) pp. 140-7
28an individual the more likely that aspect of their self is to have on their behaviour.
important one finds the relationships associated with a given identity (intensivity o f  
commitment).31 The more committed a person is to an identity the higher the identity 
salience and the bigger the impact upon the behaviour of the individual. Stryker also 
suggests that the more people who are included and affected by the social
relationships involved with an identity the more salient it will be.32
Social Identity Theory
A parallel theory of identity that has emerged in the social psychology literature 
is Social Identity Theory. Unlike IT SIT focuses not on the individual but rather on 
the social groups themselves, what do these groups offer the individual and thus 
explain why certain identities gain salience. SIT is based on the notion that society is 
structured into a hierarchy of different social categories, which engage in competition 
for both power and status with one another.33 We, as individuals divide the world into 
categories in order to make sense of and reduce our uncertainty of the world around 
us. In the same way as we have categorised the natural world (animal, vegetable or 
mineral) we structure our social world in the same way. However socially this 
process not only gives us a structured picture of the world around us, it also enables a 
person to define him or herself as well. This is because the social categories into 
which one falls provide a definition of who one is, by virtue of the defining 
characteristics o f the category, “a self-definition that is a part of the self-concept”.34 
In much the same way as IT sees that the social roles we adopt govern how we behave
l,Sheldon Stryker, cited in Hogg et al, ‘A tale o f two theories: a critical comparison o f identity theory 
with social identity theory’ p.258
3  Ibid.
B  ^°gg and Vaughan, Social Psychology p.401
.Hogg et al, ‘A tale o f two theories: a critical comparison o f identity theory with social identity 
“I !°ry’ p.259
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in different social contexts, the categories that we are members of describes and
1 “Thus, when a specific social identity becomes the salient basis for self- 
regulation in a particular context, self-perception and conduct become in-group 
stereotypical and normative, perceptions of relevant out-group members become 
i out-group stereotypical, and intergroup behavior acquires competitive and 
discriminatory properties to varying degrees depending on the nature o f  
j relations between the groups.”35
The social group one belongs to does not only describe or prescribe ones personal 
attributes; it also affects how one evaluates.
“[Social] identities have the important self-evaluative consequences, groups and 
I their members are strongly motivated to adopt behavioral strategies for 
| achieving or maintaining in-group/out-group comparisons that favor the in-
■j z:
, group, and thus o f course the self.”
So societal groups perform two important psychological roles. Firstly by categorizing 
the social world it makes sense of the chaos and thus allows an individual to better 
understand the world and also define self. Secondly, it allows them to enhance 
themselves via association with their in-group. This is achieved either by evaluating 
the in-group in positive terms, by seeing the out-group in a negative light, or a 
combination of the two. This is because people have a need to obtain a “relatively 
positive evaluation of themselves”, which in turn boosts their self-esteem.37
But what happens if the in-group itself is negative when compared to the out­
group? What are the possibilities available to the members to boost their self-esteem?
prescribes our social identity.
Sg and Vaughan, Social Psychology p.402
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How does one move either physically or psychologically from this negative situation? 
SIT postulates three main strategies: Individual Mobility, Social Creativity and Social 
Competition. Individual mobility is possible when the boundaries between the groups 
are permeable and so individuals can simply move into the dominant group and thus 
improve their situation. An example of this would be changing the football team you 
support or physically moving from a bad area of town into a good area, there is 
nothing to prevent these actions, and though there may be resistance from existing 
members o f the dominant group assimilation is possible. If this is not possible then 
group action is needed to alter the status quo in favour of the lower status group. The 
actions that are undertaken depend upon the stability and legitimacy of the current 
order. If the status quo is considered to be both stable and legitimate then actual 
social change is very difficult and so social creativity strategies are adopted. Three 
different outcomes have been experimentally observed here, the first is that the lower 
status group will rethink those factors that they use to compare themselves with the 
out-group. For example, if  one finds oneself in a group that is considered to be poor 
academically, and one has little chance o f competing in this category one may
emphasise the athletic prowess o f the group you belong to instead. In short side
*
stepping the previous point o f comparison and attempting to gain status through 
another previously untried method, without directly challenging the dominant out-
o o
group. The second outcome is that the in-group will attempt to redefine and change 
the existing values attached to their characteristics. An example of this is the slogan 
“Black is beautiful”; it is asking us to reassess our previous conceptions of the 
characteristic o f skin colour.39 The third and final strategy observed here is to try and 
compare the in-group to other low or lower status out-groups, in essence accepting
38 Thomas E. Ford and George R. Tonander, ‘The role o f  differentiation between groups and social 
identity in stereotype formation’ Social Psychology Quarterly V ol.61, N o.4 (1998) p.374
39 Hogg and Vaughan, Social Psychology p.404
that you cannot win against the dominant group and so instead compete with a more 
e^ual player or dominate an even weaker group.40 The third and final strategy 
emerges if the status quo is considered to be illegitimate, unstable and therefore 
insecure, and so the possibility arises to change the position of the in-group through 
intergroup competition. In these circumstances political action, mass protests, 
revolution and even war can occur.41 So in affect one could see these three strategies 
as having different places upon the Copenhagen schools spectrum of affairs. At one 
end there is individual mobility (non-politicised), in the middle there is social 
creativity (which bridges non-politicised and politicised), and finally at the other end 
there is direct social competition (which spans from politicised to securitized).
Self-Categorisation Theory
So the minimal group experiments show us that the very act o f belonging to, 
and being categorised to a group is enough to create a rudimentary social identity, 
identity theory explains how these identities/roles affect individual behaviour and 
finally SIT explains why we feel the need to form these groups. However more recent 
levelopments in social psychology have made more concerted efforts to try and 
explain the phenomena o f the minimal group experiments and understand more fully 
why and how the act o f belonging to a group impacts upon one identity. Self­
categorisation theory stresses the importance that the role o f self-categorisation plays 
upon identity and behaviour.42 It proposes that the process of self-categorisation 
accentuates both the similarities and differences between and within groups. So, for 
instance, all men are more aggressive than all women. This accentuation is done in
■  Ibid.
%lbid.
42
| An example o f this psychological approach is in J. C. Turner et al, Rediscovering the social group: a 
categorization theory (London: Blackwell, 1987)
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conjunction with a group prototype. These prototypes are “fuzzy sets that capture the 
context dependent features of group membership”43; they are the list we consciously 
or subconsciously go through in our heads when we assign an individual to a 
category. They act to depersonalise individuals and make them a part of a “thing” 
rather than separate allowing us to homogenise the out-group, which helps us to better 
understand the outside world.44 The prototype is also the template that we use to 
determine our own behaviour as part of the in-group, and also it is used to define what 
and who we admire and aspire to be and can have a bearing on who emerges to form 
the elite of a given social group. This is because we desire the conformity o f the 
group norm and so it is in the interest of any aspiring leader to be, or at least appear to 
be, the embodiment of the group prototype.45 However, group prototype formation is 
a process influenced by what out-group happens to be salient at a given time. This 
means that it is possible to radically alter the ‘ideal’ of the group and thus yourself 
over time. For example, when at war the behaviour and attributes that are desirable 
are not the same as they would be when one is in a peaceful situation because the 
nature of the in-group/out-group relationship has altered. Also if one changes the 
comparison group altogether a similar change can occur, for instance if Catholics 
were to define themselves with reference to Muslims rather than Protestants, the 
concept of what it is to not be Catholic would alter and thus so would the concept o f 
what it is to be Catholic.46 Therefore because prototypes are tied to whatever out­
group happens to be salient at a given time, social identity can be highly dynamic and 
responsive to the whims of social elites. This pull on the salience of ones social
: Hogg et al, ‘A tale o f  two theories: a critical comparison o f identity theory with social identity
theory’ p.261
45 H°gg and Vaughan, Social Psychology pp.407-8
46  ^°btas Theiler, ‘Societal security and social psychology’ p.261
A Fogg et al, ‘A tale o f  two theories: a critical comparison o f identity theory with social identity 
theory’ p.261
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i identity is of particular interest with relation to the role and position o f ethnic 
Minorities. Does the fact that the minorities are not (necessarily) the dominant group 
in society affect them, and if  so is it a positive or a negative affect. A positive effect 
would be if “minorities categorise themselves more strongly as a group and are more 
strongly depersonalised in their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour”47, whereas a 
negative effect would be a break down o f group integrity, and either an increase in
48deviant behaviour into the group prototype or assimilation into another group.
Salience of identity is key within the concept of societal security, for if  an identity is
salient then the likelihood of a securitizing move taking place in order to safe guard a
.group is increased, where as if an identity is not salient then changes to an ethnic 
oup or even the elimination or assimilation of it may never enter the security realm 
it all.
This relationship has been explored and two ideas have emerged the first is that 
the increasing predominance of the in-group in a social setting leads to progressively 
less consciousness of the groups ethnic identity. Secondly, ethnicity becomes more 
salient as a group becomes increasingly heterogeneous.49 So the more ethnicities you 
have to compare yours to, the more important your own identity is to you. This may 
explain the salience of national identity in the British Isles as compared to other 
ates. McGuire and McGuire found when they researched these phenomena that 
ithnic minorities also behave differently depending on the size o f their group as 
mpared to the out-group. If they were vastly out numbered, then they were reticent 
to raise the issue or possibly the identity was not salient (perhaps as an effect o f Social
co
^  Hogg and Vaughan, Social Psychology p.409 
Vbid. p.402
^Barbara Kinket and Maykel Verkuyten, ‘Levels o f  ethnic self-identification and social context’ 
M W cial Psychology Quarterly Vol.60, No.4 (1997) p.342
Creativity). By comparison when they were a more sizable minority, ethnicity was 
more salient.50 This is a particularly interesting dynamic to scholars of societal 
security.
■gtocietal Security and Social Psychology
A key issue therefore to determine when examining societal security is the 
salience of a given identity to the group being threatened. This can be interpreted in 
several ways, is the actual identity itself salient for in-group? It is likely that this 
question will be answered by the response to a securitization move that is being made. 
A more interesting proposition is the possibility that the group elite may manipulate 
the in-group prototype for their own ends, either to legitimise their own political and 
social standing, but also to the detriment of an out-group. It has been suggested that if  
an in-group wishes to boost its position it can creatively alter the defining 
characteristics o f its self or even change the out-group that it compares its self to. This 
does not contradict earlier assertions that identity can become a “solidly sedimented” 
object. This is because, whilst what has been intersubjectively determined to 
represent the in-group has altered, the in-group itself still exists. That is, I interpret 
that to be “sedimented” means that it has become an immovable object within the 
societal sector, like the state is to the military sector. This however does not mean 
that the nature o f the object does not alter. In the same way as the agendas, interests 
and perspective o f a state will alter depending upon circumstance; an identity will also 
alter given the circumstances that the in-group finds itself facing. In a security 
context it may be possible to find evidence of this manipulation, for example in the 
relationship of the New Order regime and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. O f interest
^M cG u ire and McGuire cited in Ibid.
the Indonesian case is the New Order policy of assimilation, what was the 
ijiotivation for this? Was it a legitimate attempt to homogenise an Indonesian 
identity, or was it a legitimate attempt by the in-group to establish an out-group in 
order to create or recreate an Indonesian identity and thus legitimise the new political 
regime? What strategies were employed to achieve the assimilation of the ethnic 
Chinese and what affect did they have on both the in-group (Indonesian identity) and 
e out-group (Sino Indonesian identity)? Did the targeted minority respond 
ositively or negatively and what strategies were employed by the out-group to
th
counteract their less than favourable position. The key advantage that social identity 
theory, and other psychological concepts, is that it more clearly defines what identity 
really is and thus offers to the scholar of societal security a referent object that is a 
robust and verifiable as the nation state has been for traditional approaches to the
[iscipline. At the same time as offering a more solid referent object, psychological pproaches clearly show the importance of identity to us as individuals and human 
beings and thus it validates identity as an area worthy of academic study.
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Political and Societal Security Challenges in Post-Colonial Indonesia.
Chapter Three: Sukarno and the Establishment of Indonesia’s first Post-
Colonial Regime
This chapter addresses the origins of the political security challenges that 
faced post-colonial Indonesia, covering the period 1940 until 1950. This is a period 
where Indonesia moved from being a colonial territory of the Netherlands, to being an 
independent state in its own right and a recognised member of the international 
community. This period is characterised by the leadership of Kusno Sosro Sukarno, 
whose political vision was to become the foundation of the Indonesian state, and its 
political regime. This chapter will establish the main themes that were to colour 
Sukarno’s period of rule. I will show how Sukarno worked to develop and implement 
his own notions of the physical base, institutions and principles upon which he felt 
Indonesia would be governed. It was a period of compromise and attempts to appease 
the competing visions of Indonesia as the political elite of the independence 
movement, and eventually the sate, sought to find a model that could effectively 
replace imperial rule. I will show how the political security challenges of regime 
formation, as established in chapter one, were at the forefront of the strategies that he 
adopted at this time in his efforts to effectively establish a new regime for an 
independent Indonesia. I will also show how he effectively secured external 
recognition for his regime, which in turn allowed for the possibility of Sukarno to 
then develop a regime that would appear legitimate to the Indonesian people.
& g j_945: The Foundations of Sukarno’s nationalism
In order to fully comprehend the significance that Sukarno had to the 
establishment o f the post-colonial regime of Indonesia it is necessary to understand
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hjs role in the pre-independence nationalist movement. Sukarno emerged as a 
prominent figure in the East Indies nationalist movement in the 1920s and 30s. 
During this period he assumed the leadership of the Partindo,x and set about 
developing his ideas, concepts of rule and notions of what an independent Indonesia 
should be.2 However, Sukarno was limited in his actions due to the intervention of 
the Dutch administration, and he was arrested on several occasions. This was a move 
by the Dutch to silence any potential opposition to their rule, and so the colonial 
Administration wasted no time in arresting and ultimately exiling numerous members 
of Indonesia’s fledgling independence movement. However the measures 
implemented by the imperial regime were not able to silence the growing nationalist 
tendencies within Indonesia, and Sukarno continued to establish his political mandate 
from his position of isolation on the island of Flores. During this period of exile, 
Sukarno’s writing began to adopt a more radical tone, as it became apparent that the 
Dutch were not going to be open to negotiation on the issue of Indonesian 
independence. However in May 1940 an opportunity presented itself to the 
ationalists of the East Indies, for with the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands, 
colonial control over the archipelago was significantly weakened. But it was the 
intervention of the Japanese in January 1942 that was to provide Sukarno and the 
nationalist with their best opportunity to develop their vision o f an independent 
Indonesia.
The Japanese occupation could have been negative juncture for the Indonesian 
nationalist cause; however because of the nature of Japanese regime the change o f 
ministration offered several opportunities for the Indonesian leadership, including
WPartindo was one o f  two emerging factions in the Indonesian nationalist movement, the second being 
Nasional Indonesia, the PNI or Indonesian National Party.
| | T ) .  Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972) pp. 130-48 
Though Sukarno’s exile was less extreme than that o f  many o f  his contemporaries who were 
fr&nsported off o f the Archipelago. Ibid. p. 138
Sukarno. For the Dutch, the primary method of control was repression. By silencing 
the voices of dissent and the problem would be removed. By contrast the Japanese 
had a different approach, for when the Japanese occupied the East Indies the exiled 
leadership was able to return to their place amongst the people and thereby re­
establish themselves as the voice of the Indonesian people. Secondly the Japanese
opted for a more politicised method of control. That is the Japanese encouraged the
i
use of mass organisations, rituals and ideological indoctrination. Therefore rather 
than silence the voices of opposition, the Japanese let the nationalists speak, but 
through prearranged avenues that they controlled. This is not to say that the Japanese 
agreed with the Indonesian independence movement as envisaged by Sukarno, but 
given the limited resources the Japanese had available to them to control the East 
Indies, this was a more efficient plan o f action. And also it gave them the option of 
sing the Indonesian leadership in their administration of the archipelago. This 
helped them to keep the revolutionary sentiment under control by establishing cordial 
relations with the potential revolutionary leadership, even to the extent of recruiting 
ukamo to positions o f responsibility within the administration, something that he 
justified as being in the “long-term interests of Indonesian nationalism”.5
The Japanese were exploiting the anti-Dutch mood, but in a controlled manner
enabling them to ensure that the issue of independence for Indonesia remained within
,1'the political area of the spectrum and did not escalate. Through the creation of
Organisations and committees that offered the possibility of future  independence, the
Japanese were able to even more firmly institutionalise, contain and control the
.nationalist movement, whilst at the same time using it to their own advantage. This
---------------------
^ ^ a r r y  J. Benda, “The Beginnings o f the Japanese Occupation o f  Java” The Far Eastern Quarterly
■ f t - 15, N°‘4 (1956) PP-542'3i:'! P-541, see also Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography p. 174
jiechanism gave the nationalist movement a legitimate outlet within the Japanese
regime. This was important for several reasons, firstly by using the nationalist
leadership in this way the Japanese were able to maintain control over the population
is a whole, making the administration of the region easier. Secondly, the provision of
an institutional outlet ensured the nationalist cause remained a political issue, that is
an issue that the nationalist saw as have a remedy within the realm of the ‘ordinary’.
If the nationalists had, had no political route through which to attempt to achieve their
.aims, it would meant that they would have seen no solution to their condition without 
a securitizing move being made. If the move had been successful and the 
independence issue had been securitized, then Japanese would have had to divert 
anpower from the war effort in order to maintain their control over the archipelago, 
his effort would not only have been targeted against the potential physical/military 
hreat that such a move would undoubtedly have provoked, but also the Japanese 
dministration would also have had to reengage with those members o f the population 
ho were being swayed to the nationalist cause. However, by effectively establishing 
n effective safety valve within their regime the Japanese were able to more 
fficiently control the nationalists than they would have been able using the more 
ppressive strategies of the Dutch colonial regime, and in so doing utilise the 
ationalists themselves to assist in the administration of the territory.6 In order to 
maintain their control over the nationalists, Japan had to ‘dangle the carrot o f 
independence’ and ensure that the Japanese appeared to be working in the interests o f 
Indonesia rather than for their own self-interest. This was done to great effect on the 
of September 1944, when Premiere Koiso of Japan announced, that independence
th
Josef Silverstein, “The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia” Asian Survey Vol.22, 
|°-3 (1982) p.282
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would be granted to the Indies in the near future.7 In itself this message is extremely 
ambiguous and did not offer anything concrete, however compared to the repressive 
Dutch regime this was perceived as a step in the right direction, and made the 
Japanese administration appear to be in sync with the desires of the Indonesian 
people.
By 1945 the Japanese war effort was in decline and words alone were not 
enough to appease the nationalists, actions were now a necessity. In March 1945 the 
Japanese announced the creation of the Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan 
{Cemerdekaan Indonesia (BPKI), which was a committee to investigate and prepare 
for Indonesian independence. It is unlikely that the Japanese truly considered the 
BPKI as a true step towards Indonesian independence, and it took several months for 
the committee to have its first session. However the BPKI did provide the nationalist 
leadership with an appropriate outlet to channel their energies, and despite the Islamic 
elite of Indonesia being considerably under-represented,8 this did ensure that 
“adequate procedures exist[ed] for the population to express their dissatisfaction... 
(thereby ensuring that] they [could] be satisfied within the existing political 
framework” and again keep the independence issue with the realm of the ordinary.9 
However, irrespective o f the Japanese intentions, Sukarno was able to direct the BPKI 
to his own ends and on the 1st of June delivered to the committee the five principles 
Upon which he saw Indonesia to be based. This address was to become known as
g Raymond Kennedy, “Indonesian Politics and Parties” Far Eastern Survey Vol. 14, No. 10 (1948) p. 131 
When on the 28th o f  April the membership o f  the BPKI was published o f  the sixty members only 
■ even Per cent were from the Islamic elite, compared to thirty four per cent being from Sukarno’s
Jocular nationalists”. This weighting however was considered favourable by Sukamo him self as it 
Ve bim more freedom to dictate the proceedings. B. R. O ’G. Anderson, Some Aspects o f  Indonesian
9 olitics Under the Japanese Occupation 1944-45 (New York: Ithica, 1961) p .18 
|  Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003) p.64
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%Uihirnya Pancasila or the birth of the five principles, and it outlined the foundation of 
Bukamo’s Indonesian political regime.
The principles Sukarno outlined were as follows: Nationalism,
Internationalism, Democracy or Consent, Social Justice, and the Belief in one God.
For Sukamo the Pancasila was intentionally designed to be in a form that would
appeal to the cross section of Indonesian culture and society. It was intended to
“embrace the separate currents of nationalism” and provide a basis for unity.10
Sukamo elaborated and explained each of his principles with this end in mind. It was
clearly important that he not alienate a section of his audience, the audience in this
instance being his 60 fellow member of the BPKI, for if  his vision for Indonesia was
to pass he would need the support of as many of them as possible. For Sukamo
nationalism was not merely freedom from external rule, but rather it was also
11concerned with the creation a self-conscious Indonesian people. This was an 
important distinction for several reasons, firstly Sukamo did not want to unnecessarily 
alienate the Japanese, who were present during the BPKI meetings, and secondly, due 
to the vast ethnic diversity that existed in the East Indies to call upon one “national 
identity” in particular would have gone against his attempts to unify the people. 
Sukamo knew that Indonesian nationalism must cross the ethnic divides and 
encompass “all human beings who, according to geopolitics ordained by God 
Almighty, live throughout the entire archipelago of Indonesia from the northern tip of 
Sumatra to Irian!”12 He saw that nationalism meant “neither Javanese nationalism nor 
Sumatran nationalism nor the nationalism of Borneo, or Celebes, Bali or any other,
"It
a l t  . ®e’ Sukarno: A Political Biography p. 184
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bit the Indonesian nationalism which at one and the same time becomes the principle 
of one national s t a t e d  The need to create a viable Indonesian national identity was 
of central importance to the developing regime, for if Sukamo were unable to 
overcome the differences in opinion and culture, then his vision of a unified 
archipelago would not be realised. But Sukamo needed to do more than merely unify 
his people; he also needed to effectively connect this nationalism with his second 
principle of internationalism. Sukamo understood that the Indonesian nation must 
exist as part of a wider principle, one that incorporated respect for other peoples, or 
else Indonesian nationalism would run the risk of becoming “petty patriotism”.14 For 
Sukamo the two principles fitted together to become what he called Socio­
nationalism, a nationalism tempered by a strong humanitarian undercurrent.15 The 
principles of Democracy and Social Justice were similarly connected in Sukarno’s 
mind. This was to create a notion of democracy that was separate from the 
“democracy” that existed in the West, particularly Western Europe and the 
Netherlands. The democracy that was in place there was perceived as being 
corrupted, it was no longer acting for the best interests of the people, but rather for the 
few, in particular the Capitalists. Sukamo claimed that this democracy was merely 
political and he believed that economics would also need to be democratised, so that 
prosperity could be offered to all of Indonesia’s people. This Sukamo called Socio­
democracy. 16 This was a call across the nationalist spectrum; Sukamo was not only 
pushing for self-determination but calling for a type o f determinism that was better 
than that practiced by their colonial rulers. At the same time this anti-capitalist 
rhetoric would have appealed to the Marxists and Communists who were represented
M (Emphasis added)
jj Emce Grant, Indonesia (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1967) pp.29-30 
^Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography pp. 185-6
llp u y  J. Pauker, “Political Doctrines and Practical Politics in Southeast Asia” Pacific Affairs Vol.35, 
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.in the BPKI, a significant and influential part of the nationalist community. What he 
was offering was more desirable, better and ultimately more legitimate political 
system than the Imperialists. The final principle, Belief in one God, was of particular 
importance and was a move by Sukamo to acknowledge the Muslim section of his 
udience. For Sukamo was aware that the Islamists, who held a tremendous popular 
mandate, could negatively affect the chances of his vision of an independent 
Indonesia becoming a reality. Sukamo believed that the theocratic Indonesia that the 
Muslim leaders sought would be divisive, as it would alienate non-Muslims as well as 
non-fundamentalist sections of the Islamic community. Therefore, whilst he 
conceded that religion must have a central role in Indonesia, he was careful to ensure 
at as a principle, it should have an inclusive quality. That is, the rule would have to 
be acceptable to all of the dominant beliefs within Indonesia, and Belief in one God 
allowed Muslims, Christians and Buddhists to practice their religions without 
isolating the principle.
The Lahirnya Pancasila galvanised both Sukamo and the BPKI, and created a 
sound foundation for the process by which Indonesia would attain independence. The 
speech itself did not discuss or address any of the details concerning how and when 
independence would or could be achieved. What it did was lay the ideational heart of 
tie  regime that was to follow, and it gave the nationalist cause a sense of momentum 
that the Japanese could not have predicted.17 However, what also became apparent 
after the speech was that the Islamic elite were not satisfied by Sukarno’s principle of 
Welief in one God seeing it as a compromise. Sukamo dealt with this critique in three 
f  ays. The first was to inform the Islamic community that even though he was a
Silverstein, “The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia” p.282
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luslim he felt that Islam was not an appropriate base for the state and that their 
iifluence would lie elsewhere. Namely within a representative assembly:
The House of Representatives, this is the place for us to bring forward the 
! demands of Islam ...If we really are Islamic people, let us work hard, so that 
most of the seats in the People’s Representative Body we will create are 
| occupied by Islamic delegates...then the laws made by this representative body 
will naturally be Islamic laws.18 
Much like the Japanese method of controlling political problems, this was an attempt 
to direct any potential threats to his principles towards and appropriate ‘safety valve’ 
that would keep the disagreement within the realm of the ordinary. His second 
concession was the Jakarta Charter. This was drafted at sub-committee level of the 
BKPI and was an attempt to put the ideas stated in the Pancasila speech into a 
document that would form the preamble of Indonesia’s formal, written constitution. 
The Jakarta Charter restated the five principles that Sukamo had highlighted as lying 
at the heart of the new Indonesia, but elaborated on the final principle. It stated that 
ldonesia was to be based upon belief in God “dengan kewajiban menjalankan 
syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya (with the obligation for adherents o f Islam to follow 
syari’ah, or Islamic law).”19 This amendment was clearly an attempt to appear more 
pro-Islamic than the initial speech had suggested. However it raised more questions 
that it solved and it is argued that because of this that when the constitution was 
finally completed this addition was dropped."0 Despite of this, the fact that the 
changes were even suggested has political significance. It shows a clear attempt by 
Sukamo and the nationalist leadership to create consensus within their movement. It
Sukarno cited in Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography p. 187
Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate”, Journal o f
mheast Asian Studies Vol. 36, No. 3 (2005) p.419 
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Acknowledged of the concerns of the Islamic elite, and thereby was an attempt to
ensure that the Nationalist principles would be legitimate to as many Indonesians as
was possible. What this shows is a commitment by the leadership to ensure that all
Indonesians would be represented by the principles of the regime, and where possible
.
consensus would and should be attained.
Sukarno’s third and final response to the Islamic criticisms was in the final
drafting of the Pancasila: Belief in One God; A Just and Civilised Humanity;
lational Unity; Consultation and Consensus; and Economic and Social
Lgalitarianism and Prosperity.21 Here, aside from the rewording of his principles, it is
important to note how the principle Belief in One God, has been elevated to being the
first principle. This was a compromise made so as to ensure the stability of the
regime, but was not just intended to appeal to the Indonesian people, but rather to a
dder audience. When on the 17th of August 1945 the elite made a formal
.
proclamation of independence, this was also intended for two audiences. Firstly the 
Indonesian people, but equally it was intended to send a clear message to the world at 
Marge, and especially the Dutch, that the nationalists had used the Japanese occupation 
productively. But did this declaration, and the Pancasila itself, have an impact in 
Sukarno’s attempt to sculpt an independent Indonesia? Professor George Kahin states 
[in] no other exposition of principle can one find a better example of the 
synthesis of Western Democrat, Modernist Islamic, Marxist and indigenous- 
village democratic and communalistic ideas which form the several bases of the 
I social thought of so large a part of the post-war Indonesian elite.22
See also Appendix 1
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M'his was the signal that Sukamo wished to send out, that Indonesia had a
representative and heterogeneous elite that represented the population of the
archipelago, it was not an extreme or reactionary state but rather neutral and should be
allowed to function on its own without external intervention. It was therefore within
this final drafting of his five principles that Sukamo was able to finally establish a
.sense of national unity in Indonesia ‘from the tip of Sumatra right to Irian!’ Despite 
the fact that the Japanese were still technically in charge when independence was 
declared, and far from satisfied with the move, they were unable to do anything to 
counter Sukarno’s move, and within four weeks the new administration was in control 
of much of the country.
1945-50: The Indonesian-Netherlands Dispute and International Recognition
Unfortunately for the New Indonesia despite the fact they had been under 
Japanese control for the previous 5 years, the Dutch had not relinquished their claim 
to these Islands, and when the war was finally over it was the Dutch claim that was 
supported, in particular by the other European powers. This was because there was a 
general desire to return the world to the pre-war status quo, and in some cases they 
were eager to rebuild the Empires that had been neglected during the War years and 
re-establish their dominance within the new post war world. This situation was 
compounded by the rising powers of the United States of America and the Soviet 
Union, who were beginning to exert their own influences and attempting to 
consolidate their spheres of influence. These external developments were to all to 
bave a considerable impact on the new Indonesian elite’s attempts to govern their 
territory, and even made the prospect of them remaining in control far from 
inevitable. From the outset the path to full independence was made difficult by the 
B'hons of colonial Western Europe, in part due to the personality o f the person who
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^fwas placed in charge of restoring order to South East Asia in the aftermath of World 
War Two, Lord Louis Mountbatten, British Commander in Chief in the Region. 
Mountbatten’s perception of order was radically different from that of Sukamo, he 
felt that the best way to stabilise the region would be to return the war-ravaged 
territories to their former colonial masters, including returning the East Indies to the 
Dutch.23 This is a course of action that would help support, and create natural allies, 
for British claims to other territories not only in Asia but elsewhere in the emerging 
third world. However, Mountbatten was a pragmatist and suggested to Dr van Mook, 
his Dutch counterpart, that the best way to ensure a smooth reintegration of the East 
Indies back under Dutch Colonial rule would be through negotiations with Sukamo 
and the new Government. However, this was a move that was not supported by the 
Dutch Government, who felt that to acknowledge the new regime would give it 
credence, and so van Mook’s efforts were not well received at home.24 However even 
if van Mook had the full support of his home government, Mountbatten’s plan was 
unlikely to have succeeded, because after having achieved so much, Sukamo and his 
new administration had no desire to relinquish any control back to the Dutch. The 
Nationalist movement had drastically changed its mode of operation. It was no longer 
the time for words and negotiation; it was now the time for action. The Sukamo 
administration was quickly establishing its own apparatus of government and control; 
this was sending a clear signal to Europe that as far as they were concerned, Imperial 
rule was over. Therefore it was impossible for the nationalists to have settled for 
anything less than prompt and early independence for the Indonesian nation.
Justus M. van der Kroef, “The Indonesian Revolution in Retrospect” World Politics Vol.3, N o .3
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Whilst the archipelago’s position internationally was still far from certain, 
i domestically the new elite set about creating the necessary apparatus to administer the 
■ State and on 15th November Soetan Sjahrir was appointed as the Prime Minister of the 
Republic, a move that was viewed with considerable hostility in the Netherlands and 
as such his position was not universally recognised internationally. In an attempt to 
gamer some international support for their cause the Indonesian elite created a 
memorandum, which was sent to the Dutch government. This was an attempt to 
emphasise the success that the new administration had had in normalising public
services within the territory, that the vast majority of the population supported it, and
26that the Independence movement was actually “inspiring” the population as a whole.
It concluded that “the only solution for the Dutch government lies in the recognition 
of the Republic; for this was the only guarantee for the promotion of Dutch as well as 
Indonesian interests and it is the only way out of the present impasse and for the 
prevention of further bloodshed.” This was an act to resolve the political struggle 
without further escalation, however it fell on deaf ears and the Dutch attempts to 
retake their colony continued in earnest. It is particularly interesting to note that 
despite the fact that by this time the Indonesians had created its own armed forces, 
which it could have utilized to directly combat the Colonial threat, Indonesians made 
an appeal for membership of the United Nations. In short opting to utilize the realm 
of the ordinary rather than securitizing the situation into the realm of the 
extraordinary, choosing instead to put their faith in this organisation and other nations, 
especially the United States, to recognise their claim to sovereignty.28 This is
I w  ^ rt*lur Steiner, “Post-War Government o f  the Netherlands East Indies” The Journal o f  Politics
Vol.9,No.4 ( 1947) p.633
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evidence of the Indonesian elite attempting to keep the issue independence issue 
desecuritized. This was done not only to avoid bloodshed, but rather, it was possible 
at this time that if the independence issue could be resolved with out escalation this 
would allow the new elite to focus its attention on the consolidation of it position 
domestically. And also by attempting to resolve the situation without violence, they 
were reflecting the mood of the international community who were war weary in the 
aftermath of World War two. However the Dutch and the British, in the interest of 
“international capitalism and Western strategy in the Cold War”, blocked this 
attempt.29 This move demonised the Sukamo regime and in the long run made any 
attempts by the regime to secure itself externally increasingly difficult.
Superficially it would appear that the Nationalists should have been dejected
at this time as there every move was blocked by the Dutch, however there were some
areas in which they were successful. One example of this was the Linggadjati
Agreement of November 1947. This agreement secured territory away from the
Dutch and established boundaries for the Republic, which whilst being far from the
full independence that the nationalists desired was at least a foundation to what could
become an internationally recognised state. It was established that the Republic
would have control of Java, Madura and Sumatra, and it also stated that by 1st January
1949 Dutch troops would be withdrawn from the territory and a United States of
Indonesia would be created from these three parts, with a centralised Federal
government, that maintained a union with the Netherlands. However despite the fact
the Dutch signed this agreement, they began a series of operations that they hoped
would confine the Republic and thus strengthen their own claims to the territory,
29 Simons Indonesia: The Long Oppression p. 142. For the British in particular the Oil fields and other 
Indonesian natural resources had tremendous economic and strategic interest. An interest that would 
be more easily tapped if  they belonged to a European ally rather than an Independent state.
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th
cum ulating on the 19 December 1948 when Dutch paratroops seized Jakarta and 
arrested Sukamo and other leaders of the Republic.
However the mood of the international community was altering and such actions 
were no longer deemed to be acceptable. This change in mood is highlighted by the 
non-military responses that were directed towards the Netherlands by other nations. 
For instance Dutch economic activity within the region was severely handicapped 
initially because the Dutch national Airline (KLM) was banned by states across Asia, 
and this was coupled by other actions against their Ocean based operations as well, 
for instance the boycott by Australian dock workers on all Dutch vessels. The 
combination of these activities restricted the Netherlands’ capability to function 
effectively both economically and politically in the Far East. The Dutch were put 
under further pressure not only by boycotts but also by direct political pressure, in 
particular that of the Burmese government, which proposed a Conference of Asian 
Nations to consider further joint actions. This conference did eventually take place on 
23rd January 1949 in Delhi. The consensus in Delhi was that the Dutch colonial 
stance had gone unchecked for too long and that it was a time for radical action. They 
demanded that:
All political prisoners be freed, that the legitimate Republican Government of 
Indonesia be allowed to function freely, that elections be held for a Constituent 
Assembly, that power be transferred to the Indonesians by 1st January 1950, that 
differences between the Indonesians and the Dutch should be settled by talks, 
and that the [UN] Security Council should be prepared to enforce its
30recommendations.
30 S im ons Indonesia: The Long Oppression pp. 147-8
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This regional stance was mirrored in the UN by other state actors in particular Canada 
who during their time as non-permanent member of the Security Council made 
considerable efforts to ensure the international recognition of the Indonesian Republic 
and the end of Dutch colonial rule. Due in a large part to the efforts of the Canadian 
representative on the Security Council, General Andrew McNaughton, between 1947 
and 1949 nine resolutions were passed expressing increasing concern at the escalating 
situation in the East Indies and expressing its desire to remedy the dispute. This
thcumulated on 28 January 1949 when the Security Council passed resolution 67. It 
stated that the continued occupation of Indonesian territory by Dutch forces was 
preventing the successful resolution of the crisis and that it was “incompatible with 
the restoration of good relations between [Indonesia and the Netherlands] and with the 
final achievement o f a just and lasting settlement”.31 The resolution went on to ask 
both parties to cease all hostilities but it placed particular pressure on the Dutch to not 
only discontinue its military operations, but also to release all of the political prisoners 
that had been arrested in December 1948. This release of the Indonesian leadership 
was necessary in the eyes of the UN so that the guerrilla campaign being conducted 
against the Dutch could be brought to an end.32 This acknowledgment of the 
Republic’s leadership’s significance in the resolution of the dispute signalled the 
international community’s recognition of the Sukamo administration, and the 
autonomy of the Republic of Indonesia as a sovereign nation state, or more 
particularly it recognised that Sukarno’s desire to have Indonesian sovereignty 
recognised was a just and therefore attainable goal. This blueprint for peace did not 
explicitly side with either the Indonesians or the Dutch, but by placing both parties on 
an equal footing the Security Council was recognising Indonesia as a separate and
' See Appendix 5
2 Ibid.
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independent entity away from the Dutch. In doing so the Dutch claim to the East 
Indies w as effectively quashed and the period of colonial rule in Indonesia was to 
becom e a thing of the past.
Resolution 67 further echoed the demands o f the Conference of Asian Nations 
in that it encouraged that both parties should make moves not only to cease hostilities 
but also to carry the Linggadjati agreement to its logical conclusion and transfer 
pow er away from the Dutch and into the hands of the Indonesian people. The UN set 
out a time table that power should be formally handed over no later than 1st July 1950, 
and outlined the steps and negotiations that both parties would need to agree to prior 
to the transfer of sovereignty. As a consequence of this between the 23rd August and 
2nd November 1949 a round table conference took place in The Hague to finalise the 
settlement and for the Netherlands it was an opportunity to try and retrieve something 
from the situation. However, despite their best efforts the Dutch were forced to 
concede to the will o f the international community and accept Indonesian 
Sovereignty, to take effect from 27th December, with the exception of Irian whose 
future would be decided in 1950. The plan was to create a Dutch style 
Commonwealth, the Republic of Indonesia would be joined by some 16 non- 
Republican states, with the Dutch Monarchy as their head of State. The Dutch armed 
forces, which by this time had grown to some 85,000, would be withdrawn as quickly 
as possible, leaving a naval presence in Surabaya. However even with world opinion 
against them, and a seemingly straightforward plan of action agreed the Dutch still 
proved problematic for the fledgling state. Aside from the issue of the Dutch armed 
forces continued presence in Indonesia until May 1951, continued tension between the 
incumbent Dutch officials and the newly independent Indonesians authorities meant
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that there was not to be a smooth transition of power in Indonesia. Two issues of 
particular significance was the insistence by the Dutch that the new Republic assume 
responsibility for “Dutch East Indian” debts, debt that the new regime felt that they 
had no obligation to pay as the liability belonged to the Dutch and not the people of 
Indonesia. The second issue was to have significance later in Sukarno’s rule, and that 
was the Dutch decision to maintain control of West Irian, a decision that went against 
Sukarno’s vision o f an independent Indonesia. However despite of these the transfer 
of power went ahead, and on 27th December 1949 the Indonesian National Flag was 
raised for the first time over the newly independent state, the non-Republican states 
were soon absorbed and on 20th July 1950 a Constitution was agreed and finalised. 
On the 15th August President Achmed Sukamo formally dissolved the Federation and 
announced a new state, inaugurating the Republic of Indonesia, and on the 26th 
September 1950 UN Security Council Resolution 86 was passed.
[The Security Council] Finds that the Republic of Indonesia is a peace-loving 
State which fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that the 
Republic o f Indonesia be admitted to membership of the United Nations.33 
The Indonesian-Netherlands dispute is a clear case of a struggle between two 
opposing political regimes. More specifically this is a case of a regime seeking the 
external recognition of the international community. For an imperial power like the 
Dutch legitimacy was irrelevant concept and so the focus of its battle was not on 
attempting to win the hearts and minds of the Indonesian people, rather they sought to 
ensure the support of the international community as a whole. Initially they were 
somewhat successful in that they did gain the support of several key European
33 e
see Appendix 6
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powers. When one examines the resolutions passed by the Security Council over the 
duration of the crisis you can see a shift in support for the Dutch claims. After the 
initial acknowledgement by the Security Council, in resolution 27 (1/8/47), of the 
dispute, the subsequent resolutions were not passed unanimously and there is a pattern 
of abstention by the Netherlands Imperialist neighbours in Europe. Of particular note 
are resolutions 63 (24/12/48) and 64 (28/12/48), which were both issued in response 
to the Dutch incursion into Jakarta and the arrest of Sukamo. Resolution 63 called for 
the Dutch to “cease hostilities forthwith [and to immediately] release the President of 
the R epublic of Indonesia and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December 
1948”34, superficially this is recognition of the Sukamo regime, and at the very least it 
is an acknowledgment of his position as President. However 3 major states abstained 
from the vote, those being the USSR, Belgium and France.35 Resolution 64, which 
stated that “the Netherlands Government has not so far released the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia and all other political prisoners, as required by Council 
resolution 63 of 24 December 1948, [and called for] the Netherlands Government to 
set free these political prisoners forthwith and report to the Security Council within 
twenty-four hours of the adoption of the present resolution.”36, but again there were 
abstentions, this time Belgium and France were joined by the United Kingdom. 
These two resolutions coming swiftly after the Dutch aggression were strongly 
worded and sent a clear signal that imperialist designs were no longer acceptable. 
Given that Belgium, Britain and France all had Colonial interests of their own meant 
that it was not in their interests to echo the anti-colonial sentiment of the two 
resolutions. However prior to his capture Sukamo and his colleagues had laid a
34 See Appendix 3
33 The Ukraine was also counted as an abstention, however this was due to the representative being 
absent rather than being a political decision.
See Appendix 4
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sufficient foundation to their claims of legitimacy that even though they were 
prisoners o f  the Dutch regime, regional and global opinion had moved securely in 
their favour in initially recognising the injustice of the Dutch actions thereby leading 
to the Conference of Asian Nations and UNSC resolution 67 (28/1/49). Global 
opinion had shifted significantly enough by January 1949 the Security Council was 
able pass resolution 67 and more emphatically condemn the Dutch actions and when 
in S eptem ber 1950 Indonesia was finally invited to join the United Nations no 
European member of the security council saw fit to abstain from recognising 
Sukarno’s new Republic.
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Chapter Four: Sukarno’s Vision for the New Indonesia
This chapter will address the latter two phases of Sukarno’s Indonesia the first 
being from 1950-56 and the second phase being from 1956-65. I will show that 
whilst superficially they have distinct political security challenges, were actually 
unified by the continuing theme of Sukarno’s attempts to establish, and maintain, an 
effective political regime. This phase of Sukarno’s rule was a period of consolidation, 
where he sought to secure Indonesia’s place in the world and with it, the stability of 
his regime. I will show how prior to 1956 Sukarno’s efforts to maintain the external 
recognition that had been integral to the process of independence became detrimental 
to other goals of the new regime and how they ultimately lead to a radical regime 
reform in 1956. I will then show how this new regime developed and sought to 
subvert the political challenges of the early 1950s. Finally I will address the rise to 
prominence of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (the PKI or Indonesian Communist 
Party) and the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (the ABRI or Armed Forces 
of the Republic o f Indonesia) within Indonesian politics. These organisations 
emerged as alternative sources of power in Sukarno’s Indonesia, and this in turn lead 
to a securitization paradox that preceded the failure of Sukarno’s political regime, and 
the rise of the New Order under Major-General Suharto.
1950-57: Western Style Democracy in Indonesia
As was discussed in chapter one international recognition is only one of the 
necessary factors for an effective regime. The second and in the case of new states 
the most significant is the securing of ones internal legitimacy. With the effective 
removal of the Dutch from the majority of Indonesia, the Sukamo regime found itself 
in a difficult situation. There was no longer an external other to blame for the
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nations difficulties. The Indonesian people now had to stand on their own two feet 
and govern themselves. However this was not an easy task and the regime had 
difficulty developing an effective governing strategy, as is evident from the fact that 
the Republic had five cabinets in the first six years of its existence. This did not 
promote political stability, and coupled with a National Assembly where the majority 
party on ly  held 22%  of the seats, and this did not encourage decisive action.1 This 
political uncertainty was coupled by Economic problems too. Not only the 
aforem entioned debt that the administration inherited from the Dutch, but also 
Sukarno’s fierce nationalism, which was necessary for the forging of a new Indonesia 
and that was enshrined as a root principle of the independent Indonesia, lead to a fear 
of nationalisation and scared foreign investors. This in turn exacerbated the economic 
problem s that Sukamo was faced with. This raised the question of how could the elite 
resolve these problems? Politically, Sukamo had adopted a Western Style 
parliamentary democracy. This approach had had several advantages for a fledgling 
state; firstly it was more likely to appeal to the significant political and economic 
power of the international community, particularly Western Europe and North 
America. This was a strategy adopted for two main reasons as by appearing to be 
‘one of them’ Indonesia felt it would bolster their claim for recognition and secondly 
encourage cordial relations, including economic, once independence had been 
achieved. Secondly, it made sense for a new regime to adopt a proven method of 
governance, in particular a method that lay at the heart of all of the ‘successful’ and 
prosperous states in the system. However in such a diverse nation as Indonesia, with 
so many different groups and bodies to be represented all of which were contesting 
for power, it made strong government virtually impossible. The coalitions that were
' Geoff Simons, Indonesia: The Long Oppression (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p.151
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formed w ere neither strong nor stable enough, to drive through the changes required
to rem edy the nations problems or develop the institutions of power required to
2 •effectively govern. This weakness led to the increased participation of two 
significant actors into the Indonesian political system, they were to vie for power with 
each o ther and Sukarno’s government. These two actors were the Partai Kommunist 
Indonesia (PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party), and the Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia (ABRI, the Armed Forces).
The PKI had found itself marginalized from the liberal democratic regime that
Sukamo had developed, whilst at the same, its membership was growing (100,000
m em bers in 1952 to 165,000 in 1954) due in large part to a failing economy and a
people who felt that they had been ignored and marginalized by the new Republic.
The PKI were a voice that spoke for these sections of Indonesian society. Conversely
the ABRI’s role grew out of the perceived need to deal with not only the rising
Communist threat, as the strikes the PKI organised and other acts of civil
disobedience began to more significantly impact upon the day to day living of people
in the republic, but they also they saw it as their role to more actively participate in
the administration of the Republic. By the end of 1955 the membership of the PKI
had risen to over one million, and they had secured 16% of the vote in the general
election, taking a marginal party and giving it a significant voice within Parliament.3
At the same time in response to this development the ABRI began to behave more
proactively to secure what it perceived as being Indonesia’s interests. An example of
this would be when in December 1956 Colonel Simbolon, the regional commander of
West Sumatra, actually took command of the Civil administration, the Army then
2 H. Freigth, The Decline o f  Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 
1962) passim
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made the same move in North Sumatra and forced  the Governor o f South Sumatra to 
make political reforms.4 The army councils that were established soon gained public 
support b y  ordering improvements to schools, roads and other infrastructure that the 
official government had failed or been unable implement themselves. The Army then 
began to directly target the PKI who they saw as being a threat to Indonesian 
prosperity, to this end they initiated a policy of arresting PKI members, a manoeuvre 
that w as supported by those foreign investors based in Sumatra. In fact some Western 
analysts were concluding that a military regime would be good for Indonesia, and 
would allow it “to achieve economic stability and ... guarantee the profits of the 
dom estic and foreign corporations.”5 Sukamo was caught in a difficult situation. On 
the one hand it was evident that the Democratic experiment they had undertaken had 
failed, on the other, both the PKI and the Army were establishing competing systems 
of power to the legitimate government.
1957-65: Gotong Roiong: An Indonesian Solution to Sukarno’s Political Legitimacy 
To deal with this problem Sukamo made a radical move. He initiated the 
policy of “Guided Democracy” on 21st February 1957, a form of government based 
upon mutual co-operation or Gotong Rojong, between the political parties and the 
other groups (that is Workers, Peasants, Religion, Youth etc that make up society). 
He believed that this scheme better suited Indonesia’s “national character than 
western style parliamentary democracy had and could.6 Sukamo placed the blame for 
the crisis that the nation was experiencing at the feet of the Western Style Democracy 
that had been adopted in 1950. He stated that:
4 John R. W. Smail, “The Military Politics o f  North Sumatra: December 1956 - October 1957” 
Indonesia Vol.6 (October 1968) pp. 128-87
5 Simons Indonesia: The Long Oppression  p. 153
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we [the Indonesian people] had used a wrong system, a wrong style of 
g o v e rn m e n t...an import democracy...not in harmony with our spirit...not in 
harm ony with our [national] personality.7 
Sukamo stated that Gotong Rojong was “an authentic Indonesian term which gives 
the purest reflection of the Indonesian soul”8, rather than the cabinet being made up of 
the dom inan t party or a coalition it would be a “reflection of Parliament” and 
therefore a reflection of the electorate as a whole. In parallel there was the National 
Council, which was to be made up of all of the other groups of Society and 
im portantly  the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. This council, headed by 
Sukam o, was going to be “a reflection o f [Indonesian] society” and would assist the 
C abinet.9 This was a cleverly orchestrated move my Sukamo as in one act he was 
able to deal with his peoples concern with his regimes performance, arguing that it 
was the fault o f the Non-Indonesian model that was adopted, and insinuated that an 
Indonesian way, “Our Way”, would be successful. This was a move that again 
directed the potential dissatisfaction with his rule towards an external other, even 
though in this case it had been his choice to adopt the western system. Therefore 
Sukamo was able to again look towards and use the Europeans as a counterpoint to 
help him to emphasise an Indonesian ideal. An ideal that so far had been corrupted 
and it was this corruption that had lead to the failure of Indonesia to prosper. This 
was calling upon feelings o f national and cultural identity, using the defining principle 
of national identity to help justify a radical shift and change in the political regime. 
At the same time the National Council had a central role for the Chiefs o f staff of the 
Armed Forces, which channelled their power and dissatisfaction within the regime
Sukamo quoted in Louis Fischer, The Story o f  Indonesia (N ew  York: Harper and Bros, 1959) pp. 177-
80
8 Ibid. p. 178
Q   1
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itself, thereby removing a growing source of concern and a possible political rival. 
The third effect o f the Guided Democracy principle was that it gave the PKI a 
legitimate route into power, however prevented them from assuming total control. 
Under the old style Cabinet the political conditions meant that the PKI could never 
attain a total majority and coalitions would form, in effect preventing the PKI from 
participating in government. This was frustrating and lead to the Communists 
resorting to other methods, strikes etc, to exert their influence on politics. With 
Guided Democracy they would be reflected in the Cabinet but not able to dominate 
and also as the cabinet was counter balanced by a strong President and the influence 
of the National Council the PKI should be more easily controlled.
Sukamo had seemingly found a solution to emerging or existing threats to the 
political, social and economic well being of Indonesia with Gotong Rojong. 
However, the west did not see it in the same light. The creation of an environment in 
which the Communists had any say in the governing of a nation was seen as 
destabilising and dangerous. Also all of the talk of deliberation and cooperation at the 
expense of Liberal Democracy was perceived as a dramatic shift to the left. 
Sukarno’s case was not helped by the PKI’s own satisfaction at this new principle, 
with Communist slogans appearing on walls in Jakarta and through out Indonesia 
claiming that Guided Democracy was the salvation of the Nation. So whilst Sukamo 
had seemingly removed two potential threats to his legitimacy, in doing so he had 
weakened his position international. However, in 1957 Sukarno’s primary concern 
was the survival of the regime and if he had not acted in this way it is likely that the 
PKI and or the ABRI would have significantly impeded on his ability to govern. So 
despite initial concerns for Gotong Rojong Sukamo was able to manipulate and coerce
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ministers of every level in order to gamer enough support, momentum and power to 
push his vision through, and in 1960 Sukamo was able to replace the existing 
structures and replace them with institutions and structures based upon the 
‘Indonesian’ principles of Gotong Rojong. 10 At the same time he established the 
People’s Consultative Congress, a Supreme Advisory Council, a National Front and 
other institutions necessary for “Guided Democracy”. The defining characteristic of 
this new  approach was that instead of voting and the majority deciding an issue, each 
group would debate and deliberate (musjawarah) until “they reached consensual 
opinions in agreement with the President”.11 A principle that was represented by the
acronym NASAKOM or cooperation between the Nationalists, Muslims and
12Communists, as musjawarah was dependent on getting these three factions to agree.
This was not the end of Sukarno’s struggle to secure his legitimacy. He still had 
the problem that whilst he may have in fact established a more effective way of 
administering the Indonesian Republic, not all of those in his diverse state agreed with 
his view of what was best for Indonesia. Ever mindful of the potential for future 
threats to his regime, Sukamo was able to again direct the people’s attention away by 
reintroducing the Dutch as a viable “other”; in this instance he was concerned with the 
continued occupation of West Irian. Initially, Sukamo made statements to his own 
people, re-emphasising the continued Dutch occupation of West Irian, which many 
Indonesians felt was part o f the Republic and should not be under Dutch control. 
They felt that true independence could not be achieved or claimed until West Irian 
was fully integrated into the Republic. At this time the UN was not willing to
10 J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972) p .5
Simons Indonesia: The Long Oppression p. 155 v
Dennis Bloodworth, An Eye fo r  the Dragon: South-East Asia Observed  (London: Seeker and
W arburg, 1970) p. 108
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intervene directly to force the Dutch and Indonesian governments to negotiate a 
settlem ent, however Sukamo believed if he could rally enough support domestically, 
his vision o f  Indonesia could finally be realised.13 To this end in November 1957 
Sukam o stepped up his campaign to prepare his population, stating that if external 
support for Indonesia’s claims to West Irian was not forth coming, then Indonesia 
would have to “startle the world” with a new direct course of action.14 What Sukamo 
had in mind was that Indonesia should turn her back on the West, and so proposed 
that Indonesia break off trade with Holland in particular, and the West in general, and 
instead focus on Eastern Europe, China, Japan and India.15 In the course of this 
cam paign he also stated that Indonesia needed to build up power and force the Dutch 
out o f  West Irian. These actions were not with out there critics, and they believed 
such changes were dangerous to Indonesia’s economic and political stability, and 
arguably their influence and power within the Indonesian political system.16 The 
opposition to the changes that Sukamo instigated was most explicitly expressed by the 
resignation of his Vice-President Hatta, such a strong move by a high ranking figure 
resulted in a declaration of martial law by Sukamo17, this manoeuvre effectively 
controlled the potential unrest and allow his new regime to take root. The regime 
change instigated by Sukamo at this time was only one strand in his strategy to 
improve upon Indonesia’s fragile situation. Of equal importance was the move by 
Sukamo to securitize the issue of West Irian, and effectively re-establish the Dutch 
and the West as a viable threat to the Indonesian cause. This was a move that also re­
securitized the principle of national identity, that is what constitutes Indonesia and
3 Legge Sukamo: A Political Biography p.291 
Ibid. pp.291-2
1 Merdeka, 12 November 1957 cited in Ibid. p.292
16 Ibid. p.292, also Jusrus M. van der Kroef, “ ’Guided Democracy’ in Indonesia” Far Eastern Survey
Vol.26, N o.8 (1957) pp. 115-6 
Kroef, “’Guided Dem ocracy’ in Indonesia” p .l 16
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thereby th e  Indonesian people. This was societal politics being manipulated for
political means, as the external threat would again be utilised to unify the disparate
Indo n esian s into a unified whole that would enable this new regime to more
e ffec tiv e ly  govern. The move against the Dutch was successful, as there was a
response  through out the archipelago, initiated by both Sukarno’s actions and the
apparen t in-action on the part of the United Nations regarding issue of West Irian, that
lead to a sustained campaign against Dutch property. This combination of strikes,
m ass demonstrations, and eventually the seizure of Dutch companies, banks and other
interests lead to thousands of Dutch nationals returning to the Netherlands.18 These
actions were to have mixed results for the Sukamo regime, whilst initially the new
system, the strong assertive actions of the President, and the vigour in which Sukamo
stood up to the West all played well with the majority of people in Indonesia.
However, as the campaign continued, and the situation escalated, elements within
Indonesia began to show dissatisfaction with the President’s actions. The most
explicate being assassination attempts the first of which took place as early as
November 30th 1957.19 Another unforeseen consequence of the escalation and seizure
of Dutch property was that the government was forced to announce that it would
assume control, however in reality it was not Sukarno’s administration that did this,
but rather the ABRI. Whilst this was something that Sukamo did rectify in time,
20  • •temporarily the Army found itself in a particularly strong position. This did not
effect Sukarno’s efforts to liberate West Irian, for whilst economically speaking his
regime’s performance could not be considered a success he was still able to lay the
blame at the feet o f the Imperial Dutch and so therefore so long as he was strong vis a
vis the Netherlands, he still was tremendously popular. To this end in August 1960,
18 M. C. Ricklefs, A History o f  Modern Indonesia (London: Macmillan, 1981) p.249
|9 Ibid.
20 Legge Sukarno: A Political Biography p.294
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after a sustained period of economic and diplomatic harassment of the Dutch in 
Indonesia , Sukamo formally severed diplomatic relations with the Dutch. This 
extraordinary action left the regime with only one course of action, that being an 
escalation  and the use o f military means. This in turn signified the triggering of a 
secu ritiza tio n  paradox, as there was no longer possible resolution of the West Irian 
situa tion  within the discourse to the political sector. This cross over into the military 
sector le a d  to the creation of the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian 
in th e  December o f 1961, which was under the command of Major-General Suharto, a 
p ro m o tio n  that would have significant, if in direct, ramifications for Sukamo in 
1965.21
Relations with the West at this time were not at the forefront of Sukarno’s mind
at this time. It was however important for the regime to be successful in this
endeavour, and neither the Dutch nor the United States wanted to see an extended
conflict in the region. Sukarno’s actions and rhetoric however sent a clear signal that
he was prepared to fight for West Irian, and at this time he had rallied the support of
the vast majority of his population. Importantly his stand against imperialism
appealed to the PKI and the switch to a non-diplomatic approach gave the ABRI an
important and central role in the resolution of the issue. Therefore as Sukamo
continued his courtship of non-Western governments, particularly by accepting
Military support and economic aid from the Soviet Union, the US, under the newly
elected President Kennedy began to put pressure on the Dutch to resolve the situation,
and also attempt to counter Sukarno’s shift.22 On 15th August 1962 the Dutch and
Indonesians agreed that the UN would begin administrating West Irian with the
1 At this time there was no hint o f the political ambitions that would lead to his rise to prominence in 
the aftermath o f the 1965 coup.
" Ricklefs, A H istory o f  Modern Indonesia p.257
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territory finally being ceded to Jakarta in the May of 1963.23 With this success 
Sukamo was again faced with the reality of his domestic political situation, and the 
internal rivalries o f the republic were again begun to resurface. Despite the constant 
striving on the part of Sukamo to find that external other to divert the internal 
differences, his vision of a unified and prosperous Indonesia seemed to be falling 
apart. This was problematic in several ways, as the Indonesian people were becoming 
disenchanted with his leadership; they were not enjoying the fruits of independence 
that he had  promised them. Between 1960 and 1964 Indonesia was in a state of 
econom ic hyperinflation, which remained around 100% per year. This exacerbated 
Sukarno’s political situation, as his poor performance economically created 
dissatisfaction  with the people, which in turn made the PKI and the Army seem like 
attractive alternatives.24 Sukamo needed to act, he needed a cause to have his people 
rally behind, and so he targeted Malaysia.
Konfrontasi was a policy of hostile engagement with Malaysia who Sukamo 
argued was being an accomplice of “neo-colonialists and neo-imperialists pursuing a 
policy hostile towards Indonesia.”25 Sukamo argued that the former British Colony 
was a fabrication that was designed to protect Britain’s control over Malay and 
Brunei’s national resources, therefore bolstering an “imperial” presence in the region, 
which was detrimental to the indigenous states of the region particularly Indonesia. 
Sukamo claimed that the Malay government was assisting in policies design to 
“suppress the democratic and patriotic movements of the peoples in these five
23
^ Bloodworth An Eye fo r  the Dragon p. 108 
Ricklefs, A History o f  Modern Indonesia p.259
25 Sukamo cited in John O. Sutter, “Two Faces o f Konfrontasi: “Crush Malaysia” and the Gestapu”
Asian Survey Vol.6, No. 10 (1966) p.256
26 D.R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia: Past and Present (London: Macmillan, 1989) pp. 236-8
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27 • *countries which aim at attainment of genuine national independence and freedom
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from imperialism. Konfrontasi was not supported by everyone within Indonesia, in 
particular those within the Islamic community who were “reluctant” going to war with
9 0a fellow Muslim country.
However despite initially reticence Sukamo was able to argue the case for the 
policy with the two politically significant groups of the PKI and ABRI. Firstly, to the 
PKI he appealed to their own dissatisfaction with the failure of Malaysia’s own 
communist rising, that had been quashed prior to their declaration of independence in 
1960. Evidence o f the attempt to appeal to this group is seen by Sukarno’s use of 
terminology like “neo-imperialism and neo-colonial”, which are slogans that appeal to 
the PKI’s own sensibilities. The escalation of hostilities was also ‘helpful’ to the PKI 
as it meant that the ABRI was deployed on the border, rather than in central Java 
where they could hinder the PKI.30 To the ABRI he appealed to a different set of 
criteria, significantly he appealed to their fear that if left unchecked the significant 
Chinese community within Malaysia would eventually control the state, and when 
that happened Malaysia would in turn be dominated by communist China.31 The 
policy of Konfrontasi could be explained as a continuation of his 
nationalist/revolutionary ideology that he had established in the 1920s and 30s, and he 
would have reacted to any external presence in the region. However, it can also be 
read as a calculated method of controlling the potential threats that he faced from 
within Indonesia. At the same time this courtship of the Soviet Union made his
“Five countries” refers to the idea o f Indonesia Raya (or Greater Indonesia) which incorporated 
Southern Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Sutter, “Two Faces o f  Konfrontasi: “Crush Malaysia and the Gestapu p.526
Ibid. p.527
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actions considerably anti-Western and thus further aggravated the United States. This 
was escalating his dealings with the Communist bloc outside of his Asian/regional 
context and instead onto the world/Cold War stage. When the Soviet Union began 
providing economic and military aid to the Sukamo regime this again had the West 
concerned about Indonesia, they began to rethink again how they factored the 
Sukamo regime into their equations. Importantly, because of the authoritarian nature 
of the Guided Democracy system, the responsibility for these policies could be placed 
firmly at the feet of Sukamo, giving the West, and anybody unhappy with 
developments in Indonesia as a whole, an obvious and easy place to focus their 
attention.32
Whilst antagonising the West, Soviet support and the liberation of West Irian 
had a positive impact on the standing of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Guided 
Democracy offered the Army the opportunity to exert itself in ways that had not been 
possible before. A prime example was the increase in the representation of the armed 
forces in the cabinet, in the first 1959 “Guided” Cabinet one third of its members were 
drawn from the military, as compared to 3 members in the previous cabinet and none 
prior to that.33 This is aside from Military representation in the numerous other 
“Guided” bodies and institutions. It was the Army that benefited most from 
Sukarno’s new relationship with Moscow securing numerous loans and programs with 
which to procure armaments, to both modernise and expand.34 So in his attempts to 
elevate Indonesia’s status on the World stage and secure his nation militarily and 
politically, Sukamo he was also creating a precarious situation with an increasingly 
strong and centralised armed forces. Whilst this had been pragmatic in 1957, and the
32~ Simons Indonesia: The Long Oppression p. 156
33 Ibid.
34 By 1962 the Army had grown to some 330,000 men. Ibid.
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disintegration of the Republic had been avoided, it was becoming evident that the 
balance he had created could not last indefinitely. The Army and the PKI were both 
growing terms o f influence, power and ambition. And also the realities of Cold War 
politics were beginning to influence Indonesia more heavily as the policies of 
Washington and Moscow were to cast a greater shadow on how Sukamo could and 
would act.
Guided Democracy had also been a positive development for the PKI. By the 
early 1960s membership of the organisation had risen to some 3,000,000 and the 
organisation was now part of the government in Indonesia. This legitimate role that 
they had manufactured for themselves gave them the confidence to act ‘proactively’ 
in other areas o f Indonesian politics. In 1964 the PKI was backing several Anti- 
western campaigns, especially against the British and the Americans, as part of the 
struggle against Malaysia and Imperial intervention in the region generally. These 
campaigns ranged from simple graffiti and protests against American films, to the 
occupation o f foreign held property and plantations.35 Such activities were not totally 
condoned by the Government, and certainly not the Military, and action was taken to 
restore order and “punish” those responsible, however the position the PKI held 
within the NASAKOM system, and also the growing Anti-American feeling felt by 
the population at large, meant that any reaction was little more than a gesture because 
the Army was not yet confident enough to act in any grand scale against Sukamo and 
the Communists. The few actions that the Army did undertake, for instance the 
banning of the PKI newspaper Harian Rakyat and the cancellation o f the 1960 sixth
35 Ibid. p. 157-61
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congress, were quickly met with resistance from Sukamo himself leading to the 
further muddying o f relations between the Armed Forces and the executive.
The increase in PKI campaigning and support for Sukarno’s policies, for 
example crop sharing and land distribution in the early days of Guided Democracy, 
was creating more and more tensions both domestically and internationally. Sukamo 
was increasingly struggling to maintain a balance and not a return to the crisis of the 
late 1950s. PKI activity was increasingly aggravating others within Indonesia and 
groups like the Proletarian Party (Partai Murba)36, and other members of the Cabinet 
were starting to voice their concerns both within the institutions of Gotong Rojong 
and without. Therefore when on 17th December 1964 Sukamo announced that Partai 
Murba was to be banned it sent shockwaves through out the establishment. Whilst 
this was not a popular group it was perceived that Sukamo was acting in the interests 
of the PKI, who benefited most with the disintegration of this group.
Sukarno’s perceived shift to the left was seemingly gathering pace through 
out 1965 as in his Independence Day speech on the 17th August he declared, “We are 
now fostering an anti-imperialist axis...the Jakarta-Phnom-Penh-Hanoi-Peking- 
Pyongyang axis”.37 Sending a clear message, both at home and abroad, that Sukamo 
had shifted away from a position of Non-alignment, to one that was evidently pro­
communist. Although it is interesting to note that Moscow is conspicuous in its 
absence from Sukarno’s axis. This was a clear attempt to establish an ‘Asian value
An organisation founded by Tan Malaka, who had also founded the PKI in 1920 at the behest o f  
Comintern (Communist International) and Moscow. This gave the organisation a prestige and 
legitimacy within Socialist circles, especially as Malaka had been executed in 1949. Whilst it was still 
3 small player in comparison to the PKI, it y/<is problematic to have a Socialist organisation in 
opposition to them.
Simons Indonesia: The Long Oppression p. 161
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system’, however it was one that was most certainly socialist and potentially anti- 
Western in character. And the absence of the Soviet Union whilst allying itself to the 
left, it can be perceived to be a move by Sukamo to segregating himself and thus 
Indonesia from being seen as a Soviet surrogate/colony. This was a move that echoed 
developments in the PKI’s relationship with the Peoples Republic of China, as the 
leadership of the PKI openly supported the PRC against not only the capitalist West
1 0  #
but also the USSR. This was a relationship that was to a significant impact upon the 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the aftermath of Sukarno’s regime. However at this 
time the PKI could take a lot of heart from these developments, Ewa Pauker, an 
Indonesian specialist writing at the time, stated that the “patient, careful and 
extremely dexterous” leadership of the PKI “may well succeed in making Indonesia 
the fifteenth Communist State”.39 Not only this, but the method they were using was 
far more dangerous from the point of view of anti-communists. Sukamo had given 
the PKI a legitimate route to power, this was much more difficult for those who 
wanted to end Communist expansion to fight against. The Army was particularly 
disturbed by the relationship that Sukamo had nurtured with the Communists. They 
could see that as time progressed the increased strength of the PKI was becoming 
detrimental to Indonesian interests as they saw them. Not only was it evident that the 
PKI had a rather more radical long-term agenda, and as time went on this clashed with 
the Armies perceived role to protect both Indonesia’s economic and political well 
being. The escalation in left wing policies was creating shock waves in the West that, 
in turn would impact on Indonesia. Army felt that it would have to react. In the 
August of 1965 Sukamo formally withdrew Indonesia from the International 
Monetary Fund, Interpol and the World Bank, and in doing so severed its connection
38 Ricklefs, A H istory o f  Modern Indonesia p.262
39 Ewa T. Pauker, ‘Has the Sukamo regime weakened the PKI?’ Asian Survey Vol.4, No.9 (September 
1964) p. 1070
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with the capitalist world. When viewed in conjunction with the Independence Day 
“anti-imperialist axis” speech this move sent shock waves through the anti-PKI/pro- 
Westem sections o f Indonesia, particularly the ABRI. Within the Armed forces there 
was increasing dissatisfaction at the state wide corruption that had gone unchecked 
whilst Sukamo continued his campaign against the West.41 Sukarno’s performance 
was not meeting the expectations of his population, and with his withdrawal from the 
Western capitalist institutions and further allying himself with the PRC, he had 
effectively proven that his regime was not capable of resolving the economic crisis. 
His political legitimacy had been severely damaged and alternatives began to look 
appealing.
The policy of Guided Democracy had succeeded in placating the desires of the 
Army and Communists. Unfortunately it had done so by creating an environment 
where both were able to grow and develop more fully. This was fine in the short 
term, however by 1965 both organisations had reached a size where they were both to 
begin to see their only true way of securing their positions politically was by targeting 
each other. By this time Sukamo was unable to maintain the balance he had utilised 
to make his Guided Democracy succeed. Whilst he had attempted to manufacture an 
effective outlet for potential opposition, he had in effect merely provided an incubator 
for each organisations own political desires. More over, slowly but surely in order to 
allow for the stable and effective running of the Republic and counter act the growing 
power of the Army, Sukamo had sided with the PKI. This meant that when the clash 
between the Army and the PKI was to come, he was directly in the firing line, and in
40
Ricklefs, A History o f  Modern Indonesia p.268
41 Ibid. p.264
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the aftermath o f the September 30th coup attempt, Sukamo found himself in a
precarious position.
Chapter Five: The fall of Sukarno and the rise of the New Order
The political environment that had been manufactured by Sukamo during his 
Gotong Rojong regime had become fundamentally unstable by the autumn of 1965. 
The chapter will address the events of September 30th 1965 and their impact upon 
Indonesian political security. It will chart the competing moves by Sukamo, the 
emergence of Suharto as a political actor, and how through a series of securitizing 
moves it was possible for the New Order to usurp Sukarno’s political position. I will 
then explore how Suharto and the New Order was able to effectively establish the new 
political institutions and an alternative ideational position from which to govern the 
republic. It will show how in the aftermath of the 1965 coup the tension that had been 
building through the latter part of Sukarno’s rule culminated in the ABRI effectively 
eradicated the communists from Indonesian politics, and how this in turn impacted 
upon Sukamo himself. This chapter will finally show how the New Order was able to 
successfully use the mechanisms and institutions of Sukarno’s own Gotong Rojong 
regime to counter the President’s power and lay the foundations of a regime that 
would stand until 1998. This chapter illustrates the manoeuvres that competing 
political regimes undergo in the regime formation process. Regime change is not as 
simple as flicking a switch and irrespective of the failings of an established regime, if 
it still, superficially at least, is able to claim the legitimate right to rule then the 
opposition regime needs to work to erode this right. The aftermath of the September 
30th coup shows how by using Sukarno’s own language, principles and institutions, 
the New Order was able to not only undermine Sukamo s claim to legitimacy, but 
also establish their own right to rule.
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The S ep tem ber 3 0 th C oup
The September 30 1965 coup was a defining moment in Indonesian politics. 
For in its aftermath not only would the PKI, and with it Sukamo, be irreparably 
damaged, but also from obscurity would arise the little known Lieutenant General 
Suharto. The events of the coup have been written about extensively through out the 
literature however the securitization approach can shed light on the processes that 
were at play, which enabled the unassuming career officer Suharto to not only 
establish himself and his ideas as viable alternatives to Sukarno’s Indonesia, but also 
usurp Sukarno’s legitimacy and make it his own. And it was from here that the New 
Order regime would emerge and flourish.
On the evening o f September 30th 1960 a move was made to arrest seven senior 
members of the ABRI. The plan was to arrest the generals and return them to Halim 
Air Force base, which was on the outskirts of Jakarta. However it quickly began to 
unravel as the generals did not come quietly, which in turn lead to confusion and the 
assailants shot and killed three of their targets (General Yani, Major General Haryono 
and Brigadier General Panjaitan) in their homes. And whilst the coup members did 
succeed in detaining three of the remaining generals (Major General Suprapto, Major 
General Parman and Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomihaijo), the seventh, the highly 
influential Nasution, was allowed to escape and his aide was taken to Halim in his 
stead. On the morning o f October 1st Indonesia awoke to the news that a group under 
the leadership o f Lieutenant Colonel Untung, whose battalion also acted as palace 
guards for Sukamo, had thwarted a CIA sponsored coup that was planned by the 
‘Council of Generals’. The captured Generals were alleged to be prominent members
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of the council. Untung issued a statement on Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) to 
explain the violent events that had unfolded the night before, and to let it be known 
that the action was an internal ABRI matter, which was only directed towards the 
Council of Generals. The broadcast went on to claim that these generals had 
“neglected the lot o f their men [whist they] lived in luxury, led a gay life, insulted our 
women and wasted government funds”.3 Which was clearly move by the Untung 
group to rally the support of the ABRI behind their objectives. Little did they 
understand that removing the heads of the ABRI would enable Suharto to rise to 
prominence within the armed forces and ultimately Indonesia as a whole.
Upon hearing the news of the shootings and arrests of his senior colleagues, 
Suharto quickly moved to get a better idea of what had happened the previous night, 
and he established a group of senior military staff in order to take control of the 
situation.4 Despite the fact that the Untung coup had taken control of RRI, Suharto 
did have at his disposal the army’s own shortwave facilities and through this was able 
to establish communications and control with the increasingly confused military units 
that were based in and around the capital, and in so doing establish an effective chain 
of command with him at the top.5 Thus, Suharto was effectively able to counter any 
securitizing or politicising moves made by the leaders of the coup. Suharto informed 
the forces he had contacted that there had been an attack on the State and the 
Pancasila, and that he intended to oppose it. And due to the fact that the Untung
1 Although Suharto later claimed that there was no such ‘Council’ and that it was in fact a fabrication
on the part o f  the 30 September movement’s leadership, and the PKI. See also R.E. Elson, Suharto, a 
Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 101 
Taken from an English translation o f the broadcast. Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A 
Preliminary analysis o f  the O ctober 1, 1965 coup in Indonesia (Ithica: Modem Indonesia Project,
Cornell University, 1971) pp. 121 -2
Ibid.
5 Elson, Suharto p. 101 
!bid. p. 102
136
group had arrested, and by this time killed, all of the senior, more charismatic 
members of the ABRI, there was no real opposition to Suharto’s move. Suharto’s 
need to regain control was further emphasised, when at mid day there was another 
broadcast on RRI, which explained that the group had formed a “Revolutionary 
Council” to “constitute the source of all authority” until elections could be held. Then 
Untung announced the make up of the council, and again made a move to appease the 
rest of ABRI by claiming that the Revolutionary Council was to abolish all military 
ranks higher than Lieutenant Colonel and also offered a promotion to military 
personnel who supported the coup.6 This is a clear act of a political actor seeking 
legitimation of an audience, in this case the ABRI personnel. This mid day broadcast 
was followed shortly after by a brief statement being issued on Sukarno’s behalf, 
which stated that he was safe, well and in control. When Sukamo had first received 
news of the coup he had initially opted to head to the Palace in the capital but 
eventually turned away from this course of action due to the general confusion and 
possibility that he could become a target of the coup himself. It was for this reason 
that he headed for Halim Air Base where there was an aircraft permanently based for 
him to use in case of emergencies.
It is important to iterate at this time that whilst his close proximity to the coup 
headquarters was to go some way to tarnish his reputation, there was not actually any 
evidence that Sukamo himself was in collusion with Untung and other members of 
the group. The fact that Sukarno’s afternoon statement was read on his behalf rather 
than personally shows that there was distance between the President and the Untung 
group, and the fact that he did not explicitly offer his support also gave Suharto and
Andersen and M cVey. A preliminary analysis pp. 123-4, and see also Elson, Suharto, p. 103
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his ABRI forces the necessary resolve to move against Untung. By the early evening 
Suharto and his forces had been able to encourage several of the “neutral” sections of 
the army to join with him against the Untung group,7 and Suharto was able to use this 
extra man power to retake the RRI studios and transmitters. Once this was done he 
broadcast a statement to counter Untung, in which he explained the days event, made 
moves to discredit Untung’s earlier statements and explain his own intentions.8
By this time Suharto was effectively in control and in the early hours of October 
2nd Halim Air Force Base was secured by Suharto’s forces. And it is here that the real 
power struggle began to emerge. In the immediate aftermath of the coup Sukamo, 
upon seeing the realities of the situation had began looking for ways that he could 
reassert his control. His first move was to appoint a new commander of the armed 
forces, and whilst Suharto was an option, Sukamo decided to assume command of the 
armed forces himself, and appointed Pranoto Reksosamudro as a caretaker to deal 
with day to day matters. Elson postulates that Sukarno’s reason for not picking 
Suharto to assume command, or even the caretaker position, was that given the fact 
that Suharto had control of Jakarta itself by the time Sukamo made the decision, to 
offer him a senior appointment at this time would have been seen as endorsing his 
actions. And at this time Sukamo, and the rest of Indonesia, was not yet sure which 
way the situation would develop.9 This would seem to be a credible and intelligent 
move from such an experienced political mind like Sukamo. The continued struggle
One o f the key reasons given for the movement o f troops away from Untung and the coup was due to 
the group’s inability to provide adequate food and drink for the forces that joined them. Elson, Suharto.
p.105
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for power between the PKI and ABRI that had dominated his regime was always 
finely balanced, and at this time it was not in his interest to act strongly one way or 
the other. A strong move in favour of Untung or Suharto may have radically 
backfired if he opted to support the wrong ABRI faction. Pranoto by comparison was 
a more passive, and quite possibly malleable, choice, which in turn would enable 
Sukamo to get a clearer understanding of the situation. The choice by Sukamo to not 
overtly support Suharto at this time is also due to the fact that Suharto was not seen as 
being a political operator; he was not charismatic or articulate in any way that would 
seriously give Sukamo any cause for concern, and therefore Sukamo could afford to 
snub Suharto and offer Pranoto the senior position.
It was with this in mind that after the capture of Halim Air Base, Sukamo 
attempted to meet with Suharto. However, initially Suharto sent word to the President 
explaining that he was too busy to see him at this time, and whilst Suharto did later 
meet with Sukamo, at this meeting Suharto was able to secure for himself the role of 
Provisional Leader of the Armed Forces, a post that he had assumed autonomously in 
the immediate aftermath of the coup. Suharto then made a request that the President 
make a public broadcast to spell out his formal responsibilities, and in doing so 
legitimise the position o f authority that he had stepped into the previous day. At this 
time Suharto was not trying to counter the authority of the President, or lay the 
foundations of an alternative political regime, rather Suharto s actions were the mark 
° f a military man who saw a mission to be achieved and ruthlessly sought the tools 
with which he could achieve it. First and foremost this meant securing the support of 
the ABRI, especially those forces that had been swayed by Untung’s own broadcasts.
10 Ibid. p. 108
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Upon the capture o f Halim the moves made by Sukamo to reassert himself threatened 
Suharto s own abilities and thus Suharto did make a move to ensure his position and 
his capabilities. But in doing so he had manoeuvred himself into a strong position, for 
as head of the Armed Forces Sukamo would not be able to overlook him again, and in 
hindsight it would be seen that Suharto had won an important victory against 
Sukarno’s charismatic old order.
Meanwhile on the 3ui of October, the bodies of the murdered generals were 
discovered in Halim Air Force Base. Suharto issued an order that the site should be 
secured but it was not until the following morning that Suharto arrived to personally 
supervise the recovery o f the remains. It was now that Suharto began to put his newly 
won power to full effect. After waiting until representatives of the media had arrived 
to capture the slow and grisly task of exhuming the dead,1 'Suharto then issued another 
statement to the public, in which he blamed the PKI and the air force for their role in 
the coup, and even “cast aspersions” on Sukarno’s attempts to absolve the Air Force 
in a broadcast that the President had made the previous day.12 This would seem a 
bold move by such an inexperienced political operator; however the visual images of 
the dead generals galvanised Suharto, who later said that at this time he saw that 
“[his] primary duty was to crush the PKI, to smash their resistance everywhere, in the 
capital, in the regions, and in their mountain hideouts”.13 Given the growing tension in 
relations between the PKI and ABRI in the years of Gotong Rojong rule, it is not 
surprising that Suharto would suspect the communists involvement, nor that the 
General would seek to remove the PKI as an obstacle to ABRI dominance in
" Harold Crouch, The army and politics in Indonesia, (revised edition) (Ithaca. Cornell University 
Press, 1988) p.38
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Indonesia. What was surprising was the method that Suharto sought to employ, 
having so effectively gained control of the armed forces one would assume that he 
would use a military solution to remove the communist ‘threat’. Instead however 
Suharto saw a different method to vanquish the PKI, mobilising the Indonesian 
people, and using the military in a more selective way. In his autobiography Suharto 
stated “I preferred to lend aid to the people... [in order] to cleanse the respective 
regions of these evil seeds”.14 The media circus at Halim was a way that Suharto 
could channel his ideas about the coup towards the Indonesian people and in doing so 
effectively, and with a popular mandate, finally extinguish the PKI as a force in 
Indonesian politics. By referring to the PKI and the communist ideology as an ‘evil 
seed’, Suharto was making a securitizing move. Requesting that his audience agree 
with his claim that the communists were a threat to Indonesia.
At the public funerals of the generals later that week it became apparent that 
Suharto’s mood was reflected by the public, as they flocked in their thousands to line 
the streets. Sukamo however was conspicuous in his absence. For Sukamo, the only 
appropriate course of action was to make light of the coup and make it out to be a 
normal part o f Indonesian politics.15 It was therefore in keeping with this approach 
that he did not attend, as his presence would have given the impression that the 
funerals, and therefore the deaths, were significant. This is a move to counter 
Suharto. By attempting to normalise the situation Sukamo is in effect making a de- 
securitizing move against Suharto. By the day of the funerals Sukamo had already 
established this approach to the crises in numerous staff meetings , and so even 
though the mood of the public was shifting, for Sukamo to have attended would have
Ibid. p. 136
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been perceived by his cabinet and the leadership of the ABRI as either a sign that he 
was being indecisive or as a second loss of face against the manoeuvrings of Suharto. 
What was being established at this time was an alternative assessment to Sukarno’s 
vision of Indonesia, or more importantly, Sukarno’s vision did not match that of his 
audience. An audience who at this particular time was not merely the political and 
military elites, but also made up of the Indonesian people who were following 
Suharto’s lead in response to the Coup. Sukarno’s continued attempts to minimise the 
implications of the coup began to particularly irk Suharto who was still doing 
everything in his power to bring the PKI to justice for their alleged involvement in the 
affair. That said he claimed that “[he] had no thought at all of bringing down Bung 
Kamo [Sukamo]. To [his] mind [Sukamo] remained a dedicated leader, although he 
had a different view o f what happened on 1st October 1965. But I did not think it 
necessary continually to make public my opinion of him, except at appropriate 
moments”.17 This at least superficially respectful attitude to the position of President,
tilif not the man, enabled Suharto to further cement his position, and on October 16 
Suharto formally became the Commander of the Armed Forces replacing the 
murdered Yani.
Suharto in the aftermath o f the Coup
After his appointment as the Commander of the Armed Forces, Suharto was
I g
better able to continue his efforts to destroy the PKI and the Gestapu conspirators. 
The use of the media was central to this as is illustrated by his speech on the 6 of 
October. In which Suharto had been able to lay the foundations of the rumour that the 
Generals, had been viciously and maliciously tortured and mutilated by the Gestapu
Suharto, Pikiran p. 139 , . . .
Gestapu taken from Gerakan September Tiga Puluh or the 30 September Movement.
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before their eventual murder , and supposition that was to be at the heart of the 
ABRI s campaign against the PKI and would be used to justify their actions against 
the Communists. Whilst Suharto had desired to not directly use the armed forces 
against the PKI, on Oct 10 Kopkamtib20'W2LS established with the express purpose of 
hunting down and arresting potential threats to the Republic, which to Suharto meant 
the PKI. Kopkamtib’s efforts were so successful that by the time Suharto’s position 
as Head of the Armed Forces was formally accepted by Sukamo on the 16th of 
October, 1,334 suspected PKI members had been arrested.21 These actions started a 
ripple effect out o f Jakarta and effectively out of Suharto’s direct control. Whilst in 
the capital the Army was able to systematically continue its policy of arresting PKI 
members, in the out lying areas of Java and the rest of the archipelago the situation 
began to escalate. Where the army had little presence and thus control, the local 
population took matters into their own hands and began to forcibly remove and in 
many cases kill suspected PKI members and their families. And even when the ABRI 
was present in stronger numbers, the nature of the mood that Suharto had helped 
establish lead to levels o f violence that even they could not limit or control. At the 
same time in the media Suharto was still pushing his view of the events of September 
30th, that the PKI had recruited from within the Army and the Air Force, and that the 
only way to prevent such an action from happening again was by crushing and 
eliminating the counter-revolutionary movement to its very roots.
19 Although whether or not torture and mutilation actually took place is widely debated for instance see 
Ben Anderson, ‘How did the generals die?’ Indonesia Vol.43 (1987) pp 109-34
20 Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keaman dan Ketertiban or Operations Command for the Restoration
of Order and Security.
22 Elson, Suharto p. 124 
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T his clash between the PKI and ABRI had been long in coming due to the 
centrality of the adversarial relationship between the two groups, and its role in 
m aintaining stability for Sukarno’s Gotong Rojong regime. And whilst Suharto did 
not d irec tly  blame Sukarno for the coup or the resulting violence, it is clear from his 
writings and speeches that Suharto was beginning to lay the blame for the coup on the 
regim e itself. For example on the 1st November Suharto stated:
that movement was not a movement that erupted spontaneously on 30 
September, but only came to its culmination as a result of a series of happenings 
which had been prepared long before. An atmosphere of slander, o f fomenting 
the bad feelings of one group against the other, and a gloomy social-economic 
climate which had previously been created, gave rise to a prior atmosphere and 
climate which was very easily seized upon by them [the PKI] to ignite the 
counter-revolutionary movement.23 
He elaborated further:
[in] any drama there are always the main performers, assistants and the 
mastermind [dalangnja]. It was the just the same with the counter­
revolutionary movement which called itself the 30 September Movement. 
There were major actors, there were also bit-players, and there was also the 
mastermind, the brainstrust [sic]. The main actors, whose roles amongst others 
were played by the Untung group and some other members of the ABRI, the 
bit-players, whose roles were played by members of Permuda Rak\>at and 
Gerxvani [Youth and Women organisations with strong ties to the PKI] and the 
mastermind which, based on the facts, the results of interrogation and important
Suharto cited in Elson, Suharto p. 126
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documents which fell into our hands, points to the involvement of the PKI as 
the brainstrust [sic] o f the counter-revolutionary movement.24 
This is a key statement of Suharto s view of the coup. It is clear that Suharto squarely 
places the blame on the PKI as being the organisation mind behind the coup, however 
it is important to note the emphasis he places on the nature of the regime that Sukamo 
had established. The climate of economic and social “gloom”, and mistrust between 
the PKI and ABRI were integral antecedents to the coup and therefore Suharto was 
arguing that Sukarno’s Gotong Rojong regime’s failure was equally culpable. In a 
political security context this statement erodes Sukarno’s legitimacy on the grounds of 
performance. But by blaming the circumstances rather than the man, Suharto was still 
clearly showing that he was not yet ready or perhaps willing to directly confront 
Sukamo at this time. A direct move against Sukamo would not have aided Suharto in 
his conflict with the PKI as Sukamo was still tremendously popular, and Suharto had 
yet to formalise an alternative to Sukarno’s rule.
The mood o f the population was slowly but surely moving away from Sukamo, 
as was evident in the extreme violence that the public was directing towards the PKI. 
Rather than the calm and reflection that Sukamo was attempting to promote, it was 
Suharto’s rhetoric that the population responded to. And equally importantly 
Suharto’s dissatisfaction with Sukarno’s response to the Coup began to be echoed by 
the Indonesian people at large and in particular on the University campuses. Suharto 
saw that the student body was an essential actor for the future of Indonesia. He states 
[time] and again I made contact with the students. I listened to their ideas, their 
wishes and their longings. I felt I needed to be close to them because they were the
24 Ibid.
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ones w ho would be able to help me prevent the outbreak of disorder and excesses. 
There must be no chaos. Suharto found himself in a precarious situation, whilst he 
had w on several decisive victories against Sukamo with respect to the military 
situation; Sukamo was still making great efforts to control the rapidly escalating 
political unrest on the archipelago. In one move in January 1966 Sukamo issued a 
statem ent calling on for the Indonesian people to “form your brigades [and] gather 
your forces” and to rally against the increasing unrest. This call escalated into a call 
from Sukarno’s supporters for the formation of a ‘Sukamo Brigade’, which would 
have potentially risen to become an alternative to Suharto and the ABRI. This left 
Suharto in a difficult situation, as although he was now in command of ABRI, the 
organisation was fractioned and President Sukamo, as the Father of the Republic, still 
held tremendous influence and sway over the troops on the ground. Suharto was in no 
position to counter this directly, and his lack of political experience meant that he was 
not decisive in dealing with this situation. Although Suharto himself later claimed “I 
saw the political danger and quickly intervened”27 in actuality Suharto did nothing 
decisive to counter the President’s move and it was the collective actions of several 
senior military figures, notably Nasution and Ibrahim Ajie, who effectively resolved 
the situation in the ABRI’s favour. Ajie issued a statement which said that “all state 
bodies, citizens, political parties, and mass organisations ... are in fact followers and 
supporters o f Panca Sila [sic] and the Teachings of the Great Leader of the Indonesian 
Revolutions ... and therefore automatically make up barisans [brigades] standing 
behind Bung Kamo”.28 This manoeuvre effectively removed the threat of the 
formation of any new or alternative bodies being created as Ajie argued that
25
26 Suharto, Pikiran p. 162 (emphasis in original)
27 Sukam o cited in Crouch, The army and politics in Indonesia p. 167
28 Suharto, Pikiran p. 163
Ajie cited in Crouch, The arm y and politics in Indonesia p. 169
146
Sukarno s Brigades already existed and any bodies that emerged to counter existing 
institutions could be argued as being anti-Pancasila and anti-Sukarno giving the 
ABRI free reign to ban any such organisation.29
Suharto’s inability to deal with Sukarno’s challenge left him on the back foot 
and Sukamo began to push again relentlessly. The struggle to regain control of the 
situation required Sukamo to reassert his idea of the political situation, and in so 
doing undermine Suharto’s. In mid February Sukamo gave a speech in which he 
openly praised the PKI for their sacrifices in Indonesia’s struggle for independence, 
and also called for arrangements to be made for the release of those PKI supporters 
who had been arrested in the months following the coup.30 This was followed by a 
cabinet reshuffle in which he removed several key anti-PKI ministers, including 
Nasution, and replaced them with communist sympathisers.31 The only real exception 
to this was that Sukamo offered Suharto Nasution’s post as minister o f coordinating 
defence and security, an offer which Suharto rejected.3“ This move by Sukamo was a 
sign to Suharto and Indonesia at large that although the ABRI had made tremendous 
gains in the aftermath o f the coup, they had began to lose the initiative whilst Sukamo
th 33had regained much of the “strength and energy” that he had lost on 30 September. 
The cabinet reshuffle was a signal that Suharto could not afford to ignore. For if 
Sukamo was able to re-establish himself as an effective ruler, something he had lost 
after the coup, then the ABRI’s position would be lost and it could even, potentially, 
leave the door open for a resurgent PKI.
 ^ Elson, Suharto p. 131 
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What followed was a battle of wills between the politically savvy though 
tarnished Sukamo, and the patient, pragmatic Suharto. Much of Suharto’s 
m anoeuvring had to this point been conducted quietly and indirectly out of respect for 
Sukam o s position in Indonesian politics and history. By supporting student 
m ovem ents like KAMI Suharto was able to support the reform movement without 
directly having to counter Sukamo. However Sukarno’s reshuffle, coupled with the 
banning of KAMI in early 1966, removed such avenues and left Suharto with few 
options. He could either accept Sukamo and his position vis-k-vis Indonesian politics 
and the coup, or he had to tackle Sukamo more directly. In March 1966 Suharto 
m ade a decisive move in the form of the Supersemar.
March 11th 1966: The Suversemar
On March 11th a cabinet meeting was disrupted, and abandoned after reports of 
anned forces surrounding the building. Sukamo was quickly escorted to his Bogor 
palace outside o f Jakarta, where he was to wait until it was safe. After the months of 
bloodshed and turmoil in Indonesia this reaction is particularly understandable, and 
whilst there was no evidence that Suharto was responsible for the troops' presence that 
morning, he was conspicuous by his absence from the meeting. Later that day 
Sukamo was visited by Brigadier General Amirmachmud, Major General Basuki 
Rachmat and Brigadier General Mohammed Yusuf, three senior members of ABRI 
who had close ties with Suharto, who claimed that they had gone to Bogor in order to
55 35
ensure that he “would not feel that he had been abandoned by the Army . When 
their meeting with Sukamo was over he had signed over to Suharto the powers to 
“take all necessary steps to guarantee security and calm and the stability of the
H Ibid. p. 135 
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running o f  the Government”.36 This order was known as Surat Perintah Sebelas 
Matct or the Letter ot Instruction of 11 March, the Supersemar. The increased 
military presence that accompanied the cabinet meeting, followed by the ‘visit’ by 
senior members o f the ABRI effectively countered Sukarno’s political posturing. For 
whilst at this time Suharto had proved to be less adept than Sukamo at the political 
manoeuvrings that had allowed Sukamo to reassert himself in Jakarta, Suharto
th
showed on March 11 that he was aware of his own strengths. Coupled with the anti- 
PKI program  that Suharto had conducted since the Coup, this move by Suharto sent a 
m essage that he was in control and had the manpower to back up his claims.
Once Suharto received the Supersemar, he used his new authority to formally 
attack and ban the PKI from Indonesian politics. The letter was enough to convince 
those within the ABRI who were still loyal to Sukamo that Suharto now had the 
legitimacy to carry out whatever actions he saw fit for the stability of the Republic.37 
This was irrespective o f the fact that Suharto’s move against the PKI was not directly 
sanctioned by Sukamo, who still sort to establish a balance between the ABRI and the 
Communists. But why did Sukamo sign over this power? One cannot deny the 
‘coercive’ nature o f the Military presence at the March 11th cabinet meeting, or of the 
visit at Bogor, but Sukamo was a shrewd and experienced political operator who 
would not sign away his power easily. Brian May suggests that the answer lies in the 
fact that he saw the Supersemar differently to Suharto. For Sukamo, the document 
was a limited order to tie Suharto up in resolving the increasingly ambiguous political 
climate of early 1966. The document was in many ways little more than a formal 
endorsement of the work that Suharto was already carrying out, and whilst Sukamo
37 Carmel Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag (London: Cassell, 1996) p.211
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did not desiie the destruction of the PKI, by signing the letter of authority he in some 
way owned the actions of Suharto, and could claim that he was again in control. 
However, for Suharto the letter was a “wedge” to attain power rather than a source of 
power in itself. It legitimised the action he had taken to date, and allowed him to 
secure his position within the Indonesian elite. This letter is what finally marked the 
beginning of the end for Sukarno’s regime. For whilst the letter itself was limited in 
the powers it gave, Suharto’s actions, and how his actions were perceived, gave the 
letter more significance. In a memorandum of the People’s Representative Council- 
Mutual Assistance (DPR-GR) it stated that the letter of authority was “the key to a 
new page in the history of the Indonesian Revolution, and constitutes the point of 
return to the true and pure basic objectives of the revolution as sought by the 
proclamation o f independence of 17th August and laid down in the preamble and the 
body of the 1945 Constitution.”39 And Suharto claimed that it was “[a] historical 
milestone of the utmost importance for the safety of the people, the country and the 
nation”40, and later going on to say that the Supersemar marked “the beginning of the 
struggle of the New Order”.41 The Supersemar gave Suharto the ability to act far 
more proactively to tackle his political adversaries and on the 18 of March even 
went so far as to arrest 15 members o f Sukarno’s Dwikora cabinet on suspicion of 
being involved in the September 30th Coup, forcing Sukamo to restructure his means 
of governing.
Suharto’s confidence began to grow rapidly, and he began to take the 
opportunity to address a wider audience. The Supersemar had effectively cemented
39
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his position within, and the support of, the ABRI, now he needed to appeal to 
Sukarno’s other base o f support, the Indonesian people. What is particularly 
interesting is how the language that Suharto uses at this time echoes the content of 
Sukarno’s own writings and speeches. For instance in April 1966 Suharto is reported 
as saying that Indonesia is not contented with western democracy and other foreign 
dem ocracies, with a liberal or totalitarian economy”.43 This is reminiscent of 
Sukarno’s speeches when he was introducing Gotong Rojong in 1957; however for 
Suharto it is an opportunity to use the authoritative and legitimate voice of Sukamo to 
lay the foundations of his own agenda, and the need to correct the economic failings 
o f S ukarno’s regime. In August 1966 he used the new platform he had made for 
him self to again forge a relationship with the people of the Republic, and in doing so 
establish the core o f the New Order’s political agenda. He stated that whilst “ABRI 
was not expert in politics or economics, ‘it had sufficient knowledge and 
consciousness o f the national and international problems which had to be faced, how 
to solve them and those people who are able to get them done.’”44
The emergence o f the New Order and the political defeat of Sukamo
This public assault was coupled by a less public competition between Suharto 
and Sukamo for control o f the political institutions of the Republic. The battleground 
for this was to be the MPRS -  the Peoples Consultative Assembly- which was the 
ultimate source o f authority in Indonesia, for whoever had the support of the 
Assembly could claim to be the legitimate power in the state. On 21 June 1966 the 
MPRS issued a decree to “adopt and confirm the policy of the President... that is laid
44 Tited in Kompas 5 April 1966 
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151
down in the order dated 11th March 1966 addressed to Lieutenant General Suharto.”45 
This decree changed the nature of the Supersemar from being a simple order from the 
President to Suharto, to instead being a law. Once its status had changed, then this 
meant that Sukamo could not alter or countermand the activities that Suharto did 
under the auspices of the letter of authority without having to go through the MPRS 
first. In response to this move Sukamo issued a statement to the MPRS, reiterating 
his position as President and restating the guiding principles of his regime. This move 
was a further effort by Sukamo to normalise, and in effect de-securitize, the post- 
Coup political environment, and reaffirm his position within Indonesian political life. 
The fact that he failed to comment upon the Coup at this time was not well received 
by the MPRS who stated that Sukarno’s statement had fell short of what it and the 
people expected from the President, and in particular wanted an account of the actions 
he had taken in response to the situation, especially with respect to the economic and 
moral consequences o f the coup.46 This action is evidence of the MPRS responding to 
Suharto’s earlier speeches in which he was attempting to move the political debate 
away from Sukarno’s political position, and instead posit and alternative set of ideas 
and principles. Suharto felt that the way to effectively govern was to remove the 
communist threat as this would allow the Republic to rectify the economic and 
developmental problems that he felt had been allowed to develop during Sukamo s 
time in power. Suharto’s addresses can be considered to be securitizing moves in the 
Political sector. The Mars’s decrees and responses in June 1966, whilst not 
authorising Suharto directly, elevated his position politically, and in so doing accepted 
that Suharto’s guiding principles were a realistic and potentially powerful alternative 
to Sukarno’s own. B y  directly criticising the President after his response to Decree
45 **
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No. IX, and in particular drawing attention to the President’s lack of action in respect 
to the coup and Indonesia s economic predicament, they give credence to Suharto’s 
earlier actions and ensured that Sukamo needed to respond directly thus securitizing 
the political sector. This in turn put Sukamo on the back foot, as his attempts to 
ensure that the situation remained de-securitized had failed. But the situation was 
about to become considerably worse for on July 5th the MPRS issued several more 
decrees which reinstated the institutions of the Republic to the form laid out in the 
1945 constitution, called for the DPR-GR to review all Presidential directives and 
regulations issued since 1959 and they accepted Suharto’s decision to dissolve and 
ban the PKI. Three other important developments are the fact that the MPRS called 
for Dwikora to be replaced by a new cabinet under the leader ship of Suharto (to be 
called the Amanat Pederitaan Rakyat -  Ampera or Message of the People’s Suffering 
Cabinet). They repealed Sukarno’s appointment as President for Life, they decided 
that should the President be unable to perform his duties then the holder of the 
Supersemar would become the acting President, and finally they called for a general 
election to be held by July 1967.47 These decisions effectively ended Sukamo s 
ability to resist Suharto’s rise. Not only did Suharto now enjoy the full support and 
backing of the MPRS, but the MPRS had also effectively weakened Sukarno’s own 
position by giving Suharto control of the Cabinet. And by issuing orders to 
investigate Sukarno’s own conduct during the Gotong Rojong period of government 
the MPRS was calling into question the legitimacy of Sukarno’s regime, and in so 
doing effectively opened up the possibility for Suharto to instigate an alternative.
Elson, Suharto p. 144
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At the same time the MPRS also announced that Indonesia should alter its 
policies vis a vis its position internationally and called for the government iu reinitiate 
an active and independent foreign policy. The nature of this policy, and how it 
differed from Sukamo s particular approach was emphasised by a memorandum sent 
to the DPR-GR on July 5 , which informed the council that they wanted a quick and 
peaceful settlement to the confrontation with Malaysia. This move assisted Suharto in 
his own attempts to fully secure his position of power. For once the decree was 
issued he set about removing any structures and institutions that gave the President 
any real power. One of the most important of which being Kogam {Komando 
Ganyang Malaysia -  Crush Malaysia Command), for with the MPRS sanctioning an 
end to the confrontation with Malaysia, Suharto had no difficulties abolishing this 
source of power for the President.48 This directive from the MPRS gave Suharto the 
opportunity to direct foreign policy in a manner that he saw fit, the confrontational 
and anti-Western policies of Sukamo had not been favourable to foreign investors 
who Suharto saw as being fundamental to the development process. The MPRS 
action allowed Indonesia to reengage with the outside world which was beneficial for 
the political security o f the fledgling regime. Two clear signals of this reengagement 
were Indonesia rejoining the United Nations in September 1968, after Sukamo 
withdrew in the January of 1965, and the creation of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the August of 1967. These two steps achieved much in 
the way of securing the Republics integrity and territory in a way that Sukarno’s 
strong handed tactics could not. The UN offered Suharto the opportunity to perform 
as a global statesman, which not only improved his image domestically but also 
Indonesia’s reputation globally. Meanwhile the formation of the regional institution
48
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ASEAN promoted dialogue and engagement with Indonesia’s neighbours, for 
instance Malaysia, and mutual benefits. Indonesia’s centrality to ASEAN was to have 
benefits politically for the New Order in that it allowed Indonesia to regain power and 
influence within South East Asia that had been lost by Sukarno’s confrontational style 
of rule. This change in style was evident in other moves that Suharto made in the 
aftermath of the MPRS decrees, for whilst he still overtly maintained a respect for the 
President and his position, when the Ampera cabinet was formally announced later in 
July it was clear that a new thinking lay behind its creation and Sukarno’s vision of 
Indonesia had been effectively superseded by Suharto’s. Instead of being based on 
party political grounds Suharto’s cabinet was predominately made up of civilian 
technocrats. This make up reflected Suharto’s earlier speeches saying that whilst the 
Army, and more specifically Suharto himself, could not claim to be experts in the 
fields of economics and development themselves, they did know how to solve the 
problems that Indonesia faced, or more importantly it knew the people who were able 
to get them done.
These moves and Suharto’s action in the aftermath of the coup, and the general 
run of events surrounding the end o f Gotong Rojong and the rise of the New Order 
clearly illustrate the complex social discourse that underlies regime change within 
developing states. Whilst traditional approaches concentrate on the military or 
physical aspects of radical changes to the governments of fledgling states, the 
securitization model moves the focus towards the struggle between the ideas that 
ultimately lie at the heart of the competing regimes. With the implementation of the 
Supersemar Suharto had effectively eradicated the PKI as a force in Indonesian 
Politics, eroded the power that Sukamo had over the Indonesian political elites, and
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began to establish himself and his New Order as the only viable system for the 
governance o f the Republic.
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C hapter Six; The New Order Regime
This chapter will address the political security challenges that the New Order 
faced once it was effectively in control. It will initially address the manner in which 
the New Order manufactured and sold its underlying principles and used them to 
assert control over the Indonesian political sphere. Secondly, I will explore the 
implementation o f the New Orders principles, and the institutionalisation of their 
ideas. With the creation of the Golkar the New Order was putting the ideas and 
principles agreed at Bandung into practice. I will argue how this move was carried 
out not only in an attempt to create a legitimate system of governance, by using the 
Pancasila to justify their changes, but also to appeal to the international community 
and therefore improve their security externally. I will also argue how with 
introduction of Golonga Karya the new order was essentially ‘de-politicising’ the 
regime. Manufacturing a system where political opposition could only be carried out 
within terms established by the New Order, but in their slow and careful 
implementation, the regime was able to ensure that such mechanisms were accepted. 
I will show how such a system, backed up by developmental advancement and 
economic success, shielded the regime from potential opposition. The chapter will 
examine the concept o f Dwifungsi and the role it had in allowing the regime to 
permeate through Indonesian society and provide the New Order with a means to 
engage with the disparate peoples of Indonesia in a way that had been unworkable 
under Sukamo. Finally the chapter will explore how as time progressed the principles 
and ideas that had initially proved successful began to breed resentment both 
internally and externally. I will discuss how Suharto and the New Order s 
relationship with the ABRI began to erode, how in the light of changing global
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politics previous allies began to view the regime less favourably, and ultimately how 
the failure of the regime to maintain it claim to represent the best interests of 
Indonesia lead to its eventual collapse in 1998.
The Principles o f Suharto’s New Order
The ideological foundations of Suharto’s New Order were laid in Bandung in 
August 1966. It was at this Army seminar that Suharto called for those attending to 
draw up a set o f principles and objectives for the new government to achieve political 
and economic stability for the Republic, based upon the ideas established in the 1945 
constitution and the Pancasila} Suharto was aware that in order to be able to 
instigate his development program he needed to have a secure ideological base from 
which to argue. All of the ideational threats to his vision had not been removed by the 
MPRS decrees, and Suharto still had to work in order to fully secure the regime he 
was forming, in particular with regards to the PKI. Speaking of the post-Coup PKI in 
mid 1966 stated:
[the] PKI as a party has been crushed, but perhaps the PKI as an idea lives on.
I well know that an idea can’t be crushed except with a counter-idea. It is 
fortunate that the counter-idea which opposes the PKI idea is sufficiently strong 
in Indonesia, because indeed the PKI idea is foreign for Indonesia which is 
religious and attached to Pancasila}
It was this ‘Pancasilaisation’ of Indonesian politics that was to become central to the 
New Order regime. As is shown in the above case, Suharto s rhetoric essentially
' Suharto, Pikiran, ucapan dan tindakan: otobiografi seperti dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan 
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drew a line in the sand o f the Republic’s political climate. Either an idea was based
upon/supportive of the Pancasila or it was against the Pancasila, in which case it
either had to be eradicated, or it was insignificant and could be ignored. This was a
mood that was picked up on by other political leaders in Indonesia, for example
Sarbini Sumawin, former leader of the Indonesian Socialist Party (.Partai Sosialis
Indonesia or PSI) who stated at the time that “the Panca Sila forces must be victorious
in the General Elections”/  From here Suharto was able to push more forcibly, and
consolidate his power removing any potential opposition. In February 1967 Suharto’s
battle for power over Sukamo was eventually won with the public announcement by
Sukamo of his decision, after prolonged negotiation between the ABRI leadership,
Sukamo and Suharto, to transfer his powers to Suharto as holder of the Supersemar.
This was followed by a call from the DPR-GR for a special session of the MPRS to
appoint Suharto as acting President, a session that met on 7th March. At this time
Sukamo was left in a precarious position as whilst he whilst he had no power, he was
still the President but with the change in regime now becoming more formally
accepted his position was tenuous. The solution to this problem was outlined on
March 13th, “for the time being we will treat him [Sukamo] as a president who no
longer has power, as a president who has no authority of any kind in the fields of
politics, the state, and government.”4 This treatment was necessary for Suharto to
fully secure his position, for if it had been perceived that Suharto was in anyway
mistreating Sukamo at this time, he would have alienated those members of the
Indonesian political and military hierarchy who were sympathetic to Sukamo even if
they acknowledged his inability to govern. With Sukamo formally removed from the
seat of power it left Suharto with the time to establish a consensus for his leadership.
3 Cited in Harold Crouch, The army and politics in Indonesia (revised edition) (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988)p.248  
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He was careful to downplay any overt signs of ambition or desire to become full 
president, claiming later in his biography that “eventually they were able to convince 
me that they really couldn t find anyone else. They didn’t trust anyone else as much 
as me. And even when he accepted power it was for the limited period of one year 
so that ‘ we [Suharto and the MPRS] would use that period for mutual evaluation: 
whether I was capable, whether halfway through there would be a change of mind, or 
another choice.”6 Once Suharto was in power and Sukamo placed in “political 
quarantine” he continued his public assault and Pancasilaisation process. Continuing 
to talk of the need economic modernisation and development, he began to wear 
civilian clothing to public engagements and inform the country at large of the New 
Order’s plans and proposals.8 These gestures were a sign of Suharto overtly 
attempting to disengage with his military past, and mark himself as a civilian/political 
actor. However, the question still remained as to whether or not the New Order 
would deliver on it promises, or follow the example set by Sukamo and fail.
Despite the public mood being favourable to Suharto and the New Order, it did 
however take time for their policies to take effect and in the infancy of the New 
Order, rising prices and economic uncertainty began fuelling criticism against the new 
regime. The majority o f the criticism was benign in nature; however there were 
several alleged plots to assassinate Suharto, the Cabinet and other ABRI leaders, and 
return Sukamo to power.9 Many of these failed plots were tied to the PKI, and the 
Army was active in putting down revolutionary movements and uprisings in the
6 Suharto, Pikiran p. 189 (emphasis added)
7 tiid . p. 190
8 Suharto cited in Elson, Suharto p. 159
9 -Justus M. V a n ^ r fo o e f ,  ‘Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup’ Pacific Affairs Vol.43, N o.l
(1970) p .44
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republic, for example within the Sino-Indonesian communities of West Kalimantan.10 
For Suharto though these uprisings were not in themselves a problem, and in fact the 
continued threat that the PKI posed was useful for him at this stage. For Suharto the 
PKI threat was a method of controlling the Republic in this time of flux, as they 
allowed the Army to spread and expand its influence into the regions and in doing so 
remove any potential political threats. Secondly the continued PKI activity allowed 
Suharto to reemphasise communism as a long term threat to Indonesia and its future 
development, and finally Suharto tied any opposition that was emerging to the 
communists, and therefore undermined any arguments and criticisms that were 
levelled at him and the New Order. This is because of the success of Suharto’s earlier 
addresses to the public tying the PKI and communism to Gestapu, and the violent and 
destabilising aftermath o f the coup itself. This gave the Suharto the room and time to 
develop and implement their vision of Indonesia. For the New Order, Indonesia “was 
one in which all people lived in harmony and tolerance with one another, ignoring 
those things that divided them”, which was in keeping with the Pancasila, and “the 
New Order [was] an order of Pancasila Democracy which puts the people s interests 
first and not group or private interests”.11 The fact that the PKI was seen to be 
resorting to violence was contrary to the Pancasilaised Indonesia that the New Order 
claimed to represent. To force home this vision of Indonesia Suharto used the word 
Pancasila 64 times in his inaugural Independence Day speech, and reemphasised that 
Sukarno’s regime had deviated from this path.12 This process of enforcing the 
Pancasila as the New Order’s and therefore Indonesia’s ideational foundation was 
concluded quite efficiently on the 23rd October 1967. At this time Suharto proclaimed 
that there was no more need to discuss ideology because Indonesia already [has] one
u Elson, Suharto p .160 
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ideology, Pancasila 'thereby ending any debate on the subject.'3 What Suharto now
needed was to establish an institutional basis for the regime that would aiiovv him to 
govern effectively. This was to be known as the Golkar system.
Pancasila Democracy
The New Order perceived that the party political system as established under 
Sukamo was not in keeping with the harmonious Indonesia that they wished to 
establish. The Bandung seminar had posited several solutions to this problem; firstly, 
that politics should be non-ideological and those that participated should be allowed 
to do so based on their role, utility and commitment to the development and 
modernisation of the Republic.14 Secondly, that the New Order should replace the 
Gotong Rojong system and return to the Western Liberal model of the early 1950s. 
This was problematic however as whilst it would have been useful to the new regime 
in one respect, as this model was acceptable to external powers in the west, it still 
relied on party politics. The final solution was to maintain the party structures as 
they existed under Sukamo, but also create a role for those groups within society that 
the New Order felt were essential for the development process that they envisioned. 
This particular method was useful for not only would it allow the technocrats to 
have a bigger say in the running of the country, but it would not totally undermine the 
existing political order. This was particularly important with respect to the politicians 
who had supported and assisted Suharto in the aftermath of Gestapu, as if Suharto had 
totally ignored these groups then they could become a potential threat to the sanctity
Suharto cited in Elson, Suharto p. 161
Ibid. p. 163
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of his vision. Another important reason for maintaining the political parties was that 
it was important that the elections should “be won by the New Order by means of an 
honest democratic procedure , it was for this reason that Suharto not only began to 
talk of the importance of political parties to Pancasila democracy, but in early 1968 
he sanctioned the formation of the Parmusi which was a new Islamic political party. 
In the build up to the proposed elections commentators in Indonesia were particularly 
concerned. Whilst Suharto had successfully convinced the MPRS and the ruling elite 
of the nation that Sukamo was unfit to govern, it still remained to be seen whether or 
not Suharto would be any better. Arief Budiman asked the question “was it possible 
for a military man to be more democratic than a man like Sukamo, who had thought 
about freedom and its problems for a long time while fighting to free the nation from 
colonialism?”17 The activities of the New Order in preparation for the elections did 
not however allay any o f these fears.
In the months before the election the New Order began to reorganise the MPRS 
and DPR. Replacing existing members with ones who were sympathetic to their 
cause and in doing so raised the number of seats in parliament from 347 to 414, the 
majority of which were filled by ABRI or civilians with no previous connections to 
Indonesian politics. When the New Order had completed this reshuffle of the existing 
institutions it had effectively removed any possibility of a strong, effective opposition 
emerging to challenge Suharto. With no such alternative it left the way open for the 
MPRS to elect him as President of the Republic for a full five year term. So secure 
was Suharto in this position that on the day after his being sworn in he left Indonesia
"ibid.
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on a state visit to Japan, where he attempted to secure economic support, and court 
potential investment partners so that he would be able to deliver on the New Order’s 
promises to Indonesia. This proactive and pragmatic approach to governing was 
reflected in his first development cabinet which was made up of “a combination of 
experts from university circles and members of the Armed Forces” who Suharto felt 
were essential for his modernisation scheme.18 It is however worth noting that whilst 
he did see that the Army had an important role to play in the New Order for the 
development o f the economy it was civilians who would have a greater role to play 
and so this cabinet had fewer service personnel as members than civilians. Suharto 
balanced his cabinet so that the economic matters would be dealt with by his technical 
experts, whilst matters o f security would be dealt with by military members. Suharto 
saw five goals which his new cabinet needed to face, and be judged against; “political 
stability, including the conduct of foreign policy; General Elections; the restoration of 
order and security; reform and cleansing of the state apparatus and the economic 
stability with the first five-year development plan”.19 General Elections were of 
central importance to the future well being of the regime for not only would they be 
useful domestically to ensure that there was a method to channel political unrest in the 
republic and for the people to feel fully part of his regime, but also internationally, 
elections offered the attractive target of legitimacy and stability . This would 
enable the regime to attract further economic investment and the development Suharto 
sought. However as discussed above the New Order found party politics divisive and 
Potentially dangerous to their plans, so they needed to devise a way to effectively 
maintain their ability to govern how they saw fit from within a parliamentary system.
I® Suharto, Pikiran. p.238
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The New Order saw Golonga Karya {Golkar) or functional groups as the 
solution to this problem. If they could ensure that the Parliament was populated by 
enough sympathetic and technically qualified people, not career politicians, then they 
felt that their pragmatic solutions to Indonesia’s problems would be able to be 
implemented effectively. They claimed that Golkar could be the political party 
without politicians, that it would appeal to many urban Indonesians who had become 
dissatisfied with the partisan, self-interest based Sukamo era politics and they gave 
Golkar access to state funds so that it could establish itself as a viable alternative to 
the establish parties. Golkar’s route to electoral success was virtually assured by 
senior New Order figures working to tamish the reputations and electoral campaigns 
of non-Golkar candidates,21 and this was coupled with a succession of mles and 
regulations for the 1971 elections that limited the topics and issues that could be 
addressed and debated within the campaign in particular any criticism of the 
Pancasila, religion or Suharto’s government.22 Through the media, the New Order 
started a campaign that was to make Golkar synonymous with Pancasila, ABRI, the 
government and the regime as a whole, and so made it virtually impossible to actively 
criticise the new party. The only real opposition that did stand in its way, Golongan 
Putih (Golput), was banned prior to the general election and so Golkat won by a 
landslide winning over 62% of the vote, crushing the PNI {Partai Nasional Indonesia) 
and Parmusi and NU {Nahdlatul Ulama) opposition and in doing so firmly cemented 
the New Order as its voice in the DPR.
This e lecto ral v ic to ry  show ed S uharto  that partisan  politics could  be effectively  
limited, and  th a t the Indonesian  peop le w ould  accept the changes that he sought. For
21 Ibid
22 Ken Ward, The 1971 election in Indonesia: an East Java Case Study (Clayton. Centre o f South East 
Asian Studies, Monash University, 1974) pp.85-6
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the New Order this victory gave them the signal that it would be possible to further
engineer the electoral process to their benefit without unduly damaging their
reputation. The success of Golkar in the elections proved that it was no longer
necessary to limit their strategies and that it may be possible to fully implement the
proposals outlined at the Bandung seminar. It was proposed that this new parliament
would have no need for multiple parties; instead Suharto argued that it should consist
of just four sections, which he called “material-spiritual, spiritual-material, Golkar
and ABRI”.23 In June 1973 this vision was finally institutionalised with the formal
creation of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP or Development Unity Party) and
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI or Indonesian Democratic Party). The PPP was
made up of the NU and Parmusi, whilst the PDI was the PNI and an assortment of
non-Islamic parties. Suharto explained his reasons for this consolidation as follows:
With the one and only road already there, why must we have so many cars, as
many as nine? Why must we have wild speeding and collisions? [...] It is not
necessary to have so many vehicles. But it is not necessary to have only one.
Two or three is fine.24
This continued the New Order’s Pancasilaisation of Indonesian politics. The one
road” in question was the road to development which the New Order had established
as being only achievable through the Pancasila and its institutional representation in
the ABRI and Golkar. Multiple parties meant numerous potential sources of
opposition to his policies and modernisation programs. However, the above quotation
also shows that the New Order had recognised the danger in banning opposition. As
discussed earlier it is necessary for a successful regime to have built into its
institutional make up an effective route for opposition so that problems can be dealt
23 G- Dwipayana and Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (eds.), Jejak langkah Pak Harto. (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro 
gung Persada, 1991) pp.374-5 
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with efficiently and without them escalating and potentially becoming securitized. 
The PPP and PDI were the New Order’s route for opposition sentiment, however 
within the Golkcu system, the opposition could be effectively controlled and 
suppressed. Suharto argued that “in our democracy based upon Pancasila, there can 
be differences o f opinion. What is not allowed is a sharpening of opinions which can 
result in dissension.”25 It was this Pancasila democracy that allowed the political 
elites of the Old Order to be channelled within the institutions of the new regime, 
express themselves, and maintain seats of power, but in such a way as to not intrude 
upon or interrupt the New Order’s policies. When the MPRS reinstated Suharto for a 
second term in 1973, the New Order regime’s power was complete. From the coup in 
1965 until 1968 Suharto had successfully removed obstacles from his path and 
skilfully manoeuvred himself into a position of power. Once he had been made 
President for his first term however he faced a different challenge. He had effectively 
removed Sukamo from power, but now he needed to ensure that nobody else could 
emerge to replace him. It was during this first term in office that Suharto created the 
institutions of the New Order regime and through them he not only was able to govern 
the Republic in the way he envisioned, but also he effectively removed the possibility 
of real political challenges to his authority, without the need to resort to violence. The 
Pancasila became the central principles for the regime and through constant 
reinforcement in speeches and through the media Suharto was able to de-legitimise 
opposing groups and reinforce his own policies. Through his involvement in ASEAN 
and the UN he was able to secure Indonesia’s physical boarders and concentrate on 
what he perceived to Indonesia’s final weakness. For now the regime had a secure
Kompas 18 August 1969
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physical base, established an ideational core and effective institutions, the regime 
needed to deliver on its promise of economic development and modernisation.
The rule and fall o f the New Order
Having established themselves in power the New Order regime now faced an 
increasingly difficult challenge. As is evident from the above, the regime whilst 
being a meritocracy had effectively stifled the possibility of any mass protests from 
being heard. The few movements that did occur were dealt with extreme measures 
and brutality. At this period in global politics the Anti-Communist position of the 
regime was sufficient for most of the great powers in the world to look the other with 
respect to violations o f human rights, and even sovereignty, as is evident from the 
Indonesian occupation of East Timor. What this is evidence of is that principle of 
anti-communism out weighed other principles, notably human rights and sovereignty. 
Domestically these principles had less sway, so what enabled the New Order to 
remain in power as long as it did. Aside from the limited opportunity for effective 
opposition within the regime, the fact is that the regime rewarded those who would 
potentially challenge its authority. Secondly the regime fulfilled its promises of 
economic modernisation and development. Despite a spell in the 1970s where global 
economic crises had serious repercussions towards Indonesia s economic integrity, 
which lead to widespread rioting and violence particularly directed towards the ethnic 
Chinese,26 the regime did bring about a period of sustained growth for the Republic. 
The Dwifungsi-or dual role o f the ABRI also assisted the regimes stability. This
worked in two ways. Firstly, and initially, the fact that the armed forces adopted a 
secondary, social role allowed the New Order to maintain a presence in all areas of 
'he Republic and in so doing allowed it a degree of control that had been impossible
26
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under Sukarno. This presence also had economic benefit as the Armed forces 
personnel were given a role to fulfil developmentally speaking as well. Derek Davies 
writes “the army has set the country on the right road. An admirable rescue operation 
has achieved economic stabilisation. This has since been matched by an even more 
astonishing political stabilisation, which promises to keep Indonesia along the 
pragmatic road towards sensible development for some time”.27 The second 
advantage of this was that it tied the senior military leadership into the regime. They 
would not move against the New Order as they had too much to lose.
This was because the New Order’s economic model did not follow the free- 
market model that Suharto’s technocrats originally envisaged. Even from the outset 
of the regime a degree of corruption was evident, particularly when the ABRI was 
concerned. The funds that the Government officially had at its disposal and what the 
regime actually spent did not add up. The New Order exploited a dual economy 
which was seemingly transparent and fair on the surface, whilst underneath funds and 
investments were being moved through black market and more importantly ABRI 
channels.28 This benefited the regime in two ways. Firstly it was successful, and 
promoted economic growth in Indonesia that trickled down to the population as a 
whole. Secondly, it provided wealth for those senior ABRI and political figures who 
may have opposed the regime. In short even though it was corrupt, the regimes 
performance prevented any serious challenge from emerging, and, equally 
importantly the international and domestic audiences tolerated the brutality of the
regime.29
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By the mid 1980s the regime was at the peak of its powers, as a regime based 
upon delivering economic prosperity the decade had been particularly good to 
Indonesia which had benefited from rising oil prices and a series of excellent rice 
harvests. The pinnacle of this internationally was perhaps his speech given at a 
meeting of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation in November 1985, a meeting 
where he announced to the world that Indonesia was deliver 100,000 tonnes of rice to 
Ethiopia. This event marked a clear turning point in Indonesia’s fortunes 
internationally as now they were in the position to assist in the relief of states in 
distress it was like a promotion from the developing to the developed world.30 This 
success however was marred by resistance at home to the regimes continued policy of 
Pancasilaisation. As a response to a new law on mass organisations -  Ormas- which 
called for all organisations to have the Pancasila as its guiding principle and nothing 
else, Islamic groups resented this legislation which in turn lead to rioting in the 
Tanjung Priok area o f Jakarta. In the aftermath of the riot it was claimed that the 
military had ‘desecrated’ a mosque. What followed was mass violence, including a 
terrorist bombing campaign and levels of violence in Java the likes of which had not 
been seen since the Coup in 1965. The New Order however were able to utilise these 
event, because o f the uncoordinated nature of the attacks the regime was able to use 
the prospect o f Islamic extremism in much the same way as they had used the PK1 
threat in the aftermath of the coup.31 The regime was quick to link any potential 
criticisms of the regime with the rise of Islamic extremism and so those groups that 
were opposed to Ormas fell into line to avoid a response from the New Order.
ibid. pp.239-40
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By the late 1980s Suharto’s relationship with the ABRI was beginning to wear 
thin. Those in command now were a new generation of soldier who did not share his 
particular vision for Indonesia. In order to continue the development process Suharto 
was aware that he would need to change the regimes economic operations, which 
would have repeicussions on the military. Disagreements began to emerge of policy 
issues and the direction that Suharto wished to take the regime. By this period Dr. B.J 
Habibie had established himself within the New Order elite and was placed in charge 
of carrying out this next phase of economic development. So radical was the new 
look regime that it was said that “the demilitarisation of Suharto’s New Order has 
gone so far it is barely recognisable as a military-led government”.32 When the 
regime held a new set of elections in 1993 relations between Suharto and the ABRI 
were particularly frayed. This was bought about due to the increased cronyism and 
grooming the President employed in his administering of state affairs. This tampering 
with ABRI and government agencies, promoting people though the ranks with little 
respect for the natural order of the organisation, bred resentment and dissatisfaction 
within the institutions o f state.33 Other changes had begun to impact upon the smooth 
running of the regime too. Bodies of protest began to emerge in the campuses of the 
Republic but unlike previous movements the regime was not as quick to respond, and 
not as aggressive.34 Why was this? The notable change for Indonesia at this time was 
not domestic but rather external. With the end of the Cold War, the New Order no 
longer was protected by the anti-communist principle that had sheltered it in the past. 
Evidence of this change in mood towards the regime is in the aftermath of the Santa 
Cruz massacre in November 1991, where 200 soldiers and police opened fire on a 
group of students, women and children who protesting the Indonesian occupation of
J3 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics u n d e r  Suh (London: Routledge, 1993) p.61
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East Timor. The major change was the fact that the west responded at all.35 However 
the mood in the west was shifting and Suharto became to be aware of a need to 
change his regime accordingly, however the nature of his regime was such that 
openness and dialogue that the political forces in the Republic effectively weakened 
his grasp on power and so it was a short lived experiment.37
In this period greater scrutiny of the New Order’s economic policies lead to 
increased resentment at those in power within the regime, and in particular Suharto’s 
children who were seemingly prospering at the expense of others in the country. This 
lead to increased civil unrest for example in October 1996 in Taskmalaya, however 
the regimes control over the protests was weakening. Likely due to the breakdown in 
relations between the New Order and the ABRI, but also because of the increasing 
deviation of the goals and practices of the regime and the desires of the population. 
This came to a crisis point in 1997 when in the August the rupiah crashed. Suharto 
responded in his Independence Day speech on the 17th, claiming that the economy 
was stable and that it was under control.38 Despite calls for more urgent measures to 
be taken, Suharto failed to act, and when in January 1998 he issued what was 
considered to be a particularly unrealistic budget for the coming year. In response to 
this political opponent Amien Rais publicly made an offer to stand as president, which 
though nothing came of the offer was the first open and serious opposition that 
Suharto had faced since being made president, and there was a growing mood calling 
for Suharto to step down and change to be initiated.39 However, despite this growing
36 Simons Indonesia: The Long Oppression pp.78-80
37 Elson, Suharto pp.270-75 
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unrest Suharto was re-elected as president for a 7th term, the reasons for this were that 
the institutional mechanisms that were established at the inception of the New Order 
were effectively doing their job. They channelled the calls for change and gave them 
a voice within the political sphere, however they were unable to instigate any 
effective change. What was different in post economic crisis Indonesia to previous 
elections was that the failures of the New Order system became elevated not only in 
the minds o f political opposition, but also in the eyes of the public at large. Whilst in 
the past the regime had been seemingly successful, within its own terms, and 
Indonesia was seemingly prospering under their rule. In 1998 the failures o f the 
regime to effectively deal with the aftermath of the economic crisis meant that there 
was a real mood in the population at large for genuine change.40 However, the regime 
itself was not designed to accommodate such changes, and so what followed was open 
riots and calls for Suharto’s resignation. In the final days and weeks Suharto’s grasp 
on power “unravelled with astonishing speed”.41 Despite attempts to raise a reform 
cabinet the President no longer had the confidence of the Indonesian people o f the 
political elite. At 9am on 21st May 1998 Suharto read a short statement in which he 
told the nation o f his failure to raise a reform cabinet, thanked the Nation, apologised 
for his “mistakes and shortcomings”, and he informed those listening that he would 
resign from position as president, effective from the moment he had finished reading 
his statement.
41
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Chapter Severn Societal Security: The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia
This chapter will address one of the societal security challenges that face post­
independence Indonesia. I will examine the case of the tensions that arose between 
the newly constituted Indonesian people than the ethnic Chinese. Like many states 
Indonesia is not ethnically homogenous, and during the nation building process faced 
the difficult task o f establishing an Indonesian identity that could help ferment the 
physical formation o f the state. This section looks at the role the ethnic Chinese had 
in this process during both Sukarno’s and Suharto’s periods of rule. I will examine 
the principles behind the formation of the Indonesian identity under both the Sukamo 
and Suharto regimes, and explore the strategies they deployed to ensure that this 
identity was robust and prosperous. I will then examine the place of Chinese within 
Indonesia and attempt to explain the apparent contradiction in the fact that neither 
regime incorporated the Chinese within their conceptions of “unity through diversity”. 
Finally I will address two previous explanations for the “ethnic” tensions between the 
Pribumi and non-Pribumi, the first being economic and the second being political. 
Finally, using the operationalised societal securitization concept developed in chapter 
two, I will argue that the societal threats directed against the ethnic Chinese, rather 
than being genuine existential threats to their identity, were in fact an effort on the 
part of the Indonesian elite to establish, and secure their our identity
What is an Indonesian?
Indonesia is a sequence of some 3000 islands that are populated by around 300 
distinct ethnic groups o f varying size and dominance.1 The Javanese are the most 
populous o f these ethnic groups, although there is misconception that Javanese equals 
Indonesian, similar to the way that many interchange English and British with relation 
to the United Kingdom. However in Java, aside from the presence of other 
Indonesian ethnic groups, there is a divide between the Hindu inland and the Islamic 
coastal regions.2 Despite this diversity, in the face of external oppression the native 
population o f the Dutch East Indies did rally together. In the war of independence 
Sukamo was able to fashion a shared notion of what it is to be Indonesian, which was 
conceptualised within the Pancasila. This allowed the native Indonesians {pribumi) a 
framework within which they could put aside their cultural and religious differences. 
Whether they were from Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi or Kalimantan, irrespective o f their 
religious differences the people o f the East Indies were able cooperate towards a 
common goal, which in the first instance was independence from colonial rule. 
Whilst there was still a physical struggle independence it was relatively easy for the 
pribumi elites to focus the peoples attention on the Japanese and later Dutch in order 
to unify their people. However, as was discussed in chapter two, given that self 
conception is carried out with reference to an “other”, when there is an obvious group 
that is causing problems it is easier to establish unity in such circumstances. The real 
challenge came to the Sukamo regime once “Indonesia had finally secured itself as 
an autonomous, sovereign “nation state”. For whilst the political elites had 
successfully established Indonesia as a valid participant in the international system,
‘Local Society and Culture’ in Hal Hill (ed.) Indonesia’s New Order (Sydney:
Allen & Unwin, 1994)p .267
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the question still remained as to whether or not this conception o f Indonesian-ness 
would survive with the removal o f the external other.
Sukamo s project was to encourage Bhinneka Tunggal Ika or Unity in 
Diversity. This was apparent from the Pancasilci itself, which was “the synthesis of 
Western Democrat, Modernist Islamic, Marxist and indigenous-village democratic 
and communalistic ideas which form the several bases of the social thought o f so 
large a part o f the post-war Indonesian elite.”5 In the early years of the Republic 
Sukamo was not merely attempting to remedy the archipelagos complex ethnic 
situation, he was also attempting to show the international community that Indonesia 
was a viable and successful member of the world at large. One can see the early 
attempts at parliamentary democracy as a sign of this. By emulating the west Sukamo 
hoped that this would not only prove his credentials as leader, but also encourage 
investment and thus prosperity for the fledgling state. In effect the political regime 
that Sukamo was attempting to establish was also intended to reaffirm what it was to 
be Indonesian, using external models o f governance as a point of comparison. 
Making the claim that to be Indonesian has a qualitative equivalence to being 
“developed”. However, the diversity that was supposed to be Indonesia s strength 
became its undoing in this context, as the numerous identity groups negatively 
impacted upon his ability to govern. This was because it became increasingly 
difficult to establish and maintain the degree of consensus necessary to effectively 
create institutions or coalitions stable enough to effectively govern. This is an 
example o f a cross over between the political and societal sectors, as the decision to
Ibid. p.269
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establish a diverse Indonesian identity where by the individual ethnic identities of the 
archipelago were all equally valid, meant that Sukarno’s attempts establish political 
institutions necessary to effectively govern were unsuccessful. This is because the 
political institutions required to operate in the regime he had established required the 
disparate groups to compromise their own individual interests for the good of the 
Indonesian whole. Unfortunately the identity that he had successfully established in 
the face o f colonial oppression, that of unity through diversity, was now 
problematising the regime in the face of independence. As was explored in chapter 
four the internal tensions, and the political dissatisfaction that was symptomatic of the 
tensions, lead to Sukamo instigating radical changes in order to re-establish a more 
effective conception o f Indonesia. In order to combat this Sukamo delved into the 
cultural heritage of the archipelago and initiated his program of Guided Democracy, 
which is a development of the tribal tradition of Gotong Rojong. This was a process 
of mutual consensus and cooperation amongst the numerous groups that made up 
Indonesia, including religious, cultural and political bodies as well as ethnic 
representation.7 Sukamo used cultural language however to justify this shift in policy, 
stating that “we [the Indonesian people] had used a wrong system, a wrong style of 
government.. .an import democracy.. .not in harmony with our spirit.. .not in harmony 
with our [national] personality”.8 This plea can be seen as an attempt by the elite to 
reengage with the people of Indonesia, but rather than appeal to their individual ethnic 
groups, he is instead appealing to a sense of “Indonesian-ness . He was trying to put 
an end to some of the tensions that were emerging by enforcing a system of governing 
that he claimed was “an authentic Indonesian term which gives the purest reflection of
^ Z Z ^ o V o f  Indonesia (New York: Ha,per and Bros, 1959) pp. ,77-
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the Indonesian soul . But whilst it was couched in cultural terms, this was in effect a 
way for Sukamo to have greater personal influence on every level of government and 
give him more control over Indonesia as a whole.10 His problem however was, that 
whilst this may in fact be a more effective way of administering to the Indonesian 
people, not all o f those in his diverse region agreed with what he felt was best for 
Indonesia. Ever mindful of the potential divisions, Sukamo was able to again redirect 
the people’s attention, by reintroducing the Dutch as a viable “other”, in this instance 
the othering was carried out in the name of the continued occupation of West Irian.
However this was a short lived plan of action as international pressure was put 
upon the Dutch and by 1963 West Irian was ceded to Jakarta and the internal rivalries 
of the republic were again allowed to re-emerge. Despite the constant striving on the 
part of Sukamo to find that external other to divert the internal differences, his vision 
of a unified and prosperous Indonesia seemed to be falling apart. This was 
problematic in several ways, as the Indonesian people were becoming disenchanted 
with his leadership; they were not enjoying the fruits of independence that he had 
promised them. Also, and this was to have perhaps even wider implications, the 
targets that he chose to other, whilst seemingly politically advantageous from a 
domestic point o f view (for example Malaysia and the policy of Konfrontasi, which 
argued that Malaysia was nothing but a construct of the British, and that its primary 
role was to represent western/colonial interests in the region. ) they were alienating 
important sections o f the international community, namely the United States and the 
west. It was perceived in the west that Sukamo was making a dangerous shift to the 
•eft; this was so that he could maintain his position of power against the dissatisfied
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infactions that were gaining prominence within the state. This shift was emphasised i 
his 1965 Independence Day speech, where Sukamo announced to the population that, 
We are now fostering an anti-imperialist axis...the Jakarta-Phnom-Penh-Hanoi- 
Peking-Pyongyang axis . Looking at this carefully one has to question what was 
behind this action, the notable absence of Moscow from the axis shows that this is 
obviously an attempt at fostering some “Asian” value structure. At the same time 
Sukamo is appealing to the growing mood of the nation that was increasing pro-PKI, 
anti-American and importantly anti-imperialist. The absence of the Soviet Union in 
the above extract clearly allies Indonesia with the left, which by association sets it 
against the United States, but at the same time by not allying itself to Moscow, 
Sukamo was segregating himself and thus Indonesia from being seen as a Soviet 
surrogate/colony. However this move was not supported by everyone within 
Indonesia, the Army for instance saw that the expanding power of the PKI was a 
danger to both Indonesia, and perhaps more importantly, their role as protector of 
Indonesia’s economic and political well being. This strive for an “other” with which 
to unify the people failed doubly, for not only did it create problems for Sukamo with 
the west, but it also failed to address the concerns of his own political elite. Because 
of this not only did Sukamo lay the roots for his own political down fall by tying 
himself and Indonesian identity to the communists. But he also did not effectively 
resolve the fragmentation of Indonesian identity. This fragmentation was an 
antecedent to the outbreak of violence that plagued the nation in the aftermath of the 
September 30th Coup attempt that signalled the start of the rise of Suharto. When 
the mood of the people shifted in the aftermath of this violence, Sukamo was unable 
t0 disassociate himself from the communists, and so his own legitimacy as
Simons Indonesia: The Long Oppression p. 161 
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representative o f the Indonesian people was weakened considerably. This was not a 
mistake that the New Order was about to repeat.
The New Order saw that there was no single Indonesian identity, but they 
perceived that without a unifying ideal to guide Indonesia it would disintegrate. This 
is essentially what Sukamo had tried to do with the Pancasila\ however in later stages 
of his regime Sukamo had gotten into problems by attempting to balance the various 
contending views o f his people and then finally attempted to pander to the masses. 
The New Order however saw that it was not merely an ideal that was needed but 
rather strong leadership that would ensure the prosperity of the nation and also 
prevent the disintegration of the republic. This leadership came in two main forms, 
firstly through the Army themselves, whose dwifungsi or dual military/civil role 
meant that they were visible and prominent through out the entire nation. This 
provided them with a better opportunity to influence the public, and also made them 
better able to gamer the opinions o f the various peoples than a Jakarta based regime.14 
The second, and most interesting, approach was by actually attempting to create an 
acceptable and stable notion of what it is to be Indonesian. That is the actual creation 
of a Modem Indonesian identity.15
The New Order set about a process of cherry picking the best that Indonesia had 
to offer and carefully drew them together in order to manufacture an identity for the 
nation. Unlike Sukamo who tried to extol the virtues of diversity, the New Order 
understood that left to its own devices this was not a positive move for the stability of 
the state. So they began to simplify and create mini prototypes of each province in
is ^unness, ‘Local Society and Culture’ pp. 269-70
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the republic. No where was this more evident or literal than in the Taman Mini 
Indonesia Indah, a themed garden that represented each province. But in day to day 
life these simplified identities were reinforced through the mainstream media showing 
traditional dances, plays or songs on television and even on postage stamps which 
had representations of the various indigenous costumes that could be classed as 
Indonesian national dress . So whilst on the surface it appears that the new regime 
was encouraging diversity, in actuality it was limiting it, by carefully choosing and 
reinforcing the avenues through which diversity could be expressed. So whilst it 
appeared that cultural differences were accepted, and perhaps even encouraged, in 
actuality the diversity was limited to that which was necessary to give the impression 
of cosmopolitanism, whilst any significant differences were being kept firmly in 
check by the Army and the regime in Jakarta.16 Suharto further limited the possibility 
of diversity by ensuring that the Pancasila was acknowledged by all groups as being 
central to their own ideologies. Therefore if the ideas lay out in the Pancasila were 
considered incompatible with your group ideology, then your group either had to 
rethink itself, and thus change to accommodate the Indonesian national mindset, or 
the group would cease to exist. Either outcome was positive to the New Order who 
positioned themselves to be the protectors and embodiment of the Pancasila and the 
1945 constitution. At the same time the children of Indonesia were being taught at 
school about the virtues of the nation and had to attend uniformed parades and sing 
the national anthem at least once a week, a ritual that was also practiced by public 
servants, thus continually reinforcing the idea that everyone was part of the same 
^oup.17 To oppose this in anyway was conceived as being un-Indonesian and 
backward, or worse, communist. This would have gone against the very mandate that
the New Order had used to legitimise their position in power, that is that they were 
able to not only better represent what the people wanted, but tha' they could also 
deliver the people the prosperity and success that they felt they were entitled to as an 
independent nation state. This gave the regime a degree of flexibility in how they 
conducted themselves. This is because as they claimed that they best represented not 
only the ideology of the people, the will of the people and also the best interests of the 
people, then to oppose them was to therefore oppose all of these things.
This gave the New Order a framework within which they could effectively limit 
the diversity o f the archipelago and also spread the new “modem” way. This was 
effective at drawing all of the ethnic groups more securely under the umbrella of 
pribumi. However as mentioned above diversity on some level was still encouraged, 
but why? There was still something to be gained from some of the traditions or adat 
that the Indonesian sub-groups maintained. For example the Eka Dasa Rudra, which 
is a ritual used to legitimise the authority of the ruler/leader in Bali. This ritual still 
had power in this area and as such it was still useful, even to the post colonial regimes 
of Sukamo and Suharto. This particular ritual was used by both Sukamo and the New 
Order, with very different results. Sukarno’s 1963 ceremony coincided with the 
eruption of a local volcano, which the people saw as a rejection of the ceremony and 
its attempt to legitimise Sukarno’s representative. By comparison the New Orders 
ceremony in 1979 passed untroubled and legitimacy was secured.18 There was also a 
secondary motivation for encouraging these adapt; tourism. The promotion of 
tourism by the New Order helped to unify the country as government agencies and 
offices were established to service the industry and increasing numbers of domestic
tourists travelled round the country.”19 Obviously the individuals who could afford to 
travel would be those that fit the prototype of the affluent, cosmopolitan, successful 
and above all else, modem Indonesia. This prototype would thus be seen in the far 
reaches of the Republic and thus reinforce the idea of what it was to be Indonesian. In 
the face of this dilution of the ethnic identities of the Indonesian sub-groups, the use 
of adat was a useful safety valve that the New Order, could use to allow the sub­
groups an outlet for their other identities whilst not affecting the salience of the 
greater identity or driving the people towards more militant or political expressions of 
self. This may seem that the New Order’s Indonesia was accepting to all ethnicities 
within the Republic; however this was not the case. One group in particular was 
highlighted for not only exclusion, but also acts of violence and ultimately attempts to 
eradicate their ethnic identity from Indonesia entirely. That group were the ethnic 
Chinese.
The Ethnic Chinese
Chinese began to migrate to what is now Indonesia in the 17 Century. There is 
s tendency to perceive or present the Chinese that settled in Indonesia as a single 
homogenous group.^ However this is not an accurate portrayal of the Chinese 
diaspora in Indonesia, as the Chinese migrants that settled in Indonesia during this 
Period tended to come from four distinct regions of China and so can more accurately
Ibid. p.282
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be categorised into four corresponding ethnic groups: the Hokkien, the Teochiu, the 
Hakka, and the Cantonese. The Hokkien were the first to settle in Indonesia and were 
predominantly traders and small businessmen. They quickly established themselves 
and began to dominate the economies of the areas in which they settled. They 
migrated to central and eastern Java, and the west coast of Sumatra. By contrast the 
Teochiu were an agricultural people and plied their trade along the east coast of 
Sumatra, the Riau Islands and Kalimantan, however they did branch into other 
commercial ventures, particularly where the Hokkien were not represented. The 
Hakka came from the mountainous regions of Guangdong, and were not leaving 
China purely on grounds of trying to better themselves, but rather for economic and 
physical survival, as their homeland was so unproductive.21 They established 
themselves on the outer islands of Indonesia and the Hakka took advantage of the 
natural resources in these areas. The Cantonese came in smaller numbers than the 
other Chinese and the majority were wealthy and skilled tradesmen. One area in 
which they were particularly adept was mechanics and so they set up throughout 
Indonesia as artisans and machine workers.""
Despite the apparent diversity, there is one central thing that unifies the four
ethnic groups that make up the Sino-Indonesians, they were successful and flourished.
They established themselves as being an invaluable part of Dutch colonial Indonesia,
especially in Java, which even at this early stage was the dominant island in the
archipelago and the seat of power for the Dutch. “Where the economy was
concerned, the Chinese were ubiquitous and essential. Sooner or later everyone doing
business in Java had to do business with a Chinese -  from the Dutch planter needing
21 D. Hill cited in Sarah Turner and Richard Seymour, ‘Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Crisis’ in
Roy Starrs (ed.), Nations Under Siege. (New York: Palgrave, 2002) p. 173 
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wagons and tools to a Javanese villager with fruits and eggs to sell”23, this middle 
man role that the Chinese adopted set them apart from the nati\dpribumi. This 
middle ground even went so far as to influence and change their legal standing, They 
occupied a position between the pribumi, with whom they shared civil and criminal 
legal status, and the Europeans, with whom they were considered equals in 
commercial aflairs. This set them apart from the pribumi from the outset and bred 
resentment, especially amongst the Javanese aristocracy, priyayi, who felt that their 
status was being eroded further by the Chinese. In order to protect themselves from 
this the Chinese adopted two main strategies. Firstly they looked to the Dutch to 
intervene on their behalf, or secondly, if this failed them, they formed defence groups 
within their own communities, thus further alienating the Chinese population from the 
pribumi} ' The gulf between the Javanese and the Chinese continued to grow to the 
extent that the priyayi began to view business as an “unworthy vocation” that any self 
respecting Javanese would have nothing to do with.26 This is a clear example of one 
ethnic group targeting a positive attribute of one group prototype, that is ‘Chinese are 
successful business people’, and turning it into a negative attribute for your own 
group. A process that potentially had long standing repercussions for Sino-Indonesian 
relations even in the twentieth century.
By the mid- nineteenth century the Chinese had fully established themselves 
into a dominant economic position in the East Indies, to the extent that even the Dutch 
authorities began to take measures to dilute some of the influence that they had
23 James Rush cited in Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (Boulder, CO;
^estview Press, 1994) p. 102
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amassed, but within the Chinese community itself rifts began to develop. Not 
between the different ethnic groups but rather the generations. The community split 
into two camps the totok and the peranakan. The peranakan were the Chinese who 
had been Indonesia for several generations, they were established, not only in their 
professions but also into the community at large. Many had married pribumi and 
sought the same kind of lifestyle as the population at large. The totok however were 
more recent migrants, hungry to make their mark in their new home. They did not 
care for the niceties o f Javanese society and instead knuckled down to establish 
themselves. They saw the more settled and “Javanised” peranakan as being both 
uppity and soft, whilst the peranakan saw the totok as being crass and unscrupulous.28 
This internal prejudice was carried over into the twentieth century, especially in the 
1920s and 30s when there was a massive influx of new totok migrants -  as many as 
50% more ethnic Chinese in some urban areas.29 It was in the face of this migration
• 5>30that “sinophobia infected the embryo of modem Indonesian national consciousness” , 
the totok, true to their industrious prototype, were incredibly successful. This again 
bred resentment, this time as the pribumi saw the Chinese success not only as serving 
colonial interests but also causing poverty and repressing the pribumi themselves. At 
this time however the pribumi incorporated not just the Javanese but the wider 
population o f the East Indies, who were being drawn to the anti-colonial nationalism 
that would eventually bring Indonesia independence. The internal differences that 
were of such importance to the ethnic Chinese were irrelevant to the pribumi outside 
°f the community.
28  I b i d -
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The Chinese had set themselves up to be outside of the rest of society, and as 
such were looked at with scorn. A stereotype was beginning to develop as is shown 
in the following extract by Charles Coppel:
The Chinese are clannish, they keep aloof socially and prefer to live in 
separate areas. They cling persistently to the culture of their ancestral 
homeland. Their loyalty to Indonesia is dubious at best; worst they are down 
right hostile to Indonesia. Chinese who apparently identify with Indonesia are 
not genuine; they are only pretending to do so for opportunistic reasons, rather 
than from a true sense of identification with the country and its people. This 
opportunism is characteristic of a people concerned with money, trade and 
business. They are not, like Indonesians, dedicated to ideals. Having been 
given a favoured position by the Dutch, the Chinese dominate the Indonesian 
economy, oppressing the Indonesian masses and preventing the rise of a 
national (i.e. indigenous) entrepreneurial class. Not content with their 
dominant position, they also engage in economic subversion, since they are 
expert in bribery and smuggling.31
This extremely negative portrait that was painted is the overt expression of the 
resentment felt by the pribumi towards the prosperous Chinese. What is interesting, 
and I believe central when considering identity security, is that it is this projected 
prototype that dictates the minorities position within society as a whole rather that 
how the minority sees itself. That is, in the case of Sino-Indonesians, the fact that 
they do not perceive themselves as a homogenous whole does not stop them from 
heing treated as such. Thus as the Chinese were still being alienated from Indonesian 
society as a whole at this time they did what they always did, which is to knuckle
^ d e T c ^ p p e l ,  Indonesian Chinese in crisis ( O x f o r d :  O xford  University Press, 1983)p.5
down and try to prosper as best they can. The above stereotype is unfortunate as not 
all Chinese were anti-nationalist, after all even though they did experience a different 
status in Colonial society than the pribumi it was still less that ideal. Also the 
peranakan saw themselves as being Indonesia and so felt the same towards Dutch 
oppression as many pribumi did. When independence was finally won from the 
Dutch however the Chinese were still considered outsiders to the rest of Indonesia 
and so sought to better their position within society. They were in need of a boost to 
their self esteem.
As discussed in the previous chapter SIT dictates that there are three main 
methods of altering a group’s position within society. The Chinese again were 
divided over what they should try to do in order to change their social position, 
should they adopt a position of integration or assimilation. Integration was a 
concerted effort by the Chinese elite, or a section of the elite in this instance, to 
promote the Chinese and ‘Chinese-ness’ as being just another Indonesian identity that 
was no different from Balinese or Javanese. That was not an attempt to change who 
the Chinese were, but rather through political lobbying and the use of the media they 
would try and alter the negative perceptions that had developed during the colonial 
period.32 This was carried out by bodies like Baperki, which was an organisation 
established in 1954, which used the Pancasila as its main argument to cultural 
equality with the pribumi. This was an interesting approach, they focused upon the 
religious tolerance that the Pancasila espoused as a way of justifying their cultuial 
distinctiveness whilst also allying themselves to the central tenet of what represented 
an Indonesian. The Chinese used their religious convictions that formed part of their
Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting p. 104
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identities; Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity, and in essence established that 
they had components within their ethnicity that were shared with other Indonesian 
ethnic groups. In doing so they were legitimising their rights to cultural 
independence within the Republic as a whole. In SIT terminology this was Social 
Creativity, an attempt to re-brand the Chinese for post-colonial Indonesia. 
Assimilation by contrast was an attempt at Individual Mobility, this section of the 
Chinese community made the decision that the label “Chinese” was so derogatory 
that rather than attempt to re-brand they would rather lose the label all together and 
become something else. They wanted to be assimilated into Indonesia society as a 
whole and ignore their ethnic roots and values, instead choosing to adopt those of the 
majority.33
These moves however were blocked by Indonesian society as a whole. This is 
for several reasons. Whilst the Sukamo regime was intended to be democratic and 
representative of Indonesia as whole it was limited by the extremely anti-Chinese 
sentiment o f the population. Therefore the Chinese elite were unable to exert much 
influence on the new democratic institutions that were developing and integrate into 
the wider Indonesian society in any meaningful way. The pribumi elites were 
reluctant to be seen as supporting the Chinese who were still perceived as being self 
interested and disloyal, wherever the Chinese turned, be it Sukamo or the PKI, they 
were a political liability.34 Luckily for individual Sino-Indonesians the close business 
networks that had been established within the ethnic Chinese communities meant that 
they were still able to function and prosper, allowing the republic to reap the same 
benefits that the Dutch had from the Chinese. However rather than ingratiate
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themselves to the regime and the people who also benefited ultimately from the states 
economic prosperity, this actually further alienated the ethnic group from the 
population at large, reinforcing the original stereotypes and also making integration 
even less likely. This vicious circle is central to the problems in Sino-Indonesian 
relations, the Chinese were unable to alter their social position and so internalised, 
this was perceived as being arrogant and haughty”35 by the pribumi and so they were 
reluctant to allow the Chinese to enter mainstream society, which caused the Chinese 
to become self reliant and internalise and so on. Assimilation was seemingly a way 
out of this predicament however the various pribumi ethnic groups would not allow 
the Chinese to enter their groups, and as the Chinese were not simply culturally 
distinct, they also exhibited physical differences that set them apart from the pribumi. 
With this avenue closed the Chinese could seek to assimilate themselves into the 
wider Indonesian identity, however at this time there was no real Indonesian identity 
that they could be assimilated into. When the New Order assumed power in 1966 this 
was to change as the new regime was receptive to cultural unification, however the 
Chinese were not able to reap the benefits of this development.
One other recent development to the ethnic Chinese prototype in 1960s 
Indonesia was that Chinese were considered to be, or have links to, communists. 
Given the anti-communist nature of the New Orders rise to powei and the mass 
killings in the aftermath o f the 1965 coup, the Chinese found themselves again 
alienated and also tarnished with the crimes and inadequacies of the previous regime. 
When Suharto and representatives of the “New Order” began makinging claims 
against the PKI, the Chinese were assumed to be guilty by association. The fear that
had helped fuel Sukarno’s Konfrontasi initiative,36 that is, that the Chinese diaspora 
represented a way for the Peoples Republic to influence the peop.es of South East 
Asia. Therefore, when one sees the vilification of the communists within Indonesia 
in the winter of 1965-6, and sees the fact that to many in Indonesia the Chinese were 
synonymous with communism. It is not surprising that of the many thousands of 
people killed in the aftermath of the September 30th coup, the vast majority were 
Chinese. This is an example of the way in which we as individuals catalogue the 
social world into homogenous groups, in this instance it meant that the pribumi 
lumped the ethnic Chinese and the PKI together. So the negative prototype was again 
reinforced, this time resulting in the mass murder of thousands of ethnic Chinese. 
The Chinese found themselves in an environment that was hostile and they were no 
longer given the luxury of being able to lock themselves away from the outside 
world. In fact the outside world was actively targeting them. This is emphasised by 
the words o f Major-General Soemitro, who was Military Commander in East Java at 
the time of the coup:
I didn’t allow them to live in villages, I didn’t want them to trade, I didn t 
even want them in business. No public use of the Chinese language, no 
Chinese books, no speaking of Chinese, no Chinese shrines, nothing. We
38
needed a comprehensive solution'
This v itrio lic  d is tru st and fear o f  the Chinese did have deep rooted antecedents, bu t 
then so did the  d iffe ren ces expressed betw een the other ethnic groups in Indonesia. 
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Indonesian id en tity  but also integrate the C hinese into this ideal and therefore
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eradicate the animosity for good. The New Order did seek to eradicate the problem 
but rather than integrate the New Order sort to assimilate.
In 1967 the New Order put forward the ‘Basic Policy for the Solution to the 
Chinese Problem . This policy was a systematic and nationwide development of the 
policies that were initiated in the aftermath of the coup by some local commanders. It 
gave the following guidelines for the assimilation of the non -pribumi “[all] forms of 
cultural affinity based on country of origin should be removed, in order to give all 
elements o f culture in Indonesia the opportunity to develop according to the
• , , 3 9  •  •
Pancasila.” This policy went on to specify therefore that there could only be one 
Chinese language newspaper nationally; Chinese religious expression was only 
allowed to take place in the home; Chinese language schools were to be phased out (a 
policy that was completed in 1974); Chinese script was outlawed in public, and
legally it was considered to be no different than pornography; finally, it was
encouraged that the Chinese should adopt Indonesian sounding names and cultural 
practices.40 The seemingly contradictory decision to allow the ethnic Chinese to 
maintain a newspaper, Harian Indonesia which was based in Jakarta, was that it 
served as a “channel for information and fostering Indonesian residents who only 
understand the Chinese language, in the framework of overcoming subversive 
activities and foreign propaganda that is hostile to the Indonesian Government . At 
the same time the ethnic Chinese were given no legitimate routes to power, they were 
Politically impotent and had no direct representation within the New Order
39 Mely G. Tan, “The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role o f Ethnic Chinese in Indonesian 
s °ciety” Indonesia, The Role o f  the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern Indonesian Life (Ithica:
Cornell South East Asia Program, 1991) p. 115
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Charles Coppel, “Chinese Indonesians in Crisis” in Charles Coppel,
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administration. After the coup the Chinese political elite divided into two dominant 
camps, the first was the Baperkit (.Bandan Permusjawaratan Kenvarganegaraan 
Indonesia or the Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) which was the 
dominant Chinese political party under Sukamo and had established itself as a body 
that effectively represented Chinese interests in Indonesia. The second group was the 
Lanibaga Pembinaan Kestatuan Bangsa, (LPK.B or Institute for the Promotion of 
National Unity), this was a right wing organisation that was sponsored by the 
government and military and represented those Chinese who were pro-assimilation.42 
However, despite these outlets seemingly being in place for a political outlet for the 
non-pribumi in real terms all avenues were closed off. The Baperki was dissolved in 
late 1965, and by the nature of their aspirations the LPKB were absorbed into other 
government organisations whose task it was to carry out the assimilation program.43 
And the potential utility of Harian Indonesia as a potential outlet was superseded by 
the reality that the New Order saw it more a tool to carry out their own agenda.44 The 
Chinese were seemingly powerless with no real means available to them to 
affectively compete against this policy, and so it seemed that they would have to 
accept that this was how they would have to exist within Indonesia.
However the Chinese were allowed one sector within which they were able to 
not only express themselves, but also exist more or less free from state persecution. 
That was in the economic sector. In the face of such an overtly hostile environment 
the ethnic Chinese were forced to exploit this route for all it was worth, but this had
42 Christian Chua, “Defining Indonesian Chineseness Under the New Order” Journal o f  Contemporary 
^ C ' T h f s o c ^ r d S u Z a l  Dimensions o f .he Role o f Ethnic Chinese in Indones.an Society”
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considerable economic benefits. This meant that the tight business networks that had 
always been a prominent part of their business style were reinforced. The fact that 
the Chinese could not do anything else within Indonesian society, even academia was 
extremely restrictive if you were of Chinese origin, this meant that the Chinese 
focused all o f their energies and efforts within this one avenue. This adversity also 
placed emphasis on a positive prototype attribute that the Chinese held, that is that 
“[they are] a hardy, self-reliant and, above all, a risk-taking lot”.45 The same 
resilience that had stood the earlier generations of totok re-emerged in the face of the 
new policies and the Chinese were forced to find a way to survive this threat to their 
existence. This is not to argue that all Chinese became economically prosperous 
overnight, and the vast majority of the Chinese population suffered terribly under the 
restrictive policies o f the New Order.46 The Chinese people at this time were 
represented by eminent members of the Chinese population, those being “community 
leaders ... writers, journalists, businessmen, scholars, and athletes”,47 those figures 
that could be considered to represent the best of the Chinese Indonesian population. 
However, due to the restrictions that were being placed upon the non-Pribumi by the 
assimilation program it meant that the only representatives that would have been seen 
representing the Chinese would be those considered to be successful within the 
economic sector. In short there were other forces working within the Chinese
'S Wu Yuan-li, ‘Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia' American Economic Review Vol.73, No.2 
('983) p .l 12
“  The standard assessment is that “the Chinese constitute only 3% of the population but control more 
to n  70% Of the Indonestan economy”, or as Christian Chua calls it the 70% myth, whilst ,t is true 
under the New Order Chinese conglomerates dominated the economic sector, the wealth and prosperity 
to s  by no means shared amongst all o f the circa 6 million Chinese in Indonesia^ This is discussed 
“ ore fully in Chua, “Defining Indonesian Chineseness Under the New Order pp.465-79 
Karen Kane "Pribumi Indonesians the Chinese Minority and China: A Study o f  Perceptions and 
Policies” (Review Article) The Journal o f  Asian StudieVoUO, N o.l (1980) pp.207 paraphrasing Leo
“ yadinata, Eminent Indonesian Chinese . b i o g r a p h i c a l  sketches (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast
Asian Studies, 1978)
194
community, however they did not have any real outlet to successfully interact with 
those outside the Chinese community.
The New Order was, despite its numerous faults and injustices, essentially an 
economic meritocracy. So long as you could provide something towards the 
economic growth and development of the Indonesian state then the regime would 
happily take advantage, even if it seemingly ran counter to another policy, and this 
was the case with the ethnic Chinese. How else were the Chinese able to survive the 
societal onslaught? There are three possibilities: it was simply the natural resilience 
of the ethnic Chinese and their efforts to react to the attack on their identity; there 
were political motivations for the New Order to maintain the ethnic Chinese as a 
separate entity, outside of a modem Indonesian identity; and finally, the Chinese were 
necessary for the propagation of the Indonesian identity and their assimilation was 
therefore impossible or detrimental to that agenda.
Chinese resilience defeated the societal threat
As a response to the New Order’s assimilation policy the Chinese were left with 
very few options. As with the previous change in regime after the declaration of 
independence, the Chinese ethnic character was tarnished by association with the 
proceeding political order. In order to combat this association, whether it was 
justified or not, the Chinese had to disassociate themselves from Sukarno’s system 
and appeal to the New Order. The Chinese affinity to business, which was a central 
Part of their ethnic prototype, was an obvious way to assure their necessity to the new 
regime. By making connections to the new military order they were able to not only
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make the best use o f the only available avenue of public life, but they could benefit 
themselves and the New Order at the same time. Those that wer able established 
relationships with prominent members within the local military command structures, 
this was known as a cukong or boss/master relationship. The Chinese would be able 
to laisc money and establish business ventures and the Indonesian officials would be 
the figure head for the venture, offering protection and influence on behalf of the 
Chinese businessman. This meant that the Chinese were able to conduct their 
business whilst it appeared that it was a pribumi scheme, whilst the Official was able 
to reap the benefits o f the Chinese business networks, gain a share of the profits from 
the ventures without ceding any of the capital, ensure that the venture was able to 
avoid much of the taxation and harassment that a non -pribumi would normally 
receive, and also take responsibility for the project if it was a success or easily 
disassociate themselves from it if it were a failure. These cukongs were such a 
success for the Chinese and the New Order that they began to dominate the new 
economic order, pribumi resentment of the Chinese was still at boiling point as they 
sought to break into the market. However how could they compete? The Chinese 
had little choice but to accept a subservient position in ventures, this meant that for an 
Indonesian official a partnership with a non-pribumi was more profitable personally 
than a partnership with a pribumi. The Chinese had again managed to assert their 
superiority within the economic sector and the Indonesians began to further recent the 
fact that these outsiders were again dominating Indonesian business. These issues lie 
at the heart o f the January 1974 Malari riots (which comes from the Indonesian for 
15th January Disaster), which whilst they were couched in terms of being anti-foreign 
investment, it seems evident that non-pribumi Indonesian investment was also an 
issue. This is because of the apparent targeting of ethnic Chinese businesses when
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,he initial protests turned to violence.48 If the protests were purely about external 
investment why would the Chinese be targeted in this way? It is an example again of 
the homogenisation of the out-group by the in-group. The Pribumi have established 
for themselves an effective other in the form of the Chinese economic elite, and 
Chinese are therefore deemed to representative of this group.
This was another bleak time for the Chinese; in the aftermath of the riots the 
initially liberal economic policies of the New Order began to become more in keeping 
with the rest o f the regime. Why was this? As was shown above the New Order was 
not popularist like Sukarno in that they were rarely dictated to by public opinion and 
their every action was a reflection of what they considered to be best for the nation as 
a whole. So what had changed between 1967 and 1974 that would bring about a 
change to their economic policy? By the mid 1970s the cukong relationships were 
simply not as necessary for the continued success of the economy. This was because 
the New Order officials now had become independently wealthy enough, and in all 
likelihood sufficiently aware of how to best conduct business ventures independently 
that they had no real need for their Chinese partners. Fortunately for the Chinese 
however the regime was not the only one to benefit from the relationship and they 
had also established themselves sufficiently enough that they had become integral to 
the success o f the economy as a whole. That is not to say that they were free to 
function with total independence, because attitudes towards the ethnic
Chinese were constantly negative and, in fact their continued resilience only went to 
further foster resentment. The fact that as Indonesian economic policy developed 
throughout the 1970s and 80s, the Chinese were able to take advantage of every
48
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opportunity that presented itself. This reinforced the stereotype that the Chinese were 
coiTupt and unscrupulous, and that their prosperity was disproporti mate from that of 
the pribumi. In psychological terms the ethnic Chinese combated the existential 
threat to them in the societal sector by maximising their prowess within the economic 
sector. This provided them security in two ways. Firstly because economic 
proficiency was an integral and salient part of their ethnic identity, their ability to 
prosper within the economic sector reinforced this aspect of the Chinese self and thus 
counter-acted the New Order’s attempts to assimilate them into the whole. Secondly, 
because the Chinese became so successful, anything that was too strongly anti- 
Chinese would have had a detrimental effect on the Indonesian economy as a whole. 
This meant that the Indonesian elite could not allow extreme anti-Chinese policies to 
continue and therefore effectively secured the ethnic Chinese from the existential 
threat.49
The New Order had political reasons for sustaining the ethnic Chinese minority
The initial challenge that the New Order faced when they replaced Sukamo was 
the creation o f an effective and stable notion of an Indonesian identity. It is discussed 
above what strategies were employed by the New Order to achieve this end, however 
the ethnic Chinese were not part of their equation as to what this identity was to be. 
But why? For the casual observer there is no real reason why if you can be Javanese 
and Indonesian, or Balinese and Indonesian, why can you not be Chinese and 
Indonesian? The negative stereotype of the Chinese that prevailed when the New
49
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Order came to power is an obvious answer; however these stereotypes existed for 
each and every one of the pribumi ethnic minorities as well. In fact it was to counter­
act these that the New Order was attempting to establish and promote its new modem 
Indonesian identity. Politically the ethnic Chinese were the perfect rallying point for 
the New Order to build their new identity around. They “othered” the Chinese in 
numerous ways and perhaps the most direct way was by virtue that they were 
physically different from the pribumi, in other words they look different from the 
“indigenous Indonesians and used a different language. This was compounded using 
geographical arguments or the notion that they are from elsewhere. By emphasising 
the alien origins o f the Chinese they were able to play upon the fears of all of the 
various pribumi groups that their society, culture and values were being diluted. This 
was being carried out in conjunction with the use of adat by the New Order and 
therefore making a comparison between two possible futures for the pribumi, they 
could exist as part o f Indonesia or they could be corrupted by the Chinese. This 
“othering” could have been directed at all migrants and non -pribumi, but the Chinese 
were a pre-existing “other”, they were self contained and therefore potentially more 
controllable than different ethnic groups.
A secondary form o f “othering” was cultural, or the way that the ethnic 
Chinese segregated themselves from the majority of the population through the 
overstatement o f  differences o f  religion and cultural tradition’ 5 by emphasising the 
differences inherent between the pribumi and the differences that the 
Indonesian people knew and were already very aware of, the New Order was able to 
maintain the Chinese as an out-group and thus exploit or make use of these
> ^ r y a „ , o .  -Ethnic Identities and Erasure’ in Joel S. Kahn (ed.), Southeast Asian Identities 
(Singapore: Institute o f  Southeast Asian Studies, 1998) p.97
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differences for political advantage. It seems contradictory to a certam extent but 
essentially by singling out the ethnic Chinese for cultural assimila'ion the New Order 
further isolated and reinforced the separateness of the Chinese, a separateness that 
was only exasperated by the increasing economic disparity between the pribumi and 
the Chinese. The resentment that ensued was further enforced by the fact the 
perceived special economic relationship, which not only lead to the success o f the 
Chinese in the realm o f big business but also on the streets of, for it was on the street 
that the Chinese owned small businesses thrived and flourished at the perceived 
expense and detriment o f the pribumi entrepreneurs.
So why did the New Order pursue this contradictory policy? Was it merely for 
economic gain? Or was there a deeper motivation behind the New Orders use o f the 
ethnic Chinese? The traditional approaches to the study of the C\i\x\Qsdpribumi 
relations argue that the economic disparity lay at the heart of the relationship and that 
the resentment and occasional violence directed towards the Chinese was the result of 
this.51 The above argument postulates that it was the response of the Chinese 
community to the existential threat of the New Order that lead to their unique position 
economically in society and hence the heightened economic disparity. This is 
essentially an explanation o f the traditional approach to the Sino-Indonesian question 
using Societal Security language. It assumes that the attempts to assimilate the 
Chinese failed because the Chinese made themselves indispensable. However it is 
not the only possibility, Heryanto proposes that the “othering” of the Chinese was for 
more political reasons. Not just in order to help establish a new Indonesian identity 
but also for more nefarious means. By maintaining the ethnic Chinese as an “other”
51 , . I t ,  of  T u r n e r  and Seymour, ‘Ethnic Chinese and the
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then the New Order had a scapegoat that it could use whenever they wanted to divert 
attention from other problems that they may have. Heryanto argues that this was a 
rational political move on the part of the regime, and it was the desire for a political 
“distraction” that lies at the root of the ultimate failure of the assimilation program. 
However, whilst it is likely that this political desire is a variable, I believe that the 
nature of ethnic identity itself is the real reason for the continued othering of the 
Chinese. The New Orders attempts to create a new Indonesian identity required an 
other to effectively unify the many diverse groups that make the pribumi.
SIT informs us that the way we define ourselves is with reference to an out­
group and so in order to establish an effective definition of who they were as 
Indonesians the New Order required that out-group. The Chinese were convenient 
for the task. It is possible that another out-group could have been established 
however in the aftermath of the coup there was little or no reason to do so. The 
combined impact of the communist/Chinese threat that was delivered to the 
Indonesian community by the New Order was sufficient to seed the modem identity 
that the New Order desired. In conjunction with cultural cherry picking and the 
establishment of what it was to be Indonesian, the New Order were able to build a 
prototype of what they wanted Indonesia and Indonesians to be, the Chinese were not 
and could not be part of that prototype. As time progressed the need for an active 
out-group was lessened, or at the very least it became less overt, however at times of 
national or political crisis the people still looked for a “them” to blame for what was 
wrong with their world. This is different from what Heryanto argues as it is not a 
rational political choice on the part o f the New Order to maintain the ethnic Chinese, 
the policy of assimilation still persisted and the ethnic Chinese were targets of
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sustained institutional attack on their cultural existence. However, the very identity 
that the New Order had established for Indonesia could not permit the sustained 
destruction of the Chinese. Firstly because they were the out-group that helped define 
what Indonesian in-group was. Secondly, the Indonesian identity itself prevented any 
overtly anti-Chinese actions by the Government. The vision of Indonesia that 
Suharto had established in 1966 had built into it “the pride Indonesians have in their 
multicultural society”, a society that the New Order created, “and a desire to present 
to the outside world an image of a tolerant, non-sectarian society.”52 So whilst the 
ethnic Chinese response to the existential threat that was initiated with the 1967 
‘Basic Policy for the solution to the Chinese problem’ undoubtedly ensured their 
survival in the short term, the prolonged survival of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
was in fact assured by the ethnic group that threatened them.
Transmigration in the New Order
This Indonesianisation of the Archipelago was not only carried about by the attack 
upon the Ethnic Chinese. An area of future study would be the Transmigration 
process. The traditional literature focuses heavily upon the economic benefits of the 
program, however what cannot be ignored is the impact of the program on the attempt 
to develop a coherent Indonesian self. Because the vast majority of the Indonesia’s 
population are based in Java, which constitutes only 7 % of Indonesia’s landmass, 
there are obvious economic advantages to moving the populations into the outer 
islands and so exploit the economic resources there. What is also evident is that the 
New Order regime also encouraged the movement of people to propagate the idea of
2 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting p. 129
2 0 2
a greater Indonesian self and suppress the ethnic communities that lived away from 
Jakarta. Ethnic unrest in Kalimantan, for instance between the indigenous Dayaks 
and the settling Madurese is one particular case that is worth noting, as is the struggle 
for independence in Aceh and the New Order’s invasion of East Timor. East Timor is 
an interesting for the program of migration, some 70,000 people were moved to the 
area in the late 80s and early 90s was coupled by oppressive military measures to 
suppress the Timorese. This dynamic would open up the possibility to understand the 
use of societal securitization during a military occupation.
Conclusion
This thesis is a project to operationalise the concepts of Political and Societal 
security, as laid out by the Copenhagen School in order to provide a framework for 
the re-conception of security. When I examined in my introductory chapter the varied 
competing approaches I highlighted that whilst there are several competing 
approaches to this question, it was this securitization model of the Copenhagen school 
that offered the most robust theoretical framework for the broadening of security. It 
was able to provide a wider notion of security, whilst at the same time still being able 
to engage with the concerns of the traditional/orthodox conception of security. 
Irrespective of this claim however, as a theoretical framework this model was not 
unproblematic and in order for this to be achieved I believe that it was necessary, yet 
possible, to operationalise the theory so that it could be more rigorous and applicable 
to empirical research. The aim of my thesis was to address therefore was to explore 
the concepts of the political and societal sectors as explained by Buzan et al. Then by 
examining the criticisms of each sector I was able to incorporate alternative 
theoretical approaches to the sectors and referents that Buzan et al introduced in the 
New Framework and in so doing unproblematise the existing conceptions of political 
and societal security. This in turn improves upon the securitization model of security 
analysis and so provides a more robust re-conception of security. At the start of this 
project I asked my self a series of research questions that I intend to address in turn.
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What is the referent obiect in the political sector and how does securitization occur?
Unlike the other security sectors the political sector is problematised by the fact 
that it does not have ‘physical’ referent object. Instead it is the political regime that is 
the referent object in political security challenges. More specifically an attack would 
target the two pillars upon which all regimes are built upon: the first is the internal 
legitimacy o f the regime, and the second is its external recognition. Political security 
is concerned with the threats to the instruments of power, the institutions, principles 
and apparatus that enable effective governance and those political units that are 
attempting to change the current political order. Whilst it is possible for the 
institutions and physical base upon which a regime is based to be attacked through 
other sectors, or more specifically an attack on these pillars of the regime are likely to 
be securitized via a none political sector, so therefore the only solely political referent 
within the sector are the principles upon which it is based. Therefore it is these ideas 
and principles that are the central referent within the political sector, and they in turn 
will be threatened by competing principles and ideas. The most interesting aspect of 
securitization within the political sector is the fact that because there is a non­
physical’ referent the extraordinary means required may also be non-physical there 
by leading to the formation of a securitizing paradox, this dual process is particularly 
interesting when addressing the issues involved in regime change and formation.
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Is it possible to develop the concept of political security with particular reference to 
the problems that occur within the developing world and see whether it is applicable 
for the study of an authoritarian regime?
By integrating the work of Alagappa and Ayoob one is better able to 
comprehend the internal and external challenges that a developing regime faces. 
Alagappa’s definition of legitimacy, and in particular how it is attained and utilised 
within authoritarian regimes, allows one to more completely understand the process of 
securitization within dictatorial states, and it allows a clearer understanding of the 
audience-elite discourse under authoritarianism. Ayoob by addressing the difficulties 
faced by developing states during the nation building process in particular the way in 
which new regimes are forced to balance the need for external recognition against the 
legitimacy derived internally. The synthesis of these writers enabled me to develop a 
more clear understanding of not only the nature of the threat within the political sector 
for the developing world but also how the struggle to attain and maintain political 
legitimacy impacts upon the power elites within states, and in turn explains why they 
identify these problems as security issues.
Is possible to use social psychology to create a more robust and clearly defined notion 
of identity for the operationalisation of societal security?
The introduction of social psychology to our notions of identity is particularly 
useful for the operationalisation of the societal sector. For whilst Buzan and Waever 
have responded to criticisms levelled at their conception of identity, psychological 
literature enables us to empirically ascertain the notion of identity and its importance
206
to group dynamics. This in turn allows us to address the concerns of critics who 
argue that because identity is a fluid, social defined variable, it is therefore unable to 
become objectified and be used as a referent object. Whilst there does exist within DR. 
conceptions of “us and them” and “othering” the research carried out in the areas of 
SIT and Self Categorisation Theory that allow one to truly comprehend the processes 
that are taking place. And also the ways in which it is possible to attack and defend 
identity as a referent object. Whilst it could be criticised that the application of these 
psychological principles to the securitization literature does not actually expand our 
understanding of the societal sector, rather merely reemphasising what we already 
assumed to know. I would argue that the fact that these assumptions now have a more 
rigorous and empirical underpinning is necessary for a more complete understanding 
of the sector.
What does the operationalised concept of political security tell us about regime 
formation in Post-Colonial Indonesia?
Within the Indonesian context this operationalised theory has shed light upon 
the dynamics involved in the regime formation processed of both Sukarno and the 
New Order. It allows one to comprehend why Sukarno took the route he did in order 
to attain independence from the Dutch. How the UN offered an acceptable route for 
the recognition of an independent Indonesia. It also explains why the fiercely 
patriotic Sukarno adopted a Western style of government in the immediate aftermath 
of independence, and also why it was necessary for the President to instigate a change 
of regime in 1957 due to its failure to resolve the states domestic issues. Of particular 
interest here was the role PKI-ABRI was to play in Sukarno’s eventual downfall, 
especially how the nature of the regime he created laid the foundations for the
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eventual crisis that lead to the failure of the Gotong Rojong regime. The use of this 
model to examine the security challenges of the Sukarno regime does change the 
focus of analysis. For example, when one examines the policy of Konfrontasi from a 
traditional security approach one sees an interstate conflict playing out between 
Malaysia and Indonesia. In particular one will be drawn to the concepts of territory 
and ideology, in particular it can be read as an attempt by Sukarno to redress the 
injustices of the Colonial period and secure Indonesia’s borders from the neo-colonial 
threat posed by the newly created Malaysia. The political security model instead 
posits that the confrontation was as much concerned with the internal political 
challenges that Sukarno faced from the PKI and ABRI. Konfrontasi represents an 
effort by Sukarno to control these two rival factions within his regime, to not only 
channel their animosity away from him, but to also utilise it for his own political ends.
This framework is also of use when examining the New Order regime. The 
securitization model highlights the processes and dynamics by which the regime not 
only sought power, but also maintained it. The creation of the Golkar democracy and 
the Pancasilaisation of Indonesian domestic politics are fascinating methods of 
controlling and channelling potential political dissent. It is also important to note how 
the success o f the regimes defining principle, namely economic development, allowed 
it to function effectively even with a high degree of corruption and brutality. This is 
coupled by careful control of the routes to power and in doing so define its own 
political audience. This focus on the establishment of the realm of the ordinary and 
how this in turn establishes the rules and mechanisms not only by which the regime 
administers over the people, controls potential opposition, but also determining the 
criteria by which the regime is judged by the politically significant, allows us to
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understand the power dynamics with developing regimes. It enables the security 
analyst to comprehend how a seemingly “unjust” regime can survive. If the 
politically significant determine that the regime is performing effectively, based upon 
the regimes own criteria of success, then the regime will survive. If the regime is 
seemingly not performing, then this in turn opens up the possibility for the politically 
significant to be swayed by an alternative approach to governance.
What does the operationalised concept of political security tell us about regime 
formation in Post-Colonial Indonesia?
Looking at Sino-Indonesian relations, and in particular the “othering” of the 
Chinese for political ends, the operationalised societal securitization model helps 
illuminate a more complex pattern of events than previous existed within the 
literature. The assimilation that was instigated by the New Order regime becomes 
more than the systematic destruction of an ethnic minority, and instead one can see 
evidence that in fact the role that the Chinese play is actually central in defining what 
it is to be Indonesian. This insight can help us understand the policy decisions made 
by the New Order with respect to the Chinese, and also it allows us to comprehend 
why such a brutal campaign failed to fully assimilate the non -pribumi. Equally 
interesting is that if one examines acts of atrocity from directed towards the Chinese, 
for example in the aftermath of the 1965 coup. In this instance, one can see how the 
homogenisation of the out-group (the non-Pribumi) on the part of the “Indonesians” 
in the face o f a crisis of self, in this case the arguable treachery of the part of the PKI, 
meant that the Chinese were vilified and attacked not merely because of their 
ethnicity, but rather due to the interpretation of this ethnicity by the in-group. In other 
words it was the Pribumi’s own constructed conceptions that altered and thus lead to
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violence, rather than an action on the part of the Chinese. Therefore in order to 
understand the anti-Chinese sentiment within Indonesia, this framework suggests you 
not focus on the acts of violence, or even the actions of the Chinese. But rather it is 
necessary to understand the actions of the in-group committing the acts of violence.
Possibilities for future research?
There are several potential areas for future study that have been highlighted by 
this research. I feel that within the Political sector the research that I have carried out 
concerning the Suharto era should be further expanded and particularly attention 
given to his downfall in 1998. Within the Societal sector I would like to address the 
transmigration programs of the New Order, the Javanisation of the archipelago and its 
role in forming a coherent notion of Indonesian identity. Here I would pay particular 
attention to the separatist movements and ethnic conflicts that emerged in the outer 
islands post Independence.
More generally there are several other directions that my research could go. As 
I feel that the Copenhagen model is the best way to allow us to expand our notions of 
security without losing validity, but it is not only the political and societal sectors that 
are problematic. To this end I would like to look at operationalising the economic and 
environmental sectors. The environmental sector in particular is of particular 
relevance currently, not only within Indonesian in the aftermath if the earthquake and 
tsunami in December 2004, but also in the developed world, for example Hurricane 
Katrina in the USA. I would also be interested in moving the operationalised models 
that I have established here and apply them to another area. I would be particularly
2 1 0
interested in looking as regime formation in Myanmar and Vietnam, and ethnic 
conflict in Africa.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: The Preamble to the Constitution
Whereas freedom is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be abolished 
in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice;
And the moment of rejoicing has arrived in the struggle of the Indonesian freedom 
movement to guide the people safely and well to the threshold o f the independence of 
the state o f Indonesia which shall be free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous;
By the grace of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to live a free national 
life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.
Subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect 
all the people of Indonesia and their entire native land, and in order to improve the 
public welfare, to advance the intellectual life of the people and to contribute to the 
establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, the 
national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the 
sovereign Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in the One and Only 
God, just and humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner 
wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives and the realization of social justice 
for all o f the people o f Indonesia.
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Appendix 2: The 1945 Constitution 
Chapter I. Form of the State and Sovereignty 
Article 1
1. The State of Indonesia shall be a unitary state which has the form of a republic.
2) Sovereignty shall be vested in the people and shall be exercised in full by the. 
Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
Article 2
1. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall consist o f the members of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat augmented by the delegates from the regional territories and 
groups as provided for by statutory regulations.
2. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall meet at least once in every five years in 
the capital o f the state.
3. All decisions of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be taken by a majority 
vote.
Article 3
The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall determine the constitution and the guide 
lines of the policy o f State.
Chapter III. The Executive Power
Article 4
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1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia shall hold the power of government in 
accordance with the Constitution.
2. In exercising his duties, the President shall be assisted by a Vice-President.
Article 5
1. The President shall hold the power to make statutes in agreement with the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat.
2. The President shall determine the government regulations to expedite the 
enforcement of laws.
Article 6
1. The President shall be a native Indonesian citizen.
2. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat by a majority vote.
Article 7
The President and the Vice-President shall hold office for a term of five years and 
shall be eligible for re-election.
Article 8
Should the President die, resign or be unable to perform his duties during his term of 
office, he shall be succeeded by the Vice-President until the expiry of his term of 
office.
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Article 9
Before assuming office, the President and the Vice-President shall take the oath of 
office according to their religions, or solemnly promise before the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat or the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat as follows:
The President's/Vice-President's Oath
"In the name of God Almighty, I swear that I will perform the duties of the President 
(Vice-President) o f the Republic of Indonesia to the best of my ability and as justly as 
possible, and that I will strictly observe the Constitution and consistently implement 
the law and regulations in the service of the country and the people."
The President's/Vice-President's Promise
"I solemnly promise that I will perform the duties o f the President (Vice-President) of 
the Republic of Indonesia to the best of my ability and as justly as possible, and that I 
will strictly observe the constitution and consistently implement the law and 
regulations in the service of the country and the people."
Article 10
The President is the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. 
Article 11
In agreement with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the President declares war, makes 
peace and concludes treaties with other states.
Article 12
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The President declares the state of emergency. The conditions for such a declaration 
and the measures to deal with the emergency shall be governed by law.
Article 13
1. The President appoints ambassadors and consuls.
2. The President receives the credentials of foreign ambassadors.
Article 14
The President grants mercy, amnesty, pardon and restoration of rights.
Article 15
The President grants titles, decorations and other distinctions of honour.
Chapter IV. The Supreme Advisory Council 
Article 16
1. The composition of the Supreme Advisory Council shall be determined by law.
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2. The Council has the duty to reply to questions raised by the President and has the 
right to submit recommendations to the government.
Chapter V. The Ministers of State
Article 17
1. The President shall be assisted by the Ministers of State.
2. These Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by the President.
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3. These Ministers shall head the government departments.
Chapter VI. The Regional Governments 
Article 18
The division of the territory of Indonesia into large and small regions shall be 
prescribed by law in consideration of and with due regard to the principles of 
deliberation in the government system and the hereditary rights of special territories.
Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
Article 19
1. The composition of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall be prescribed by law.
2. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall meet at least once a year.
Article 20
1. Every law shall require the approval of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
2. Should a bill not obtain the approval of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the bill shall 
not be resubmitted during the same session of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
Article 21
1. Members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat have the right to submit a bill.
2. Should such a bill not obtain the sanction of the President notwithstanding the 
approval of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the bill shall not be resubmitted during the 
same session of the Dewan.
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Article 22
1. In the event of a compelling emergency, the President has the right to issue 
government regulations in lieu of laws.
2. Such regulations shall have the consent of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat during its 
subsequent session.
3. Where the approval of the Dewan is not obtained, the government regulations shall 
be revoked.
Chapter VIII. Finance
Article 23
1. The annual state budget shall be sanctioned by law. In the event that the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat does not approve a draft budget, the government shall adopt the 
budget of the preceding year.
2. All government taxes shall be determined by law.
3. The forms and denominations of the currency shall be determined by law.
4. Other financial matters shall be regulated by law.
5. In order to examine the accountability of the state finances, a State Audit Board 
shall be established by statutory regulation. The findings of the Board shall be 
reported to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
Chapter IX. The Judiciary Power
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Article 24
1. The judiciary power shall be exercised by a Supreme Court and such other courts of 
law as are provided for by law.
2. The composition and powers of these legal bodies shall be regulated by law.
Article 25
The appointment and dismissal of judges shall be regulated by law.
Chapter X. The Citizens 
Article 26
1. Citizens are native Indonesian persons or persons of other nations who have 
acquired a legal status as citizens.
2. Conditions to acquire and other matters on citizenship shall be determined by law. 
Article 27
1. All citizens have equal status before the law and in government and shall abide by 
the law and the government without any exception.
2. Every citizen has the right to work and to live in human dignity.
Article 28
Freedom of association and assembly, of verbal and written expression and the like, 
shall be prescribed by law.
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Chapter XI. Religion
Article 29
1. The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God.
2. The State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her 
own religion or belief.
Chapter XII. National Defence
Article 30
1. Every citizen has the right and duty to participate in the defence of the country.
2. The rules governing defence shall be regulated by law.
Chapter XIII. Education
Article 31
1. Every citizen has the right to education.
2. The government shall establish and conduct a national educational system which 
shall be regulated by law.
Article 32
The government shall advance the national culture.
Chapter XIV. Social Welfare 
Article 33
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1. The economy shall be organized as a common endeavour based upon the principles 
of the family system.
2. Sectors of production which are important for the country and affect the life of the 
people shall be controlled by the state.
3. The land, the waters and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by 
the State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people.
Article 34
The poor and destitute children shall be cared for by the State.
Chapter XV. The Flag and the Language 
Article 35
The national flag of Indonesia shall be the red-and-white.
Article 36
The national language of Indonesia shall be the Bahasa Indonesia or the Indonesian 
language.
Chapter XVI. Amendments to the Constitution
Article 37
1. In order to amend the Constitution, not less than two thirds of the total number of 
members o f the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be in attendance.
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2. Decisions shall be taken with the approval of not less than two thirds of the number 
o f members in attendance.
3. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Clause I
The Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence shall arrange and conduct 
the transfer of administration to the government of Indonesia.
Clause II
All existing state institutions continue to function and regulations remain valid as long 
as no new ones are established in conformity with this Constitution.
Clause III
For the first time, the President and the Vice-President shall be elected by the 
Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence.
Clause IV
Prior to the formation of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat and the Supreme Advisory Council in accordance with this Constitution, all 
their powers shall be exercised by the President assisted by a national committee.
4. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
1. Within six months after the end of the Great East Asia War, the President of 
Indonesia shall take preparatory steps and execute all the provisions of this 
Constitution.
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2. Within six months after its formation, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall 
convene a session to decree the constitution.
5. ANNOTATIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION
General
I. The Constitution as a part of the Basic Law
The Constitution of the country is only a part of its basic law. It is the written part. In 
addition, there is the unwritten part of the basic law which comprises principal 
regulations that grow and are preserved in the conduct of state affairs.
Indeed, to study the basic law (droit constitutionnel) of a country we cannot only 
analyze the articles of the constitution (loi constitutionnelle). We need to know the 
circumstances and the spiritual background (geistlicher hintergrund) that led to the 
drafting of the document.
We cannot understand the constitution of any country whatsoever by reading the text 
alone. To gain a thorough understanding of such constitution we have to know how 
the text came into existence, the conditions that prevailed at the time. In this way we 
can grasp the fundamental ideas and the basic reasoning underlying the constitution.
II. The basic thoughts in the Preamble
What are the basic thoughts which are embodied in the preamble to the constitution?
1. "The State", so it reads, "protects all the Indonesian people and the entire territory 
of Indonesia on the basis of unity. The State shall also establish social justice for all
the people o f Indonesia."
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The preamble, therefore, incorporates the idea of a unitary state which protects and 
accommodates all the people with no exception. Thus, the state stands above all 
groups of the population and above all individual convictions. The state, in the 
context of the preamble, calls for the unity of all the Indonesian people. This is one of 
the principles of the state that must never be forgotten.
2. The state shall strive for social justice for all the people (This is the second 
principle).
3. The third basic thought in the preamble is that the state shall be based on the 
sovereignty of the people, on democracy and the deliberations of representatives. 
Hence, the political system envisaged in the Constitution shall be based on democracy 
and the deliberations of representatives. This line of thoughts conforms to the 
characteristics of the Indonesian society.
4. The fourth basic idea in the preamble is that the state shall be based on the belief in 
the One and Only God and on just and civilized humanity. It follows that the 
constitution must make it the duty of the state and all its institutions to foster high 
human ethical norms and to live up to the noble moral aspirations of the people.
III. The basic ideas in the preamble are embodied in the articles of the 
Constitution
The basic ideas reflect the spiritual atmosphere in which the constitution was drafted. 
These ideas gave rise to legal aspirations (Rechtsidee) which encompassed the basic 
law of the state, both the written (the constitution) and the unwritten. Thus the articles 
of the Constitution incorporate those ideas.
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IV. The Constitution is concise and flexible
The Constitution is made up of only 37 articles. The clauses merely refer to 
transitional and additional aspects. Thus, this draft constitution is very brief if 
compared, for example, with the constitution of the Philippines.
It is adequate if the constitution only contains the fundamental provisions and 
guidelines as directives for the government and other state institutions to conduct state 
affairs and create public welfare. In particular for a new and young country, such a 
basic law is best to contain the basic provisions only while the operational procedures 
can be accommodated in laws which are easier to make, amend and repeal. Hence the 
system in which the constitution is drafted.
We always have to remember the dynamics of social and state life in Indonesia. The 
Indonesian society and state grow and time changes, especially during the period of 
physical and spiritual revolution. Therefore, we have to live a dynamic life; we have 
to watch all developments in social and political life. Consequently, we had better 
avoid hasty crystallization and moulding (Gestaltung) of ideas that can easily change.
It is true that a written provision is binding. Hence the more flexible a provision, the 
better. We have to see to it that the system of the constitution does not lag behind the 
change of time. We must not make laws that quickly become absolete. The important 
thing in government and state life is the spirit of the authorities, of the government 
leaders. Even though a constitution is characteristic of the family system, if the spirit 
of the authorities and the leaders of government is individualistic, then the 
constitution is in reality meaningless. On the other hand, even if a constitution is 
imperfect, but the spirit of the government leaders is right, such a constitution will in
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no way hinder the process of government. Thus, what is most important is the spirit. It 
must be a living and dynamic spirit. On the basis of these considerations, only the 
basic principles should be embodied in the constitution while the instruments of 
execution should be left to the law.
6. THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
The government system emphasized by the constitution is as follows:
I. Indonesia shall be a state based on law (rechtsstaat, a legal state).
1. As the Indonesian state is based on law, it is not founded on power alone 
(machtsstaat).
II. The constitutional system
2. The government is based on the constitution (basic law), not on absolutism 
(unlimited power).
III. The highest power of the state is vested in the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(Die gezamte staatgewalt lieght allein bei der Majelis).
3. The sovereignty of the people is held by a body named the Majelis Permusyaratan 
Rakyat which is the manifestation of all the people of Indonesia (Vertretungsorgan 
des Willens des Staatsvolkes). This Majelis determines the Constitution and the 
Guidelines of State Policy. This Majelis appoints the Head of State (President) and the 
Deputy Head of State (Vice-President).
It is this Majelis that holds the highest power of the state, whereas the President shall 
pursue the state policy as outlined by the Majelis. The President who is appointed by
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the Majelis shall be subordinate and accountable to the Majelis. He is the mandatory 
of the Majelis; it is his duty to carry out its decisions. The President is not in a equal 
position (neben) as, but subordinate to (untergeordnet) the Majelis.
IV. The President is the Chief Executive of the State under the Majelis
Under the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the President is the Chief Executive in 
the state.
In the conduct of the state administration, the power and responsibility rest with the 
President (The original annotation reads: "(There is) concentration of power and 
responsibility upon the President" which may be misleading. The new annotation 
serves to clarify the point).
V. The President is not accountable to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (the House of 
Representatives)
The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat is beside the President.
The President must obtain the approval of the Dewan to make laws (Gezetsgebug) 
and to determine the budget (Staatsbergroting).
Hence, the President has to cooperate with the Dewan, but he is not accountable to it, 
in the sense that his status does not depend upon it.
VI. The Ministers of state are the assistants of the President. They are not accountable 
to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
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The President appoints and dismisses the ministers of state. They are not accountable 
to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Their status does not depend upon the Dewan but 
upon the President since they are his assistants.
VII. The Powers of the Head of State is not unlimited
Although the Head of State is not accountable to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, he is 
not a dictator since his power is not unlimited.
As pointed out earlier, he is accountable to the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. 
Furthermore, he has to pay full attention to the voice (or the opinions) of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat.
The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat is strong.
The Dewan Perwakilan is in a strong position. The Dewan cannot be dissolved by the 
President unlike its position in a parliamentary system. Moreover, members of the 
Desan Perwakilan Rakyat are concurrently members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat. Hence the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat can always control the actions of the 
President and if the DPR is of the opinion that the President has acted in 
contravention of the state policy as laid down in the Constitution or as determined by 
the MPR, the Majelis may convene a special session and request the President account 
for.
The Ministers of State are no ordinary senior officials.
Although the status of the ministers of state depends upon the President, they are no 
ordinary senior officials since they mainly exercise the executive power.
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As head of a department, a minister ought to know all the matters related to his duties. 
Hence a minister has great influence upon the President to decide a policy on his 
department. In fact this asserts that ministers are leaders of the state.
To determine the govemment's policy and for the purpose of coordination in the 
administration, ministers have to work in close cooperation with one another under 
the leadership of the President.
Chapter I. Form of the State and Sovereignty
Article 1
The decision to form a unitary state and a republic is a manifestation of the basic idea 
of the people's sovereignty.
The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat is the highest authority in the conduct of state 
affairs. The Majelis is the manifestation of the people who hold the sovereignty of the 
state.
Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
Article 2 
Section 1
This article implies that all the people, all groups and all regions are represented in the 
Majelis such that this assembly can really be considered as the manifestation of the 
people.
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The term groups" refers to such bodies as cooperatives, labour unions and other 
collective organizations. This provision fits with the conditions of the time. In 
conjunction with the idea of creating a cooperative system in the economy, the first 
section of this article is a reminder of the existence of such groups in economic 
organizations.
Section 2
The Majelis with such a large membership should meet not less than once in every 
five years. The term "not less than" implies that, should it be necessary, the Majelis 
may meet more than once within its five-year term, that is, by calling a special 
session.
Article 3
Since the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat is vested with the sovereignty of the state, 
its power is unlimited. To keep pace with social dynamics and by paying due attention 
to all developments and trends of the time, once in every 5 years the Majelis decides 
the policy o f the state to be pursued in the future.
Chapter III. The Executive Power
Article 4 and Article 5, section 2
'The President is the Chief Executive of the state. To enforce laws he has the power to 
issue government regulations (pouvoir reglementair).
Article 5, section 1
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Beside the executive power, the President together with the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat exercises the legislative power of the state.
Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9
These are self-explanatory.
Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15
The powers of the President referred to in these articles are the consequences of his 
position as the Head of State.
Chapter IV. The Supreme Advisory Council
Article 16
This body is a Council of State whose duty is to give recommendations to the 
government. It is only an advisory body.
Chapter V. The Ministers of State
Article 17
See above points VI and VII.
Chapter VI. The Regional Governments
Article 18
I. Since Indonesia is a unitary state (eenheidstaat), there will be no region under its 
jurisdiction that constitutes another state (staat).
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The Indonesian territory will be divided into provinces which, in turn will be divided 
into smaller (administrative) regions.
All regions with an autonomous status "streek" and "locale rechtsgemeenschappen" or 
which merely form an administrative unit, must respect statutory regulations.
In regions with an autonomous status, a regional legislative body will be established 
since in the regions too the administration must be based on the principles of 
deliberations.
II. In the territory of Indonesia there are approximately 250 self-governing regions 
(zelfbesturende landschappen) and village communities (volksgemeeschappen), such 
as the "desa" (village) in Java and Bali, the "nagari" in Minangkabau, the "dusun" and 
"marga" in Palembang and other social-adminstrative units. These regional units have 
their own indigenous social systems and thus may be considered as special regions.
The Republic of Indonesia respects the status of the special regions and any 
government regulation on these regions shall have due regard to their hereditary 
rights.
Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
Articles 19, 20, 21 and 23
The Dewan has to approve all bills submitted by the government. It also has the right 
to initiate bills.
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III. Following article 23, the Dewan has the right to control the budget (begrooting).
In this way the Dewan controls the government. It has to be borne in mind that all the 
members of the Dewan are also members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.
Article 22
This article concerns the emergency rights (noodverordeningsrect) of the President. It 
is necessary to include this provision in order that in times of emergency the 
government can guarantee the safety of the country by taking prompt and appropriate 
actions. Nevertheless, the government cannot escape the control of the Dewan. 
Therefore, government measures referred to in this Article must obtain the approval 
of the Dewan must obtain the approval of the Dewan as they have the same validity as 
laws.
Chapter VIII. Finance
Article 23, sections 1, 2, 3, and 4
Section 1 refers to the right of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat to control the budget 
(begrooting). The method to decide a budget is a yardstick to assess the characteristics 
of the government. In a fascist country the budget is exclusively determined by the 
government. In a democracy or a country based on the people's sovereignty, like the 
Republic of Indonesia, the budget is sanctioned by law, meaning with the approval of 
the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
How the people will live as a nation and where to get the funds from, must be decided 
by the people themselves through their representatives in the Dewan. The people 
decide their own destiny and hence also their way of living.
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Article 23 stresses that to decide a budget the Dewan is in a stronger position than the 
government. This reflects the sovereignty of the people.
Since the right of the people to decide their own destiny is involved in the process of 
adopting a budget, any measures which impose a burden on the people, such as taxes 
and the like, must be determined by law, which means that these must be approved by 
the Dewan.
In this connection, the authority of the Bank of Indonesia, which will issue and 
regulate the circulation of money, should be set out by law.
Section 5
How the government spends the money that has been approved by the Dewan must 
conform to the decision on the budget.
To examine the accounts of the government there must a body that is free from 
government influence and authority. A body that is subordinate to the government 
will not be able to discharge such a difficult task. Nor does such a body stands above 
the government. Hence, its authority and duty should be determined by law.
Chapter IX. The Judicial Power
Articles 24 and 25
The judicial power is independent to such an extent that it is free from government 
interference. Thus, the status of judges should be guaranteed by law.
Chapter X. The Citizens
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Article 26, Section 1
People of other nations, such as those of Dutch, Chinese and Arabic descents, whose 
domicile is Indonesia, recognize Indonesia as their home country and are loyal to the 
Republic of Indonesia, may become citizens.
Article 26, Section 2
Self-explanatory
Article 27, 30, 31 and, section 1
These articles concern the rights of citizens. Otherwise they are self-explanatory. 
Articles 28, 29 section 2, and 34
These articles concern the status of residents. Articles which only concern citizens as 
well as those regarding the entire population, accommodate the aspirations of the 
Indonesian people to build a democratic state which will promote social justice and 
humanity.
Chapter XI. Religion
Article 29, section 1
This section emphasizes the belief of the Indonesian people in the One and Only God. 
Chapter XII. National Defence 
Article 30 
Self-explanatory.
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Chapter XIII. Education
Article 31, section 2 
Self-explanatory.
Article 32
The national culture is the product of the mental and spiritual activities of the entire 
Indonesian people.
The old and indigenous cultures which were the peak of cultural life in all the regions 
of Indonesia, together form the national culture. Cultural activities should lead to the 
advancement of civilization and culture, and the strengthening of unity without 
rejecting new elements of foreign cultures which can develop or enrich the own 
national culture and raise the human dignity of the Indonesian people.
Chapter IX. Social Welfare
Article 33
Article 33 embodies the principle of economic democracy which states that 
production is done by all for all, under the leadership of supervision of members of 
the community. Social prosperity is the primary goal, not individual prosperity. 
Hence, the economy is organized as a common endeavour based on the principles of 
the family system. The form of enterprise which meets those conditions is the 
cooperative.
The economy is based on economic democracy which envisages prosperity for 
everybody. Therefore, economic sectors which are essential for the country and which
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affect the life of the people, must be controlled by the state. Otherwise the control of 
production might fall in the hands of powerful individuals who could exploit the 
people. Hence, only enterprises which do not affect the life of the general population 
may be left to private individuals.
The land, the waters and the natural resources therein are basic assets for the people's 
prosperity and should, therefore, be controlled by the state and exploited to the 
greatest benefit of the people.
Article 34
Self-explanatory.
Chapter XV. The Flag and the Language
Article 35 
Self-explanatory.
Article 36 
Self-explanatory.
Regional languages which are well preserved by the people, such as the Javanese, 
Sundanese, Madurese and other languages, will be respected and preserved by the 
state. Since these languages are also part of the Indonesian culture.
Chapter XVI. Amendments to the Constitution
Article 37
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Self-explanatory.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THE 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
Department of Information 
Republic of Indonesia
First Edition
1. THE OPENING TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION
Whereas Independence is the natural right of every nation, colonialism must be 
abolished in this world because it is not in conformity with Humanity and Justice.
And the Struggle of the movement for the independence of Indonesia has now 
reached the hour of rejoicing by leading the People of Indonesia safe and sound to the 
gateway of the Independence of an Indonesian State which is free, united, sovereign, 
just and prosperous.
Thanks to the blessing of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to lead their 
own free national life, the People of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.
Following this, in order to set up a government of the State of Indonesia which shall 
protect the whole of the Indonesian People and their entire native land of Indonesia, 
and in order to advance the general welfare, to develop the intellectual life of the 
nation and to contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon 
independence, abiding peace and social justice, the structure of Indonesia s National
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Independence shall be formulated in a Constitution of the Indonesian State which 
shall have the structural state form of a Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty of the 
people, and which shall be based upon: Belief in the One, Supreme God, just and 
civilized Humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and democracy which is guided by the 
inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives, 
meanwhile creating a condition of social justice for the whole of the People of 
Indonesia.
2. THE 1945 CONSTITUTION 
Chapter I. Form and Sovereignty.
Article 1
1. The State of Indonesia shall be a unitary state which has the form of a Republic.
2. Sovereignty shall be in the hands of the People and shall be exercised in full by the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.
Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.
Article 2
1. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat *) shall consist of members of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat**) augmented by delegates from the regional territories and the 
groups in accordance with regulation prescribed by statute.
2. The Majelis P e rm u sy a w a ra ta n  R akyat shall s it a t least o n ce  in  ev e ry  fiv e  y ea rs  in 
th e  capital o f the State.
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3. All decisions of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be determined by 
majority vote.
Article 3
The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall determine the Constitution and the 
guidelines of the policy of the State.
Chapter III. The Powers of Government of the State 
Article 4
1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia shall hold the power of government in 
accordance with the Constitution.
2. In exercising his duties, the President shall be assisted by a Vice-President.
Article 5
1. The President shall hold the power to make statutes in agreement with the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat.
2. The President shall determine the Government Regulations necessary to implement 
statutes.
Article 6
1. The President shall be a native-born Indonesian.
2. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by the Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat by majority vote.
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Article 7
The President and Vice-President shall hold office for a term of five years and shall 
be eligible for re-election.
Article 8
Should the President die, ceased from executing or be unable to execute his duties 
during his term of office, his office shall be taken by the Vice-President until the 
expiry o f that term.
Article 9
Before assuming the duties of office, the President and Vice-President shall take an 
oath according to the requirements of religion, or shall make a solemn promise, before 
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat as follows:
Oath of the President (Vice-President).
"I swear before God that, to the best of my ability, I will fulfill as justly as possible 
the duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia; that I will 
hold faithfully to the Constitution and conscientiously implement all statutes and 
regulations, and that I will devote myself to the service of Country and Nation".
Promise of the President (Vice-President).
"I solemnly promise that, to the best of my ability, I will fulfill as justly as possible 
the duties o f the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia; that I will 
hold faithfully to the Constitution and conscientiously implement all statutes and 
regulations, and that I will devote myself to the service of Country and Nation .
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Article 10
The President shall hold the highest authority over the Army, the Navy and the Air 
Force.
Article 11
The President, with the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, declares war, 
makes peace and concludes treaties with other states.
Article 12
The President declares the state of emergency. The conditions governing, and the 
consequences of, the state of emergency shall be prescribed by statute.
Article 13
1. The President appoints diplomatic representatives and consuls.
2. The President receives the diplomatic representatives of other states.
Article 14
The President grants grace, amnesty, abolition and restoration of rights.
Article 15
The President grants titles, decorations and other marks of honour.
Chapter IV. The Supreme Advisory Council 
Article 16
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1. The structure of the Supreme Advisory Council shall be prescribed by statute.
2. This Council shall submit replies to issues raised by the President and shall have 
the right to submit proposals to the Government.
Chapter V. The Ministers of State
Article 17
1. The President shall be assisted by the Ministers of State.
2. These Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by the President.
3. These Minister shall lead the Government Departments.
Chapter VI. Local Government
Article 18
The division of the area of Indonesia into large and small regional territories together 
with the structure of their administration, shall be prescribed by statute, with regard 
for and in observance of the principle of deliberation in the governmental system of 
the State, and the traditional rights in the regional territories which have a special 
character.
Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (The Legislative Body)
Article 19
1. The s tru c tu re  of th e  D ew an  P e rw ak ilan  R ak y a t sha ll be  p re sc rib ed  b y  sta tu te .
2. Dean Perwakilan R ak y a t shall sit at least once  a  year.
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Article 20
1. Every statute shall require the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
2. Should a draft law not obtain the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the 
draft may not be submitted again during the same session of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat.
Article 21
1. Members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall have the right to submit draft laws.
2. Should those drafts, although agreed to by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, not be 
ratified by the President, those drafts may not be submitted again during the same 
session o f the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
Article 22
1. Should exigency compel, the President shall have the right to determine 
Government Regulations in lieu of statutes.
2. Those Government Regulations must obtain the agreement of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat in its next session.
3. Should that agreement not be obtained, the Government Regulation shall be 
revoked.
Chapter VIII. Finance
Article 23
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1. The estimates of revenue and expenditure shall be fixed each year by statute. 
Should the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat not agree to the estimates proposed by the 
Government, the Government shall work to the estimates of the previous year.
2. All kinds of taxes for the needs of the State shall be based upon statutes.
3. All kinds and values of the currency shall be prescribed by statute.
4. Further matters of the finances of the State shall be regulated by statute.
5. In order to investigate the accountability for state Finances, a Body for the 
investigation of finances shall be set up, the regulation for which shall be prescribed 
by statute.
The results of that investigation shall be made known to the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat.
Chapter IX. The Judicial Powers
Article 24
1. The judicial powers shall be exercised by a Supreme Court and other courts of law 
in accordance with statute.
2. The structure and powers of those courts of law shall be regulated by statute. 
Article 25
The conditions for becoming a judge and for being dismissed shall be prescribed by 
statute.
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Chapter X. Citizens
Article 26
1. Citizens shall be persons who are native-born Indonesians and persons of other 
nationality who are legalized by statute as being citizens.
2. Conditions with regard to citizenship shall be prescribed by statute.
Article 27
1. Without any exception, all citizens shall have equal positions in Law and 
Government and shall be obliged to uphold that Law and Government.
2. Every citizen shall have the right to work and to a living, befitting for human 
beings.
Article 28
Freedom of association and assembly, of expressing thoughts and of issuing writing 
and the like, shall be prescribed by statute.
Chapter XI. Religion
Article 29
1. The State shall be based upon Belief in the One, Supreme God.
2. The State shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere to his respective 
religion and to perform his religious duties in conformity with that religion and that
faith .
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Chapter XII. Defence
Article 30
1. Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defence of the 
State.
2. Conditions concerning defence shall be regulated by statute.
Chapter XIII. Education
Article 31
1. Every citizen shall have the right to obtain an education.
2. The Government shall establish and conduct a national educational system which 
shall be regulated by statute.
Article 32.
The Government shall advance the national culture of Indonesia.
Chapter XIV. Social Well-Being 
Article 33
1. The economy shall be organized as a common endeavour based upon the principle 
of the family system.
2. Branches of production which are important for the State and which affect the life 
of most people shall be controlled by the State.
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3. Land and water and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the 
State and shall be made use of for the people.
Article 34
The poor and destitute children shall be cared for by the State 
Chapter XV. Flag and Language
Article 35
The Flag of the Indonesian State shall be the Honoured Red-and-White.
Article 36
The Language of the State shall be the Indonesian Language.
Chapter XVI. Alterations to the Constitution 
Article 37
1. In order to alter the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the total members of the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat must be in attendance.
2. A decision shall be taken with the agreement of at least two-thirds of the total 
number o f members who are in attendance.
3. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Clause I
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The Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence shall regulate and execute 
the transfer of government to the Indonesian Government.
Clause II
All existing institutions and regulations of the State shall continue to function so long 
as new ones have not been set up in conformity with this Constitution.
Clause III
The President and Vice-President shall be elected for the first by the Preparatory 
Committee for Indonesia's Independence.
Clause IV
Before the Majelis Permusyarwaratan Rakyat, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat and the 
Supreme Advisory Council have been set up in conformity with this Constitution, all 
their powers shall be exercised by the President with the assistance of a National 
Committee.
4. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
1. Within six months after the end of the Greater East Asia War, the President of 
Indonesia shall regulate and implement all things which are stipulated in this 
Constitution.
1. Within six months after the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat has been set up, the 
Majelis shall sit in order to determine the Constitution.
5. ELUCIDATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
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GENERAL
I. The written Constitution, a part of Fundamental Law.
The written Constitution of a state is only a part of the Law which is the basis of the 
state. The Constitution is that part of the Fundamental Law which is written down, 
while besides that Constitution there also prevails a Fundamental Law which is not 
written down, namely, the basic rules which arise and are maintained in the practice 
o f running a state, although they are not written down.
Certainly, in order to study the Fundamental Law (Droit Constitutionnel) of a state, 
it is not enough only to study the articles of its written Constitution (Loi 
Constitutionnel) alone, but one must also study how it is applied and what is the 
spiritual background (Geistlichen Hintergrund) of that written Constitution.
The Constitution of any state whatsoever can not be understood if merely its text is 
read alone. Truly, to understand the meaning of the Constitution of a state, we must 
also study how that text came into being, we must know the explanations made of it 
and we must also know under what conditions that text was made.
In this way we shall be able to understand what is the meaning and purpose of the 
Constitution we are studying, and what current of thought it was which became the 
foundation of that Constitution.
II. Fundamental ideals in the '’Opening” (Preamble).
What are the fundamentals contained in the Preamble to the Constitution?
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1. The State—so the text runs— is what "shall protect the whole of the Indonesian 
People and their entire native land of Indonesia...based upon...unity...meanwhile 
creating a condition of social justice for the whole of the People of Indonesia".
2. In this Preamble, the current of thought is accepted of the unitary state, the state 
which protects and covers the whole of the people. Thus the state encompasses every 
kind of group opinion, encompasses all opinions of individuals. The state, in 
accordance with the concept of this Preamble, seeks unity, and extends over the whole 
of the Indonesian People. This is one foundation of the state which may not be 
forgotten.
3. The third fundamental idea contained in the Preamble is that of sovereignty of the 
people, based upon democracy and deliberation amongst representatives. Therefore, 
the system of state which is given form in the Constitution must be based upon 
sovereignty of the people and must be based upon deliberation amongst 
representatives. Indeed, this current of thought accords with the character of the 
Indonesian society.
4. The fourth fundamental idea contained in the Preamble is that the state is based 
upon that Belief in the One, Supreme God which conforms with the principles of 
just and civilised humanity.
Therefore, the Constitution must oblige the Government and other authorities of state 
to nurture the nobility of human character and to hold fast to the fine moral ideals of
the people.
III. The Constitution gives form in its articles to the fundamental ideas contained 
in the Preamble.
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The above fundamental ideas pervade the spiritual background of the Constitution of 
the State of Indonesia. These fundamental ideas give rise to those ideals of law 
(Rechtsidee) which dominate the Fundamental Law of the State, both written law (the 
constitution) and unwritten law.
The Constitution gives form to these fundamental ideas in its articles.
VI. The Constitution is short and flexible in character.
The Constitution has only 37 articles. The other paragraphs contain only additional 
and transitional provisions. This draft is thus very brief when compared, for instance, 
with the constitution of the Philippines.
It is enough if the Constitution contains only fundamental rules, contains only 
guidelines of instruction to the Central Government and to other authorities of the 
State for conducting the life of the State and providing social well-being. Especially 
for a new state and a young state, it is better if that written Fundamental Law contains 
only basic rules, whilst the provisions implementing those basic rules are left to 
statutes which are more easily drawn up, altered and revoked.
This is the system of the Constitution.
We must always remember the dynamic of the life of the Indonesian society and state. 
The Indonesian society and state are growing, the era is changing, especially during 
this present period of physical and spiritual revolution.
Therefore, we must live dynamically, we must watch every kind of movement in the 
life of the Indonesian society and state. In that connection, let us not precipitately 
crystallize, provide form to (Gestaltung), ideas which can still easily alter.
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Certainly, it is the nature of those written rules to be binding. For that reason, the 
more flexible ( elastic ) those rules are, the better. Thus we must guard against the 
constitutional system being left behind the times. Let us not go so far as to make a 
constitution which is quickly out-moded (verouderd). What is extremely important in 
the administration and in the life of the state is the spirit, the spirit of the authorities of 
the state, the spirit of the leaders of the administration. Although a constitution is 
drawn up which, according to the letter, is charactersized by the family principle, if 
the spirit o f the authorities of the state, the leaders of the administration, 
individualistic, that constitution is certain to have no meaning in practice. On the 
other hand, although that constitution is not perfect, if the spirit of the authorities of 
the administration is good, that constitution will certainly not obstruct the course of 
the state. Thus what is most important is the spirit. That spirit is a living thing, or, in 
other words, it is dynamic. In this connection, only the fundamental mles alone must 
be laid down in the constitution whilst what is necessary for executing those 
fundamental rules must be left to statutes.
6. THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE
The system of the government of the State which is stipulated in the Constitution is.
I. Indonesia is a State based on Law ("Rechtstaat ).
1. The State of Indonesia is based upon law (Rechtstaat), it is not based upon more 
power (Machtstaat).
I. The System is Constitutional
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2. The government is based upon constitutionalism (Fundamental Law) not 
absolutism (authority without limits).
III. The Highest Authority of the State is in the hands of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat ("die gesamte Staatsgewalt liegt allein bei der Majelis").
3. The sovereignty of the people is held by a body named the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat as the embodiment of the whole of the People of Indonesia 
(Vertretungsorgan des Willens des Staatvolkes). This Majelis determines the 
Constitution and the guidelines of the policy of the State. The Majelis appoints the 
Head of State (President) and the Vice-Head of State (Vice-President).
It is this Majelis which holds the highest authority of the State, whilst the President 
must execute the policy of the State according to the guidelines which have been 
determined by the Majelis.
The President who is appointed by the Majelis, is subordinate to and responsible to 
the Majelis. He is the "mandatory" of the Majelis, he is obliged to execute the 
decisions of the Majelis.
The President is not "neben" but is "untergeordnet to the Majelis.
IV. The President is the Highest Executive of the Government of the State below 
the Majelis
Below the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the President is the Highest Executive of 
the government of the State.
In conducting the administration of the State, authority and responsibility are in the 
hands of the President (concentration of power and responsibilit y upon the President).
V. The President is not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
Besides the President there is the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. The President must 
obtain the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat in order to make laws (Gesetz 
gebung) and in order to fix the estimates of the revenues and expenditures of the State 
(Staatsbegroting).
Because o f this, the President must work together with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
but the President is not responsible to the Dewan, which means that the President's 
position is not dependent upon the Dewan.
VI. The Ministers of State are Assistants to the President: the Ministers of State 
are not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
The President appoints and dismisses the Ministers of State. Those Ministers are not 
responsible to the Dean Rakyat. Their positions are not dependent upon the Dewan 
but are dependent upon the President. They are the assistants of the President.
VII. The Authority of the Head of State is not unlimited.
Although the Head of State is not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, he is 
not a "dictator", which means that his authority is not unlimited.
It has been stressed above that he is responsible to the Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat. Apart from this, he must carefully and thoroughly pay attention to the voice
of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
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The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat is strong. The Dewan can not be 
dissolved by the President. (This is at variance with the parliamentary system). Apart 
from this, members of the Dewan are all of them concurrently members of the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. For that reason the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
can at all times control the acts of the President, and if the Dewan considers that the 
President has in fact transgressed against the policy of the State determined by the 
Constitution or by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. The Majelis can be called 
for a special sitting so that can ask the President to account for his responsibility.
The Ministers of the State are not ordinary high-ranking Civil Servants.
Although the position of the Ministers of State is dependent upon the President, 
nevertheless they are not ordinary high-ranking civil servants, because it are those 
Ministers who, in the first place, in practice execute the authority of the Government 
(pouvoir executil).
As the leaders of Departments, the Ministers know the ins and outs of matters 
connected with their jurisdictions. In this connection, Ministers have a great influence 
upon the President in determining that part of the state s policy with which their 
Departments are concerned. Indeed, what is intended is that the Ministers are Leaders
of the State.
In determining Government policy and in co-ordinating the administration of the 
State, the Ministers work together as closely as possible, one with the other, under the
leadership o f the President.
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CONCERNING THE ARTICLES 
Chapter 1. The Form and Sovereignty of the State.
Article 1
This prescribes that the form of the state shall be unitary and a Republic, and contains 
the fundamental idea of sovereignty of the State.
Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.
Article 2
Clause 1.
The intention is that the whole of the people, all the groups and all the regional 
territories throughout the country, shall have representatives in the Majelis, so that the 
Majelis can truly be considered to be the embodiment of the People.
What are referred to as "groups" are bodies such as co-operatives, workers' 
associations and other collective bodies. Such rule is indeed in harmony with the trend 
of the times. In connection with the recommendation to establish the co-operative 
system in the economy, this clause recalls the existence of groups in economic 
organizations.
Clause 2
This organ which will have a large total membership, sits at least once in five years.
At least once, therefore if necessary of course it may sit more than once in five years
by holding special sessions.
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Article 3
Because the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat holds the sovereignty of the State, its 
powers are not limited. In view of the dynamic of society, once in five years the 
Majelis reviews everything which has happened and considers all the trends at that 
time, and determines what policies it desires to be used for the future.
Chapter III. The Powers of Government of the State.
Article 4 and Article 5, clause 2.
The President is the head of the executive power in the State. In order to execute laws, 
he possesses the power to prescribe government regulations (pouvoir reglementaire).
Article 5, clause 1
Apart from the executive power, the President together with the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat exercises the legislative power in the State.
Articles 6, 7, 8, 9.
Already clear
Articles 10 ,11 ,12 ,13 ,14 ,15
The powers o f the President provided by these articles are consequences of the 
President's position as Head of State.
Chapter IV. The Advisory Council 
Article 16
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This Council is a Council of State which is obliged to provide considered views to the 
Government. It is purely an advisory body.
Chapter V. The Minister of the State 
Article 17
See above.
Chapter VI. Local Government 
Article 18
I. Because the State of Indonesia is a unitary state, Indonesia, therefore, will not have 
within its jurisdiction areas which have the character of "states".
The area of Indonesia will be divided into provinces, and these provinces will 
likewise be divided into smaller regional territories. These regional territories will 
have an autonomous character (streek- and locale rechtsgemeen-schappen), titles of 
so-called autonomous areas during the colonial period, or have the character of purely 
administrative regions, all to be in accord with rules to be laid down by statute.
In those regional territories with an autonomous character, local representative bodies 
will be set up, because local government also will be founded upon the principle of 
deliberation.
II. Within the territory of the State of Indonesia there are to be found about 250 
zelibesturende landschappen, and volksgemeenschappen, titles of so-called 
selfgoveming localities during the colonial period, such as the desa of Java and Bali,
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the nagari of Minangkabau, the dusun and marga: names of various social- 
administrative units.
Those localities have their own traditional structures, and for this reason can be 
considered to have a special character.
The State of the Republic of Indonesia respects the position of the said special 
regional territories, and all its regulations affecting those areas will bear in mind their 
traditional rights.
Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Articles 19, 20, 21 and 23
See above.
The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat must give its agreement to each and every draft law 
originating with the Government. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat also possesses the 
right to initiate legislation.
III. The Dewan also possesses the hak begroting (right to fix the budget, Article 23). 
Through this right, the Dewan controls the Government.
It must also be recalled that all members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat are 
concurrently members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.
Article 22
This article concerns the n o o d v ero rd en in g srech t (right to make emergency 
regulations) o f the President. Such a provision is indeed necessary, so that the safety
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of the State can be ensured by the Government in critical conditions which compel the 
Government to quick and appropriate action. Although this is so the Government is 
not, however, to be, released from the control of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
Therefore, the Government Regulations referred to in this article, which have the 
same force as laws, have also to be ratified by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
Chapter VIII. Finance. 
Article 23, clauses 1, 2, 3,4
Clause 1 lays down the budget-making right of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
The method of fixing the estimates of revenues and expenditures is a criterion of the 
character o f the government of a state. In countries based upon fascism, those 
estimates are fixed solely by the administration. But in democratic states or states 
based upon sovereignty of the people, such as the Republic of Indonesia, the estimates 
of revenues and expenditures are fixed by statute, which means: with the agreement of 
the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
How the people -  as a nation -  shall live, and from where the expenses for living 
shall be obtained, must be determined by the People themselves through the 
intermediary of their representative body. The People determine their own fate and 
therefore their way of life also.
Article 23 states that in fixing revenues and expenditures, the position of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat is stronger than the position of the Government. This is a sign of
the sovereignty of the People.
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Because the fixing of expenditures concerns the right of the People to determine their 
own fate, all measures placing burdens upon the people, such as 'axes etc., must be 
prescribed by statute, that is, with the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.
Also the kinds and values of currency are prescribed by statute. This is important 
because the position of the currency has great influence upon the community. Money 
in the first place is an instrument of exchange and of measurement of value. As an 
instrument of exchange its purpose is to facilitate exchange — buying and selling — in 
society. It follows that it is necessary for there to be those kinds and forms of money 
needed by the people as measures of value as a basis for fixing the worth of the 
respective goods which are exchanged. The thing which becomes the measure of 
value must have it fixed worth, it must not be allowed to rise and fall because of the 
irregular condition of the money. Therefore, the state of the currency must be 
prescribed by statute.
Related to this, the position of Bank Indonesia, which is to issue and to regulate the 
circulation of paper money, is prescribed by statute.
Clause 5
The way in which the Government makes use of the allocations already agreed by the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat must be in keeping with that decision. In order to 
investigate the Government's responsibilities in this respect, a body is needed which is 
free from the Government's influence and authority. A body which is subordinate to 
the Government could not perform so heavy a duty. On the other hand, neither is that 
body one which stands above the Government.
Because o f this, the power and duties of that body are prescribed by statute.
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Chapter IX. The Judicial Powers
The Judicial powers are powers which are independent, which means that they are 
free from the influence of the Government's authority. Therefore, guarantees must be 
established by statute concerning the position of judges.
Chapter X. Citizens 
Article 26, clause 1
People of other nations, for instance, people of Dutch descent, o f Chinese descent and 
of Arab descent, who are domiciled in Indonesia, who recognize Indonesia as their 
country and who are loyal to the State of the Republic of Indonesia, can become 
citizens.
Article 26, clause 2
Already clear.
Articles 27, 30 and 31 clause 1
These articles concern the rights of citizens.
Articles 28, 29 clause 1, and 34
These articles concern the position of the residents.
These articles refereed to here, both those which concern citizens alone as well as 
those which concern all residents, contain the desire of the Indonesian people to build 
a state with a democratic character which seeks to put into practice social justice and
the principle of humanity.
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Chapter XI. Religion 
Article 29, clause 1
This clause states the belief of the Indonesian people in the One, Supreme God. 
Chapter XII. Defence of the State 
Article 30 
Already clear.
Chapter XII. Education 
Article 31, clause 2
The nation's culture is the culture which grows as the outcome of the endeavours 
expressing the identity and vitality of the entire People of Indonesia.
The ancient and indigenous cultures which are to be found as cultural heights in all 
the regions throughout Indonesia are part of the nation's culture. Cultural efforts 
should lead toward advances in civilisation, culture and unity without rejecting from 
foreign cultures new materials which can bring about the development of or enrich the 
nation's own culture, as well as to raise the height of humanity o f the Indonesian 
nation.
Chapter XIV. Social Well-being 
Article 33
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In Article 33 is laid down the basis of economic democracy, production by all for all, 
under the leadership or control of the members of the communit}. It is prosperity of 
the community which is stressed, not prosperity of the individual.
For that reason, the economy is organised as a common effort, based upon ways of 
working that accord with the family principle. The co-operative is the form of 
enterprise in harmony with this.
The economy is based upon economic democracy, prosperity is for everybody. 
Therefore, branches of production which are important for the state and which affect 
the life of most people should be under the control of the State. If they are not, the top 
management of production will fall into the hands of individuals who are in power 
and numbers of people will be oppressed by them.
Only those enterprises which do not affect the life of most people may be in the hands 
of individuals.
The earth and waters and the natural riches contained therein are the fundamentals of 
the people's prosperity. Therefore they should be controlled by the State and be made 
use of for the greatest possible prosperity of the people.
Article 34
Already clear enough; see above 
Chapter XV. Flag and Language 
Article 35 
Already clear.
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Article 36
Already clear.
In the areas possessing languages of their own which are actively used by the people 
concerned (for instance, Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, and so forth), those 
languages will be respected and also cared for by the State.
Those languages are a part of the living culture of Indonesia.
Chapter XVI. Alteration to the Constitution
Article 37
Already clear.
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Appendix 3: UN Security Council Resolution 63
Adopted by the Security Council at its 392nd meeting, by 7 votes to none, with 4 
abstentions (Belgium, France, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, [1] Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics), on 24 December 1948
The Security Council,
Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia,
Having taken note of the reports of the Committee of Good Offices,
1. Calls upon the parties:
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith;
(b) Immediately to release the President of the Republic of Indonesia and other 
political prisoners arrested since 18 December 1948;
2. Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and 
urgently by telegraph on the events which hev transpired in Indonesia since 12 
December 1948, and to observe and report to the Security Council on the compliance 
with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above.
[1] The representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was absent, and the 
President ruled that he should be counted as having abstained.
Appendix 4: UN Security Council Resolution 64
Adopted by the Security Council at its 395th meeting, by 8 votes to none, with 3 
abstentions (Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland), on 28 December 1948
The Security Council,
Noting that the Netherlands Government has not so far released the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia and all other political prisoners, as required by Council 
resolution 63 (1948) of 24 December 1948,
Calls upon the Netherlands Government to set free these political prisoners forthwith 
and report to the Security Council within twenty-four hours of the adoption of the 
present resolution.
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Appendix 5: UN Security Council Resolution 67
Adopted by the Security Council at its 406th meeting, on 28 January 1949 [1]
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 27 (1947) of 1 August, 30 (1947) and 3J_ (1947) of 25 August, 
and 36 (1947) of 1 November 1947, with respect to the Indonesian question,
Taking note with approval of the reports submitted to the Security Council by its 
Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia,
Considering that its resolutions 63 (1948) and 64 (1948) of 24 and 28 December 1948 
have not been fully carried out,
Considering that continued occupation of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia by 
the armed forces o f the Netherlands is incompatible with the restoration of good 
relations between the parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting 
settlement of the Indonesian dispute,
Considering that the establishment and maintenance of law and order throughout 
Indonesia is a necessary condition to the achievement of the expressed objectives and 
desires of both parties,
Noting with satisfaction that the parties continue to adhere to the principles of the 
Renville Agreement [2] and agree that free and democratic elections should be held 
throughout Indonesia for the purpose of establishing a constituent assembly at the 
earliest practicable date and further agree that the Security Council should arrange for 
the observation of such elections by an appropriate agency of the United Nations; and 
that the representative of the Netherlands has expressed his Government’s desire to 
have such elections held not later than 1 October 1949,
Noting also with satisfaction that the Government of the Netherlands plans to transfer 
sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia by 1 January 1950 if possible, and in 
any case during the year 1950,
Conscious o f its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and in order that the rights, claims and positions of the parties may not be 
prejudiced by the use of force,
1. Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to ensure the immediate 
discontinuance of all military operations, calls upon the Government of the Republic 
simultaneously to order its armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare, and calls upon 
both parties to co-operate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance o f  law and 
order throughout the area affected;
2. Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to release immediately and 
unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by it since 17 December in 
Republic o f Indonesia, and to facilitate the immediate return of officials ot the
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Government of the Republic of Indonesia to Jogjakarta in order that they may 
discharge their responsibilities under paragraph 1 above and exercise their appropriate 
functions in full freedom, including administration of the Jogjaka ta area, which shall 
include the city of Jogjakarta and its immediate environs. The Netherlands authorities 
shall afford to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may 
reasonably be required by that Government for its effective functioning in the 
Jogjakarta area and for communication and consultation with all persons in Indonesia;
3. Recommends that, in the interest of carrying out the expressed objectives and 
desires of both parties to establish a federal, independent and sovereign United States 
of Indonesia at the earliest possible date, negotiations be undertaken as soon as 
possible by representatives of the Government of the Netherlands and representatives 
of the Republic of Indonesia, with the assistance of the Commission referred to in 
paragraph 4 below, on the basis of the principles set forth in the Linggadjati [3] and 
Renville Agreements, and taking advantage of the extent of agreement reached 
between the parties regarding the proposals submitted to them by the representative of 
the United States of America on the Committee of Good Offices on September 1948; 
[4] and in particular, on the basis that:
(a) The establishment of the interim federal government which is to be granted the 
powers of internal government in Indonesia during the interim period before the 
transfer of sovereignty be the result of the above negotiations and shall take place not 
later than 15 March 1949;
(b) The elections which are to be held for the purpose of choosing representatives to 
an Indonesian constituent assembly should be completed by 1 October 1949;
(c) The transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Government of the Netherlands 
to the United States of Indonesia should tale place at the earliest possible date and in 
any case not later than 1 July 1950;
provided that, if no agreement is reached by one month prior to the respective dates 
referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) above, the Commission referred to in 
paragraph 4 (a) below, or such other United Nations agency as may be established in 
accordance with paragraph 4 (c) below, shall immediately report to the Security 
Council with its recommendations for a solution of the difficulties;
4. Resolves that:
(a) The Committee of good Offices shall henceforth be known as the United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia. The Commission shall act as the representative of the 
Security Council in Indonesia and shall have all o f the functions assigned to the 
Committee of Good Offices by the Security Council since 18 December 1948 and the 
functions conferred on it by the terms of this resolution. The Commission shall act by 
majority vote, but its reports and recommendations to the Security Council shall 
present both majority and minority views if there is a difference of opinion among t le 
members o f the commission;
(b) The Consular Commission is requested to facilitate the work of the United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia by providing military observers and other statt and 
facilities to enable the Commission to carry out its duties under the Counci s 
resolutions 63 (1948) and 65 (1948) of 24 and 28 December 1948 as well as under 
present resolution, and shall temporarily suspend other activities;
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(c) The Commission shall assist the parties in the implementation of this resolution 
and in the negotiations to be undertaken under paragraph 3 above and is authorized to 
make recommendations to them or to the Security Council on matters within its 
competence. Upon agreement being reached in such negotiations, the Commission 
shall make recommendations to the Security Council as to the nature, powers, and 
functions of the United Nations agency which should remain in Indonesia to assist in 
the implementation of the provisions of such agreement until sovereignty is 
transferred by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia;
(d) The Commission shall have authority to consult with representatives of areas in 
Indonesia other than the Republic, and to invite representatives of such areas to 
participate in the negotiations referred to in paragraph 3 above;
(e) The Commission, or such other United Nations agency as may be established in 
accordance with its recommendation under paragraph 4 (c) above, is authorized to 
observe on behalf of the United Nations the elections to e held throughout Indonesia 
and is further authorized in respect of the territories oj Java, Madura and Sumatra, to 
make recommendations regarding the conditions necessary (a) to ensure that the 
elections are free and democratic, and (b) to guarantee freedom of assembly, speech 
and publication at all times, provided that such guarantee is not constructed so as to 
include the advocacy of violence or reprisals;
(f) The Commission should assist assist in achieving the earliest possible restoration 
of the civil administration of the Republic. To this end it shall, after consultation with 
the parties, recommend the extent to which, consistent with reasonable requirements 
o f public security and the protection of life and property, areas controlled by the 
Republic under the Renville Agreement (outside of the Jogjakarta area) should be 
progressively returned to the administration of the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia, and shall supervise such transfers. The recommendations of the 
Commission may include provision for such economic measures as are required for 
the proper functioning of the administration and for the economic well-being of the 
population of the areas involved in such transfers. The Commission shall, after 
consultation with the parties, recommend which, if any, Netherlands forces shall be 
retained temporarily in any area (outside of the Jogjakarta area) in order to assist in 
the maintenance of law and order. If either of the parties fails to accept the 
recommendations of the Commission mentioned in this paragraph, the Commission 
shall report immediately to the Security Council with its further recommendations foi 
a solution of the difficulties;
(g) The Commission shall render periodic reports to the Council, and special reports 
whenever the Commission deems necessary;
(h) The Commission shall employ such observers, officers and other persons as it 
deems necessary;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission such staff, 
funds and other facilities as are required by the Commission for the discharge of its
functions;
6. Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to co­
operate fully in giving effect to the provisions of this resolution.
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[1] The draft resolution was voted on in parts. No vote was taken on the text as a 
whole.
[2] Ibid., Third Year, Special Supplement No. 1, appendices XI, XIII and VIII.
[3] Linggadjati Agreement, between the Government of the Netherlands and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, signed on 25 March 1947.
[4] The proposals were submitted to the Committee of Good Offices on 10 November 
1948 (see Official Records o f the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for  
December 1948, document S/1117/Add. 1, appendix IV.
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Appendix 6: UN Security Council Resolution 86
Adopted by the Security Council at its 503rd meeting, by 10 votes to none, with 1 
abstention (China), on 26 September 1950
The Security Council,
Finds that the Republic of Indonesia is a peace-loving State which fulfils the 
conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, and therefore 
recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Indonesia be admitted to 
membership of the United Nations.
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